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1 Introduction
Curbing climate change, limiting ozone depletion, combating air pollution, halting
ocean degradation, reducing river and lake pollution - a list of various environmental
challenges that could be continued at will. What all these diverse challenges have
in common is the structure of a social dilemma. However, these dilemmas arise on
different scales at the local and global level, which poses specific challenges. In five
related but distinct essays, this thesis examines both global and local social dilemma
situations in order to design institutional mechanisms that successfully address these
challenges. After this introductory chapter, the thesis is structured along three parts
and a schematic overview is provided in Table 1.1.
In a nutshell, Part I addresses aspects of international climate negotiations to testbed
institutions that aim to foster cooperation among sovereign agents at the global level.
Based on a laboratory experiment, Chapter 2 investigates whether groups of sovereign
and heterogeneous agents are able to reach an agreement on how to share the cost of
providing a public good. Relating to this first essay, Chapter 3 captures recent devel-
opments in international climate negotiations by considering pre-existing public good
contribution levels and giving heterogeneous participants the opportunity to increase
contributions to the public good beyond the pre-existing contribution level, maintain
the current level, or even undo efforts. Part II forms the bridge to more localized pub-
lic good problems. Chapter 4 takes into account that local and global public goods
are not necessarily mutually exclusive and analyzes voluntary contributions to public
goods at different spacial levels. To investigate whether individuals’ narrow concerns
for local outcomes can harm efficiency, the online experiment is based on participants
recruited from two neighboring cities in Germany. Part III comprises results of two
experiments focussing on more localized public good problems. Chapter 5 takes into
account that local public good problems have authorities with permissions to inter-
vene and regulate de jure, but de facto costly monitoring and sanctioning can preclude
the emergence of formal and even informal regulations. Based on an artefactual field
experiment in Indonesian fishing communities, it tests the effects of non-enforced ex-
traction limits on extraction behavior in a common-pool resource game. Chapter 6 is
based on a laboratory experiment to test whether democratic participation can be used
to increase compliance with imposed regulations at the local level. I test if, how, and
why the effect of a simple contribution rule in a public goods game depends on how
the rule has been implemented: whether is was democratically chosen or externally
imposed.
Although each chapter is based on a stand-alone working paper or journal article and
thus includes a separate introduction, I want to provide a broader rationale of the re-
1
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Table 1.1: Schematic overview of the thesis
Part Chapter Method
I.
Global Public
Goods
Voting for burden sharing rules in
public goods games
Laboratory
experiment
Ratchet up or down? An
experimental investigation of global
public good provision in the United
Nations Youth Associations Network
Artefactual field
experiment via the
internet
II.
Multi-level
Public Goods
Leveling up? An inter-neighborhood
experiment on parochialism and the
efficiency of multi-level public goods
provision
Artefactual field
experiment via the
internet
III.
Local Public
Goods
Non-binding restrictions,
cooperation, and coral reef
protection: Experimental evidence
from Indonesian fishing communities
Framed field
experiment
Democracy and compliance in public
goods games
Laboratory
experiment
Note: Schematic overview of the conceptual and methodological approach of the thesis.
search conducted in this introductory chapter. I start by giving some background on
social dilemma situations in the realm of environmental and resource economics (Sec-
tion 1.1). Then, I examine various facets of global and local public good problems (Sec-
tion 1.2). In Section 1.3, I outline the methodological approach of the thesis. I discuss
the focus and contribution of this thesis in Section 1.4 and Section 1.5 concludes.
1.1 Social dilemmas in environmental and resource economics
Social dilemmas meet two criteria. First, individuals receive a higher payoff for a so-
cially defecting choice than for a socially cooperative choice, no matter what the other
individuals in society do. Second, all individuals are better off if all cooperate than if
all defect (e.g., Dawes 1980). In the realm of environmental and resource economics,
two polar cases of social dilemmas can be classified: public good and common-pool
resource problems.
Benefits of public goods are non-rival and non-excludable in consumption. Benefits are
non-rival when a unit of the good can be consumed by one individual without redu-
cing the quantity available for consumption by another person. Climate protection, for
instance, gives a non-rival benefit, since people who benefit from mitigating climate
2
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change do not reduce the benefits for others. If the benefits of a good are available to
all once the good is supplied, then the benefits are non-excludable. Climate protection
is also non-excludable because it is impossible to prevent others from benefiting from
mitigating climate change.
The first welfare theorem in economics states that private competitive markets lead
to Pareto efficient allocations, as long as certain conditions are fulfilled (e.g., Debreu
1959). However, the conditions under which markets are efficient are restrictive and
in reality there are many distortions (e.g., Fullerton and Stavins 1998). As analyzed by
Samuelson already in 1954, the important point about public goods is that the private
market generally does not guarantee efficient provision. Non-excludability poses a
free-rider problem because a provider cannot keep non-contributors from consuming
the good’s benefits. Free-riding incentives will prevent individuals from contributing
to a public good because they will get the good’s benefits for free once it is provided by
others and prevent uncoordinated action to meet an efficient allocation (e.g., Bergstrom
et al. 1986; Sandler 1998).
Common-pool resources refer to resource systems in which exclusion of beneficiaries is
impractical and benefits are rival in the sense that every use of the resource has an effect
on others by decreasing the resource left for all others (e.g., Ostrom et al. 1994). As
Bromley (1992) emphasizes, it is the institutional arrangement as much as the resource
itself that gives rise to the common-pool resource problem.1 Open-access resources,
where no property rights have been established and the resource is non-excludable
and open to all, give rise to Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968). It
is rational for resource users to consider marginal revenue and marginal extraction
costs, but to ignore scarcity rents (e.g., Stavins 2011). In the open ocean, for instance,
each fisherman receives the full benefit of fishing and each fisherman’s choices have
an effect on other fishermen. These impacts are not taken into account and drive the
resource stock below the efficient level.
In social dilemmas, individual rationality is not sufficient for collective rationality and
Olson argued already in 1965 that “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to
achieve their common or group interest”(Olson 1965, p. 2). This gives rise to an in-
tense research on designing adequate institutions to overcome these dilemmas (e.g.,
Chaudhuri 2011). However, social dilemmas arise on different scales at the local and
global level, which poses specific challenges (e.g., Sandler 1997). In Section 1.2, I out-
line the specific conditions of social dilemmas at both the global and local level.
1Bromley (1992) distinguishes between four regimes in relation to common-pool resources: state prop-
erty, common property, individual property, and non-property (open-access). Open-access - the ab-
sence of property rights - leads to degradation of the resource. For a detailed discussion of types of
property regimes, see, e.g., Bromley (1992), Feeny et al. (1996), Ostrom et al. (1999).
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Table 1.2: Taxonomy of public good problems in the realm of environmental and re-
source economics
←− Temporal −→
Intragenerational Intergenerational
←−
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
ca
l−
→
Lo
ca
l
Intragenerational
local public goods
Intergenerational
local public goods
Ground water
pollution clean-up
Reduction of acid rain,
depletion of local
ecosystems
G
lo
ba
l
Intragenerational
global public goods
Intergenerational
global public goods
Ocean pollution
clean-up
Limiting ozone
depletion, curbing
climate change
Note: Classification according to the geographical and temporal dimension of public good problems
follows Sandler (1997; 2004). Examples in italics.
1.2 The character of local and global public goods
In order to provide a clear taxonomy, I distinguish between local and global public
goods as well as intra- and intergenerational public goods. A corresponding classific-
ation in the realm of environmental and resource economics is provided in Table 1.2.
Although both public good and common-pool resource problems are social dilemma
situations, they are strategically not equivalent (e.g., Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud
2006). At the global level, however, both pose similar challenges and I follow the lit-
erature (e.g., Kaul et al. 1999; Sandler 2004; Nordhaus 2006) and use the generalizing
label public good problem, knowing that both types of dilemma are distinct.
Global public goods are non-rival and non-excludable and, therefore, qualitatively not
different from other - more local - public goods. However, in term of beneficiaries -
the publicum - global public goods differ. Sandler (1997; 1998; 2004) follows a strict
geographical approach and defines global public goods as those with no geographical
limits of non-rival and non-excludable benefits and, therefore, beneficial to the world
at large. Conversely, this defines local public goods as public goods that deliver non-
rival and non-excludable benefits to a more limited geographical area. In addition,
Nordhaus (2006) emphasizes the temporal dimension of public good problems and
states that the impact of a variety of global public goods depends upon a stock of a
variable that accumulates over time. Depending on the depreciation rate, this could
have long-lasting consequences for many generations. In this sense, intergenerational
4
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public goods, in contrast to intragenerational public goods, provide non-rival and non-
excludable benefits among and within generations (e.g., Sandler 1999).2
Like limiting ozone depletion, curbing climate change is an ideal example of an inter-
generational global public good. Efforts by any agent to mitigate greenhouse gases
limit the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases globally (e.g., Sandler 2004).
Furthermore, the impact of greenhouse gases depends upon the concentration in the
atmosphere. Especially, carbon dioxide, identified to be the main driver of climate
change, has an atmospheric residence time with a half-life in the order of a century or
more and long-lasting consequences affecting future generations (e.g., Nordhaus 2006;
2007). The depletion of ecosystems or acid rain, for instance, are more localized public
good problems. Benefit spillovers from abatement are less far reaching in these cases
and tend to affect multiple generations in a well-defined region (e.g., Sandler 2004).
Further examples of intergenerational local public goods are curbing desertification,
the preservation of wetlands, and the removal of pollutants like lead, and dioxins (e.g.,
Sandler 1997). Other public goods provide either regional or global benefits just for
the current generation. The clean-up of ground water pollution, for example, provides
benefits for the current generation in a well-defined region. The benefits of ocean pol-
lution clean-up, in contrast, affect the current generation on a global level (e.g., Sandler
1997). Undoubtedly, all public good problems pose severe challenges (see Section 1.1).
Market failures and resulting inefficiencies are the largest for global and especially in-
tergenerational global public goods affecting a vast number of people for long periods
of time (e.g., Nordhaus 2006).
Global public goods are not a new phenomenon. Globalization, however, enhances the
transfer of public good spillovers (e.g., Sandler 2004) and global public goods become
more important as a result of technical change and the decline in transportation and
communication costs (e.g., Nordhaus 2006; 2007). Or to put it in the words of Sandler:
“Technology continues to draw the nations of the world closer together and, in doing
so, has created novel forms of global public goods [...] that have diminished somewhat
the relevance of economic decisions at the nation-state level” (Sandler 1998, p.221).
He thereby also emphasizes that global public goods create additional economic and
political challenges since the effect of one country might be very minor for solving
2More nuanced definitions emphasize that the world is not only divided along geographical and tem-
poral lines and that this should be taken into account when defining local and global public goods
(e.g., Kaul et al. 1999). In addition to Sandler (1998) and Nordhaus (2006), Kaul et al. (1999) stress
also a sociological dimension. Following Kaul et al. (1999), a global public good provides non-rival
and non-excludable benefits to more than one geographical region for many generations and it does
not discriminate against any population group. Though it is conceptionally possible to separate the
geographical from the sociological dimension, I abstain from this subdivision since these dimensions
are almost congruent in many examples of application.
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market failures at the global level. Before I provide a detailed discussion of the specific
challenges in the voluntary provision of global and local public goods relevant for this
thesis in Section 1.4, I outline and discuss the methodological approach of the thesis in
Section 1.3.
1.3 Experiments in environmental and resource economics
Carried out within a controlled environment, economic experiments improve our un-
derstanding about how incentives, values, norms, and choices interact. Experiment-
ation has therefore made its transition from a topic to a tool (Samuelson 2005) and
has became another methodological approach within environmental and resource eco-
nomics (e.g., Shogren and Nowell 1992; Shogren and Hurley 1999; Ehmke and Shogren
2009; Sturm and Weimann 2006; Cherry et al. 2008). In the following, I outline on which
experimental techniques and tools this thesis relies on in order to provide new insights
on the voluntary provision of global and local public goods.
1.3.1 A useful tool
In economics experimentation began in earnest during the 1960s with the work of Ver-
non Smith (1962; 1965; 1967).3 In very general terms, (economic) experiments are
defined as controlled data generation processes, in which the most factors which af-
fect behavior are held constant and only one factor of interest is varied at a time (e.g.,
Croson and Gächter 2010). Experiments have a long tradition in environmental and
resource economics4 and experimentation on how to design and implement institu-
tions to foster cooperation in social dilemma situations has been a subject of intense
research since the beginning (e.g., Shogren and Nowell 1992; Kling 2008).5 Following
this tradition, my work relies on experiments for at least three reasons.
First, I use economic experiments as a tool to testbed institutional designs that aim to
foster cooperation in the voluntary provision of public goods both at the global and
more localized level. The purpose of a testbed is to determine if institutions can be
implemented, how they work once they are implemented and which institutions per-
form best (e.g., Plott 1994; Sturm and Weimann 2006; Ehmke and Shogren 2009). One
important asset of economic experiments to testbed institutions is that, in principle,
they provide ceteris paribus observations of incentivized individual economic agents
3Notable exceptions are Chamberlin (1948), Mosteller and Nogee (1951) and Flood (1958).
4For selective surveys of laboratory experiments related to environmental and resource economics, see,
e.g., Sturm and Weimann (2006) and Noussair and van Soest (2014).
5Peter Bohm (e.g., Bohm 1972) as well as Charles Plott (e.g., Plott 1983) provide early examples of using
laboratory experiments to test different mechanisms to voluntarily provide public goods.
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and allow to make causal inferences (e.g., Levitt and List 2007).
Second, in general, experiments are used to test the predictive power of theories and
axioms underlying the theory (e.g., Shogren and Hurley 1999; Sturm and Weimann
2006; Cherry and Dickinson 2008; Ehmke and Shogren 2009). Within the scope of this
thesis, I follow this line of research and use experiments to test the power of hypotheses
on predicted reactions to changes in exogenous parameters.
Third, researchers use experiments to look for behavioral patterns and explore, for
instance, how people reveal their demand and construct preferences and beliefs (e.g.,
Sturm and Weimann 2006; Cherry and Dickinson 2008). In this light, my thesis relies
on experimentation in order to investigate individual preferences, resentments, and
patterns in the voluntary provision of global and local public goods.
Finally - even if this is not directly related to this thesis - I want to briefly mention that
experiments are used as a tool to teach (e.g., Ehmke and Shogren 2009 ).6 Furthermore,
Ehmke and Shogren (2009) highlight that experiments can - in principle - also be used
outside the classroom to inform policy-makers, businesses, and households about how
new policies or regulations work.
1.3.2 Experimental challenges, methods, and techniques
A fundamental question is whether findings from an economic experiment can provide
reliable inference outside the laboratory. Whatever we observe in an experiment might
not be valid and relevant outside the laboratory, since the experimental environment
differs from the world beyond (e.g., Levitt and List 2007). According to Smith’s precept
of parallelism (e.g., Smith 1980; 1982; Plott 1987), it should be possible to conclude that
experimental results apply outside the laboratory if similar ceteris paribus conditions
hold in both cases. However, different factors that systematically vary between the
laboratory and the outside world have been identified to question Smith’s precept of
parallelism and, therefore, the external validity of economic experiments.
First, in a laboratory experiment subjects enter an environment in which they are aware
that their behavior is monitored, recorded, and scrutinized. Such scrutiny can be re-
sponsible for the sense of role obligations of being an experimental subject and the
willingness to reply expectedly, i.e., the experimenter demand effect (e.g., Zizzo 2010),
and exaggerate, for example, pro-social preferences (e.g., Levitt and List 2007). Second,
the context in experimental settings influences subjects’ behavior and factors beyond
the experimenter control may cause subjects not to play the game that the experimenter
6Bergstrom and Miller (2000) present a set of experiments to teach microeconomic principles. Fol-
lowing this line, Giamattei and Lambsdorff (2015) provide with classEx a web-based ready-made
software tool to carry out experiments in the classroom.
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has in mind (e.g., Hertwig and Ortmann 2001; Levitt and List 2007). Third, the exper-
imenter creates and restricts a set of actions a subject is allowed to take and defines
the temporal aspect of a task. In naturally occurring environments, in contrast, the
choices are often unlimited and one should take into account that identical preferences
might be expressed in different ways in and outside the laboratory due to different
options (e.g., Levitt and List 2007). Fourth, Henrich et al. (2010), for instance, point out
that experiments are largely based on students recruited from western, educated, in-
dustrialized, rich, and democratic societies who self-select into the experiments. Since
subjects in an experiment differ systematically from agents in many situations outside
the laboratory, potential subject pool biases are likely to question the generalizability
of experimental results (e.g., Levitt and List 2007; Henrich et al. 2010). Fifth, Levitt and
List (2007) highlight the differences between low stake laboratory experiments and the
world beyond. However, they also point out that large increases in stakes do not ne-
cessarily lead to proportional changes in participants’ decisions and that it is, thus,
important to adequately adjust for differences in stakes across settings when general-
izing results.
In order to address these factors, three different types of experiments are employed in
this thesis. According to the nomenclature of Harrison and List (2004), laboratory exper-
iments - as experiments that employ a standard subject pool of students and an abstract
framing - are the basis for the work in my thesis. In order to reach greater applicability
of the results, parts of the thesis are based on participants from non-standard subject
pools recruited in the field rather than in the classroom for participation in artefactual
field experiments. Finally, a framed field experiment is conducted with participants from a
non-standard subject pool using field context rather than abstract terminologies.7
A further distinction can be made between the technologies how economic experi-
ments are conducted. The first economic experiments relied on very basic tools. Pa-
per, pencils, blackboards, and posters have been used to explain instructions as well
as to capture and process participants’ decisions (e.g., Kagel and Roth 1995). In the
1990s, tools for conducting experiments via local computer networks were developed
and became the primary tool of conducting laboratory experiments (e.g., Horton et al.
2011).8 Computer-mediated experiments made it easier to conduct interactive exper-
7Natural field experiments are defined the same way as framed field experiments but the environment is
one where the subjects naturally undertake these tasks and where the subjects do not know that
they are in an experiment. As the focus of the thesis is on laboratory, artefactual, and framed field
experiments rather than natural field experiments, I abstain from a discussion of field experiments.
For an overview of field experiments and randomized control trials in environmental and resource
economics, see, e.g., List and Price (2016).
8Most prominently, Urs Fischbacher provided with z-Tree a software package for conducting and de-
veloping computer-mediated experiments via local computer networks (Fischbacher 2007).
8
Introduction
iments, collect data, and also increase control over the flow of information. By now
researchers have developed tools to get around local computer networks and get past
physical laboratories with all their limitations and restrictions. In this line, parts of this
thesis contributes to the growing literature in economics postulating an online laboratory
(Bainbridge 2007) by conducting experiments via the internet to overcome limitations
of laboratory experiments and get access to non-standard subject pools and combine
participants from a variety of different countries.
Experiments conducted via the internet are a subject of intense discussion and some
of their greatest advantages can be summarized as follows:9 First, running experi-
ments via the internet provides the opportunity to reach more diverse subject pools in
terms of education, profession, age etc. (e.g., Hergueux and Jacquemet 2015). Second,
via the internet it is possible to increase anonymity, for instance by inducing “double
blindness” between experimenter and subject (e.g., Eckel and Wilson 2006). Third,
without the physical limitations of laboratories, it is possible to run experiments sim-
ultaneously or asynchronously with a large number of participants (e.g., Reips 2002).
Fourth, using the internet makes it possible to run experiments at different sites which
provides the opportunity of comparing and combining decisions across countries and
cultures (e.g., Eckel and Wilson 2006).
However, there are requirements of economic experiments that create methodological
and practical problems for the online laboratory. Following Eckel and Wilson (2006)
as well as Horton et al. (2011), methodological aspects of online experiments that chal-
lenge experiments’ internal validity are diverse: It is difficult to monitor the identity of
participants; participants may read instructions carelessly, make decisions too quickly,
or may be distracted; participants may not believe that there are other subjects in-
volved in the experiment, that the experiment is conducted as described in the instruc-
tions, and that they are going to be paid; participants may exhibit a lack of trust toward
others on the internet; and participants may selectively drop out of the experiment.
Further practical problems include the logistics of recruiting and paying participants
as well as restrictions to the experimental design. While the implementation of one-
shot experiments is straightforward, repeated games require a substantial technical
effort (e.g., Horton et al. 2011).
Comparative studies on experiments conducted both in the laboratory and online find
that if these challenges are adequately considered within the design of online exper-
iments, then there is strong parallelism between individuals’ behavior in these two
types of experiments. Consequently, online experiments can be just as valid as labor-
9See, e.g., Anderhub et al. 2001; Reips 2002; Shavit et al. 2001; Eckel and Wilson 2006; Charness et al.
2007; Horton et al. 2011; Hergueux and Jacquemet 2015 for discussions of methodological aspects of
online experiments.
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atory experiments (e.g., Horton et al. 2011; Hergueux and Jacquemet 2015).
1.4 Focus and contribution of the thesis
The overall objective of my thesis is to study the voluntary provision of global and local
public goods in order to design and testbed institutions that aim at addressing these
challenges. Against the conceptual and methodological approach outlined in Sections
1.2 and 1.3, five different experiments were conducted, which are structured along
three parts (see Table 1.1). In the following, I will discuss the most relevant challenges
in the provision of global and local public goods for this thesis and its corresponding
contribution in greater detail.
Part I The first part of the thesis presents results of two experiments on different
challenges in the voluntary provision of global public goods. Both Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3 address two specific aspects of international climate negotiations to test-
bed institutions that aim to foster cooperation among sovereign agents to halt climate
change.
First, a fundamental challenge in providing global public goods is that it requires
global collective action (e.g., Sandler 2004). This leads to what William Nordhaus
refers to as the Westphalian dilemma (e.g., Nordhaus 2006).10 On the global stage, the
crux is that there is no jurisdictional control through a central authority with enforce-
ment capacities comparable to those of a national government within the nation-state
(e.g., Barrett 1990; Sandler 2004; Nordhaus 2007; 2015). Consequently, the voluntary
provision of public goods becomes the decisive field of research on how to overcome
collective action problems without a central authority with corresponding enforcement
capacities (e.g., Löschel and Rübbelke 2014; Noussair and van Soest 2014; Nyborg et al.
2016). This immediately gives rise to the question whether groups of sovereign indi-
viduals are able to set themselves institutions in social dilemma situations. The first
experiment that allows sovereign individuals to collectively set up an institution to
solve a social dilemma situation is Ostrom et al. (1992). They find that around half of
their participants implement a decentralized peer-to-peer punishment scheme, if they
have the chance, and that efficiency levels are higher, if the institution is adopted than
10Following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the system of sovereign states established the central
principles of modern international law. States are sovereign and have the fundamental right of polit-
ical self-determination, they are legally equal, and are free to manage their internal affairs without
interventions of other states (e.g., Kaul et al. 1999; Nordhaus 2015). Consequently, international ob-
ligations may be imposed on a sovereign state only with its consent. The requirement of reaching
unanimity makes it considerably more difficult to reach universal and binding international agree-
ments (e.g., Nordhaus 2006).
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if groups fail to adopt the institution. Further experiments suggest that groups are also
able to voluntarily impose centralized institutions, i.e., rules specifying what penalties
will be imposed under what conditions, and set up a body that observes rule viola-
tions and imposes penalties (e.g., Feld and Tyran 2002; Tyran and Feld 2006; Dal Bó
et al. 2010). Results by Markusson et al. (2013) and Kamei et al. (2015) suggest that
individuals prefer decentralized compared to centralized schemes. Individuals also
tend to choose reward over punishment schemes (e.g., Sutter et al. 2010) and prefer to
sanction below rather than above average cooperators (e.g., Noussair and Tan 2011).
However, within the literature on endogenous institutions in social dilemmas, hetero-
geneities between agents, which are a major source of controversies in international
climate negotiations, remain sparsely studied. Margreiter et al. (2005) and Noussair
and Tan (2011) are notable exceptions and suggest that heterogeneity among group
members confounds coordination on an institutional scheme.
Chapter 2 contributes to this literature by investigating whether groups of heterogen-
eous agents, differing in their initial endowment, reach an agreement on how to share
the costs of providing a public good. Against the background of international climate
negotiations, we consider a set of three different burden sharing rules: equal contribu-
tions from all group members to the public good, equal payoffs for all group members,
and contributions to the public good that are proportional to participants’ endowment.
We use a laboratory experiment to provide participants with the opportunity to choose
between these burden sharing rules and impose the rules also exogenously as controls.
Despite the fact that preferences for the burden sharing rules differ among participants,
we find that most groups manage to agree upon a common scheme and successfully
avoid an uncoordinated action. Furthermore, our results reveal both opportunities and
risks of burden sharing negotiations. Average efficiency levels increase, if agents reach
an agreement on how to share the cost. However, average efficiency levels decrease
and are below an externally imposed voluntary contribution mechanism, if agents fail
to reach an agreement.
Second, another aspect of global collective action and the provision of global public
goods is that it requires transboundary cooperation (e.g., Sandler 2004). This could
be especially demanding since a variety of experiments show that cooperation beha-
vior substantially differs across countries (e.g., Weimann 1994; Burlando and Hey 1997;
Henrich et al. 2001; Henrich et al. 2006; Herrmann et al. 2008). These results come from
running the same experiment in a number of different countries and then comparing
the results across locations. Herrmann et al. (2008), for instance, investigate the ef-
fect of costly punishment in public good games conducted in 16 subject pools around
the world. They find that some subject pools punish above average contributors as
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much as below average contributors. In some subject pools, this antisocial punish-
ment is strong enough to erode the cooperation enhancing effect of decentralized pun-
ishment. These papers provide valuable insights, but it is not clear if evidence from
intranational comparisons can be extrapolated for international concerns (e.g., Adler
and Graham 1989; Chuah et al. 2007). Yet, there have been only a few published studies
that experimentally investigate international social dilemma situations. They provide
mixed results. Castro (2008) as well as Matsumoto and Hwang (2011), for example, find
that mixing groups leads to less cooperative behavior. Carpenter and Cardenas (2011)
conducted an international common-pool resource experiment with participants from
Columbia and the US. They show that mixing groups leads to a decrease in extrac-
tions by American participants, but to an increase in extraction choices by Colombian
participants. Based on prisoner’s dilemma with Australian and Japanese participants,
Yamagishi et al. (2005) find that participants from Australia and Japan cooperate more
in international than in intranational groups. A crucial feature of international climate
negotiations is that they need to cover a variety of different countries and regions. So
far, only participants from up to six countries have been combined in experiments on
international social dilemmas. The international public goods experiment by Buchan
et al. (2009) is based on a sample of participants from Argentina, Iran, Italy, Russia,
South Africa, and the United States. Brick and Visser (2015) investigate the percep-
tion of different burden sharing rules in a threshold public good game drawing on a
sample of participants from the United States, the European Union, China, India and
South Africa. They report evidence of self-interested use of burden sharing rules only
among participants from China and the United States.
In Chapter 3, we capture important heterogeneities and varieties in global public good
problems by collaborating with the United Nation Youth Associations Network (UN-
YANET) and establishing an international subject pool with more than 130 participants
from more than 50 countries. By conducting an artefactual field experiment via the in-
ternet we enabled individuals from different countries to participate in the experiment.
To address wealth heterogeneity among parties in international climate negotiations,
participants from developed and developing countries make decisions on high and
low endowments, respectively. Furthermore, the experiment addresses recent devel-
opments in international climate negotiations by capturing pre-existing public good
contribution levels and giving participants the opportunity to increase contributions to
the public good beyond the pre-existing contribution level, maintain the current level,
or even undo efforts. We find that reducing pre-existing contributions by taking some-
thing out of the public good appears to be a strong behavioral barrier. Consequently,
public good provision levels are higher when starting with an intermediate provision
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level compared to a pure giving frame.
Part II To build a bridge to the analysis of more localized public goods, the second
part of the thesis takes into account that local and global public goods are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive. In many cases local and global public goods are interre-
lated by joint provision benefits. Reducing multi-level air pollutants like tropospheric
ozone, for instance, causes interrelated effects varying from local health benefits to
global climate stability (e.g., Shindell et al., 2012). In other cases, local and global pub-
lic goods do co-exist and individuals have to decide not just whether to contribute,
but also how much to contribute to which type of good. Cornes and Sandler (1984)
provide first theoretical insights on interdependent public goods with benefits linked
on multiple levels. This simultaneity of local and global public goods gives rise to
an increasing number of experiments on voluntary contributions in multi-level pub-
lic good games (e.g., Wachsman 2002; Wit and Kerr 2002; Blackwell and McKee 2003;
Buchan et al. 2009; Güth and Sääksvuori 2012; Fellner and Lünser 2014; Beekman et al.
2017; Chakravarty and Fonseca 2017). These experiments suggest a tendency towards
contributing to the local public good, if the social returns of the local and global public
good are equal (e.g., Blackwell and McKee 2003; Fellner and Lünser 2014; Chakrav-
arty and Fonseca 2017). Furthermore, they report that the most efficient public good
attracts voluntary contributions (e.g., Blackwell and McKee 2003; Fellner and Lünser
2014). Based on an international subject pool Buchan et al. (2009) show that the in-
dividual as well as country level of globalization increases individuals’ propensity to
contribute to the global public good. In this line, social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel and
Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1979) and experiments on in-group favoritism (e.g., Chen
and Li 2009) give rise to the question whether individual resentments can affect con-
tribution behavior in multi-level public good games.
Chapter 4 is based on an artefactual field experiment conducted via the internet in or-
der to test whether individual’s local identity and narrow concern for local outcomes
(parochialism) can harm efficiency in a setting where different public goods co-exist
and can be provided at different spatial levels. In order to conduct the experiment in a
setting conducive to parochial behavior, we recruit more than 600 citizens of two neigh-
boring cities in Germany. In our inter-neighborhood intra-region design, participants
allocate an endowment between a personal account, a local public good account, and
a regional public good account. The experimental design varies across two dimen-
sions: whether participants learn that the small group contains only members of the
participant’s own neighborhood or not and the relative productivity of the local and
regional public good. By comparing groups in which participants were or were not
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aware that the small group consisted of their local neighbors, we find that both groups
increased their contributions to the regional public good as the marginal return of the
regional public good is increased. Importantly, this increase is not statistically smaller
in the group where neighborhood attachment was made salient. In other words, we
find evidence for parochialism, but parochialism does not interfere with efficiency.
Part III The third part presents results of two experiments which address different
challenges in the provision of more localized public goods.
First, although the provision of local public goods is perceived as less problematic (e.g.,
Nordhaus 2006), it nevertheless poses severe challenges. In contrast to global public
goods, more localized social dilemmas often do have de jure authorities with respect-
ive permissions to intervene and regulate, but de facto authorities can either be ig-
norant or lack the resources needed to monitor, sanction, and enforce interventions
(e.g., Feeny et al. 1996; Kroll et al. 2007). Even if authorities with respective enforce-
ment capacities exist on paper, the outcome of many local public good problems is
more likely to confirm predictions of a regime without any formal institutional frame-
work (e.g., Ostrom et al. 1994). Cardenas and Carpenter (2008), for instance, highlight
that especially communities in developing countries rely on informal local norms and
rules to provide local public goods and regulate common-pool resources. Evidence
from the field illustrates the likelihood of many failures, and some notable successes
of self-organized small scale local social dilemma situations underline the importance
of informal institutions to solve social dilemma situations in the absence of central au-
thorities (e.g., Ostrom 1990). However, monitoring and sanctioning costs could even
hamper the emergence of informal institutions which aim at fostering cooperation.
Chapter 5 takes into account that costly monitoring and sanctioning can preclude the
emergence of centralized and even decentralized institutions to preserve coral reef fish-
eries in Indonesia. Coral reef protection in Indonesia is an ideal example of a local pub-
lic good with de jure competences of the Indonesian government to regulate fisheries,
but de facto the government lacks capacities to actually monitor and sanction. The ex-
periment relies on an extension of a standard common-pool resource game in order to
explore the potential of different management approaches to reduce overfishing. We
conduct an artefactual framed field experiment on the effect of non-enforced extraction
limits in Indonesian fishing communities. We explore whether individual extraction
decisions vary according to three non-binding recommended extraction levels origin-
ating from a democratic process, a group leader, or an external authority. We find
a strong effect of the external treatment, a weaker effect of the democratic treatment
and no effect of the leadership treatment. Closer inspection reveals that the results are
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driven by one of the three sites where the experiment was conducted – that having
the highest levels of ethnic and religious diversity. The absence of effects in two of
the three sites suggests that a non-binding recommendation may often be insufficient
in promoting the cooperative behavior that underpins contemporary approaches to
managing coral reefs, and most importantly, underlines the importance of designing
institutions and evaluating effects on a community-by-community basis.
Second, the idea that democratic participation may affect how individuals will respond
to policies has a long tradition. Already in 1839 de Tocqueville wrote: “It is not always
feasible to consult the whole people, either directly or indirectly, in the formation of
the law; but it cannot be denied that, when such a measure is possible, the authority
of the law is much augmented.” (de Tocqueville 1838, p. 228). In this line, a series of
laboratory experiments on endogenous institutions in social dilemma situations tend
to find support for a democracy premium. Decentralized (e.g., Sutter et al. 2010; Markus-
son et al. 2013; Kamei et al. 2015) as well as centralized (e.g., Feld and Tyran 2002;
Tyran and Feld 2006) punishment institutions seem to be more effective in increasing
contributions to a public good in case they are endogenously chosen than if they are
externally imposed. This gives rise to the idea that local authorities with respective en-
forcement capacities may abstain from top-down regulations and use participation in
order to increase compliance. Dal Bó et al. (2010) identify and quantify different drivers
of the effect of democratic participation and conclude that a deterrent policy is more
likely to be respected if it is democratically chosen than externally given. Since many
interactions in real life related to cooperation are subject to non-deterrent policies (e.g.,
Ostrom 1990; Kroll et al. 2007), it remains an important and as yet unanswered ques-
tion whether the findings by Dal Bó et al. (2010) can be extrapolated into a setting with
a non-deterrent intervention and whether participation improves agents’ willingness
to follow rules although they face incentives not to do so.
In Chapter 6, I combine the key design elements of Tyran and Feld (2006) and Dal Bó
et al. (2010) in order to test if, how, and why the effect of a non-deterrent contribution
rule in a public goods game depends on how the rule has been implemented: demo-
cratically chosen or externally imposed. The rule prescribes full contributions to a pub-
lic good and is backed by a weak and non-deterrent sanction for those participants who
do not comply. I complement the existing literature on endogenous institutions in so-
cial dilemma games, by using a randomization strategy in order to investigate to what
extent the effect of democratic participation is driven by self-selection into the rule,
information transmitted via voting, and democracy per se. I find that contributions
to the public good are significantly higher if the rule is democratically chosen than if
it is democratically rejected. By contrast, when treatments are exogenously given, the
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contribution rule has no effect. A naive comparison suggests that the contribution rule
is more effective, if it is democratically chosen than externally imposed. However, my
decomposition reveals that this difference is not directly attributed to democratic par-
ticipation. Democratic participation does not affect participants’ contribution behavior
if I take into account self-selection into treatments and the information transmitted by
revealing the outcome of the referendum.
1.5 General lessons
What are the general lessons of these five essays with regard to designing institutions
that aim at fostering the voluntary provision of public goods both at the global and
more localized level?
Experiments in Part I of the thesis are devoted to the provision of global public goods
absent jurisdictional control through a central authority and within the context of in-
ternational climate negotiations. Even if the experimental results cannot be transferred
one-to-one to the real world, Chapter 2 reveals both opportunities and risks of inter-
national climate negotiations. It shows that sovereign and heterogeneous agents are
able to reach an agreement on how to share the costs of providing a public good. Fur-
thermore it shows that cooperation increases, if an agreement is reached. However,
if agents fail to reach an agreement, cooperation collapses. Thus, Chapter 2 emphas-
izes the importance of small steps in the process of international climate negotiations
in order to avoid that negotiations fail. Relating to this, the online experiment con-
ducted among the international members of the United Nations Youth Associations
Networks in Chapter 3 underlines the importance of a status-quo within the process
of international climate negotiations. The results reveal that reducing the public good
by undoing what has been already achieved appears to be a strong behavioral bar-
rier. This finding provides support for the pledge and review process within the Paris
Agreement. Even though Nationally Determined Contributions are, from a current
perspective, not sufficient to limit global warming to below 2°C above pre-industrial
level as intended and absent a central authority with respective enforcement capacities
that precludes a downward revision of national targets.
Part II of the thesis shows that individuals’ narrow concerns for local outcomes do not
harm efficiency in a setting where different public goods co-exist and can be provided
at different spatial levels. It indicates that a higher efficiency of the higher level public
good is associated with increasing contributions and that this is irrespective of whether
agents’ local attachment was made salient or not. The implications of the experiment
are relevant to policy as they give an indication that naturally grown types of local
identity play a considerable role in individuals’ cooperation behavior, but does not
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necessarily imply a penalty on efficiency in a situation in which public goods can be
provided simultaneously at different spatial levels.
Having said this, what can we learn from the experiments in Part III dedicated to more
localized public good problems? Chapters 5 and 6 come to the conclusion that par-
ticipatory processes have a rather limited effect in fostering cooperation in local so-
cial dilemma situations. The framed field experiment conducted in Indonesian fishing
communities presented in Chapter 5 does not support the hypothesis that participat-
ory processes in general reduce individual extractions from a common-pool resource.
It shows only a weak effect of non-binding recommendations originating from a demo-
cratic process and finds that recommendations from a group leader have no effect on
individual extraction decisions. Further inspections reveal that the results are driven
by one of the three sites where the experiment was conducted. The experimental res-
ults underline that institutions and evaluations must be made on a case-by-case basis,
even in a rather localized setting with seemingly similar conditions. Within a laborat-
ory experiment, it is shown in Chapter 6 that the effect of a non-deterrent contribution
rule is more effective in increasing public good provision levels if treatments are demo-
cratically chosen than if they are externally imposed. However, the experiment reveals
that this difference is not directly attributed to democratic participation. It shows that
the effect is a conglomerate of different sub-effects of participation, especially the effect
of self-selection into the intervention and of the information transmitted by voting, and
that participation does not affect agents’ contribution decisions per se. Thus, Chapter
6 does not support the hypothesis that democratic participation directly affect how in-
dividuals respond to policies and can be used as an instrument to increase individuals’
willingness to comply with non-deterrent policies.
This introductory chapter provided an overview of the broader rationale of the re-
search conducted in this thesis in order to motivate the specific research questions ad-
dressed, to outline the scientific contributions, and to draw some general lessons. The
detailed literature reviews, explanations, and analyses are provided in the following
chapters.
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games
This chapter has been published as:
Gallier, C., M. Kesternich and B. Sturm (2017). Voting for burden sharing rules in
public goods games. Environmental and Resource Economics 67, 535-557.
This article can be downloaded via
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-016-0022-6
Abstract: We experimentally investigate whether groups of heterogeneous agents can
reach an agreement on how to share the costs of providing a public good. Thereby, we
explore the performance of different burden sharing rules being implemented either
endogenously or exogenously. In case of an endogenously implemented burden shar-
ing rule, subjects vote for different burden sharing schemes either by unanimity or ma-
jority vote. Despite the fact that preferences for the allocation schemes differ among
agents, most groups agree upon a common scheme, and consequently avoid an unco-
ordinated action. Our results reveal both the opportunities and risks of burden shar-
ing negotiations. We find average efficiency levels to increase in case an agreement is
reached. If groups however fail to agree upon a common rule, cooperation collapses
and efficiency levels decrease compared to a voluntary contribution mechanism being
exogenously imposed. Most importantly, agents who face a voting decision on average
receive higher payoffs than agents in an exogenously implemented voluntary contri-
bution mechanism and do not earn less than participants in any externally determined
burden sharing rule.
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2.1 Introduction
Inducing contributions to public goods remains an important endeavor and is partic-
ularly demanding when sovereign agents have different interests due to heterogen-
eous preferences. Free riding incentives prevent the voluntary provision of a public
good and every institutional design which aims at countervailing free riding has to
address the question of a fair distribution of the costs and benefits from providing
public goods. The experimental literature suggests rule-based contribution schemes
which are inspired by different fairness norms as being effective in enhancing cooper-
ation (e.g., Orzen 2008; Dannenberg et al. 2014; Kesternich et al. 2014; 2017). In such a
scheme, agents have to agree upon a common group provision level of the public good
by knowing that the associated costs are distributed among the agents according to an
exogenously predetermined burden sharing rule.
While the previous papers devoted to this issue show that exogenously imposed bur-
den sharing rules are able to increase efficiency levels in contrast to a voluntary con-
tribution mechanism (VCM), we argue that the external implementation of a certain
burden sharing scheme is rarely a feasible or desirable option due to sovereign agents.
As an important example, in most international negotiations parties have to volun-
tarily agree upon a joint decision. Regarding international climate negotiations as an
important application, a variety of rules for carbon emissions reductions among parti-
cipating countries is conceivable and it constitutes a major challenge for participants to
agree upon a common rule (e.g., Lange et al. 2007; 2010; Kesternich et al. 2014). Burden
sharing rules being currently discussed within international climate policy are inspired
by different fairness norms. These fairness norms comprise, for instance, sovereignty,
calling for equal contributions from all agents (e.g., equal percentage reductions of
emissions), or need, which implies relatively low obligations for developing countries
and economies in transition and consequently shifts the burden towards agents with
substantial economic capacity (e.g., Johansson-Stenman and Konow 2010). In most in-
ternational negotiations, the consensus principle serves as the primary decision mak-
ing tool. Even though the term consensus does not necessarily equal unanimity but is
rather defined as “the absence of any formal objection” (e.g., Schwarte 2011) in many
conventions, it is often claimed that a consensus enables one single party to block and
delay decisions. Therefore, ongoing debates in international climate negotiations on
possible changes in the decision-making process include calls for a supranational au-
thority or an international framework being able to enforce the distribution of global
mitigation efforts, for instance, through adjusting the consensus principle by establish-
ing some form of majority voting (e.g., Vogel 2014). Also in the management of local
commons like irrigation systems, different rules that regulate the distribution of costs
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and benefits of cooperation among group members are subject to discussions. Ostrom
(1990) demonstrates that governing schemes which are characterized by rules that dis-
tribute costs and benefits equivalently lead to comparatively high cooperation levels.
Even in case of local public goods where enforcement problems appear less severe, an
agenda-setter such as a local government may give agents the opportunity to agree
on a contribution scheme by themselves instead of determining the burden sharing
exogenously.
Our experimental design enables us to analyze the performance of different burden
sharing rules being endogenously implemented by the participating agents themselves,
both to an exogenously given VCM and to a setting where allocation schemes are pre-
determined by an agenda setter. We thereby apply a design with players differing in
their initial endowments which, based on our previous findings, creates substantial
tensions in the different rule-based contribution schemes (Kesternich et al. 2017). In
particular, we investigate whether (i) sovereign and heterogeneous agents are able to
agree upon a joint burden sharing rule, whether (ii) agreement formation does affect
contribution behavior, and whether (iii) efficiency gains from exogenously implemen-
ted schemes persist in a setting with endogenously induced institutions.
Our three-player repeated public goods game is implemented either as a Single- or as a
Multi-Phase Game. Subjects in the Multi-Phase Game play a collective-choice and a con-
tribution phase. In the collective-choice phase, subjects vote for a joint burden sharing
rule in a repeated voting decision. In order to acknowledge different levels of sover-
eignty, we implement either unanimity or majority vote. Furthermore, we consider
three different burden sharing rules: equal contributions from all group members to
the public good (eqcont), equal payoffs among all group members (eqpay), and contri-
butions to the public good that are proportional to the participants’ initial endowment
(propcont). If a burden sharing rule obtains a sufficient majority in the collective-choice
phase, it is implemented in the contribution phase. In case a sufficient majority cannot
be reached after three voting rounds, the agreement formation has failed and subjects
end up in a VCM. In the Single-Phase Game, subjects only play the contribution phase
and make their contributions to the public good according to a burden sharing scheme
being exogenously predetermined. In our experimental setting, all rule-based con-
tribution schemes are based on the principle of “the smallest common denominator”
which ensures veto power for all negotiating parties and comprises two steps: First,
all agents can propose a minimum group contribution level to the public good. Then,
the minimum of all proposals is selected and allocated among subjects according to a
(predefined) burden sharing rule.
Our findings indicate that most groups agree upon a common scheme, and consequently
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avoid an uncoordinated action, given that preferences for the allocation schemes differ
among agents. The results reveal both the opportunities and risks for burden sharing
negotiations. In case an agreement is reached we find that average efficiency levels
increase compared to an externally implemented VCM. If groups however fail to agree
upon a common rule, cooperation collapses and efficiency levels decrease compared
to a VCM being exogenously imposed. Most importantly, we observe that it is benefi-
cial to provide endogenous institution formation on a joint burden sharing agreement
at the aggregate level, i.e., including both groups that reach a consensus upon a joint
burden sharing rule and groups that fail to agree upon a common scheme. On aver-
age, agents who face a voting decision receive higher payoffs than participants in the
external implemented VCM.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides an overview
of the related literature. Section 2.3 describes the experimental design and derives our
theoretical predictions. We present the experimental results in Section 2.4 and Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
As soon as the provision of public goods involves heterogeneous agents, any volun-
tary contribution mechanism has to cope with burden sharing issues. By summarizing
the literature on contribution patterns in heterogeneous public goods games, Ledyard
(1995) and Zelmer (2003) reveal that heterogeneity lowers average contribution rates
in public goods experiments. Fisher et al. (1995) find evidence that players with high
marginal per capita returns contribute less in heterogeneous groups with agents re-
ceiving low benefits from the public good compared to a homogeneous setting. Tan
(2008) reports that heterogeneity with respect to contribution costs lowers cooperative
behavior. Ambiguous effects have been shown with respect to the effect of inequal-
ity of initial endowments, indicating both negative (e.g., Anderson et al. 2008; Cherry
et al. 2005; van Dijk et al. 2002) and potential positive effects (e.g., Chan et al. 1996;
1999). Georgantzis and Proestakis (2011) show positive impacts of heterogeneity in lab
endowments on contribution levels, at least as long as subjects are not aware of the
real wealth inequality of the group members. By tying contribution behavior to so-
cial norms based on different fairness principles, Reuben and Riedl (2013) reveal that
players contribute proportionally to their endowments if punishment is allowed in a
setting with endowment heterogeneity.
There are two additional strands of experimental literature which are particularly im-
portant for our research questions. Recent papers study the effect of rule-based contri-
bution schemes on the voluntary provision of public goods. In such allocation schemes,
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players first agree upon a common group provision level of a public good which is
based on a minimum contribution mechanism. The associated costs for providing the
public good are then distributed among players according to a specific predetermined
burden sharing rule. Orzen (2008) and Dannenberg et al. (2014) show the benefits
of this contribution mechanism for groups of homogeneous players in contrast to a
VCM. When players are identical, there is only one fair sharing norm which assigns
the same burden to all agents. In contrast, different burden sharing rules - inspired
by different fairness norms - may seem plausible as soon as agents are heterogeneous.
Remarkably, a burden sharing rule that aims at equalizing payoffs leads to substantial
cooperation gains for providing a public good that generates heterogeneous benefits to
agents (Kesternich et al. 2014). Further experimental investigation, however, indicates
that efficiency gains from these rule-based contribution schemes are limited in case of
endowment heterogeneity and that the perception on various contribution norms is
sensitive to the circumstances under which the different positions accrued (Kesternich
et al. 2017). In all these experiments, the different allocation rules are exogenously
imposed instead of being endogenously determined by the group itself. An external
implementation is rarely a feasible option among sovereign agents, e.g., for the provi-
sion of international public goods, and moreover may not be desirable in many cases.
Our experimental design is tied to a growing number of experiments on the emer-
gence and effects of endogenous institutions in social dilemma situations. An import-
ant challenge always remains whether or not institutions can emerge endogenously
within groups of sovereign agents with conflicting interests. For instance, Plott and
Levine (1978) as well as Hoffman and Plott (1983) have already studied how agents
with opposing interests form agreements, and they emphasize that particular proced-
ures which limit or favor the accumulation of information are at least as important as
the structure of preferences in determining outcomes. Experimental studies show that
sanctioning or rewarding mechanisms are successfully formed in public good games
and that this also affect the behavior of the respective agents (e.g., Sutter et al. 2010;
Gürerk et al. 2014). Thus, the leading question concerning the effect of endogenously
implemented institutions covers important aspects of procedural fairness: Individuals
do not only care about outcomes, but also pay attention to the conditions and processes
leading to these outcomes (e.g., Frey et al. 2004; Frey and Stutzer 2005). Many experi-
ments focusing on the impact of endogenously implemented institutions on coopera-
tion behavior tend to find a democratic premium: Democratically implemented institu-
tions lead to more cooperative behavior when compared to the same institutions being
implemented exogenously (e.g., Grimm and Mengel 2009; Sutter et al. 2010; Dal Bó
et al. 2010; Gürerk et al. 2014). Dal Bó et al. (2010) attribute this observation to both
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a self-selection and a democracy effect. While players who vote for a certain institu-
tion may differ from those who oppose it (self-selection effect), the democracy effect
disentangles potential differences in the decision behavior between endogenously or
exogenously determined settings. In the same manner, empirical studies indicate that
stronger direct democratic participation rights are associated with an increase in co-
operation and a decrease in, for instance, tax evasion (e.g., Pommerehne and Weck-
Hannemann 1996; Frey 1998).
2.3 Experimental design and theoretical predictions
Participants in the Multi-Phase Game play a collective-choice and a contribution phase.
In the collective-choice phase, subjects themselves determine the contribution scheme
to be implemented in the contribution phase. Participants in the Single-Phase Game
play only the contribution phase whereby the different contribution schemes are exo-
genously given.
2.3.1 Single-Phase Game
In the Single-Phase Game, the contribution phase contains one of four different alloc-
ation rules: three rule-based contribution schemes (eqcont, eqpay, and propcont) and a
standard voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). In all contribution schemes, the
payoff to player i, pii, is determined by a linear public goods game and given by
pii = ei − qi + bQ
where ei marks the initial endowment, qi the individual contribution to the public
good, b the marginal per capita return from the public good for player i, and Q =
∑nj=1 qj the aggregated provision level. Players differ with respect to their initial en-
dowment. Each group of n = 3 players consists of one “low-type” player (type20)
with an initial endowment of etype20 = 20, one “middle-type” player (type30) with
etype30 = 30, and one “high-type” player (type40) with etype40 = 40. Thus, there is a
total group endowment of E = ∑nj=1 ej = 90. The endowment as well as contribution
levels and payoffs are expressed in LabDollar (LD). Finally, we assume the marginal
benefit from the public good to be b = 0.6 and the marginal costs for investing into the
public good to be equal to one.
In the baseline (VCM), agents simultaneously determine their individual contributions
to the public good qi. Since their marginal costs from investing into the public good
exceed their individual benefits, standard theory predicts full free riding and zero con-
tributions for all players and individual payoffs of pii = ei ∀i.
23
Voting for burden sharing rules in public goods games
Our rule-based contribution schemes comprise two stages: In the first stage, the min-
imum stage, all players simultaneously suggest a minimum group provision level
Qmini ∈ [0, 90].11 The smallest suggested proposal consequently determines the lower
bound for aggregated contributions to the public good in the second stage, i.e., Qmin =
minj∈SQminj where S is the set of players in a group. In the individual contribution
stage, the minimum individual contribution level, qmini , is derived from the binding
group minimum provision level, Qmin, according to a specific burden sharing rule,
i.e., qmini (Q
min), whereby subjects have to contribute at least the minimum contribu-
tion level qmin, i.e., qi ≥ qmini . However, players can exceed these minimum require-
ments and voluntarily contribute more. We cover three different rule-based contribu-
tion schemes:
Equal-contribution scheme (eqcont) - If a rule-based contribution scheme requires equal
contributions from all players to the public good, the individual minimum contribu-
tion levels are given by
qmini =
1
n
Qmin
for sufficient low group provision levels. Thus, the binding minimum proposal, Qmin,
is equally distributed across all group members. However, it should be taken into
account that in all burden sharing schemes, it is obligatory that the desired aggreg-
ated provision level Qmin is provided by the group and that qmini ∈ [0, ei]. Therefore,
it appears that eqcont may require higher contributions from subjects with high en-
dowments if the equal contribution rule would requires contributions from low-type
players to exceed their initial endowment. More formally, contributions of all group
members are given by qmini =
1
n Q
min for Qmin ∈ [0, 60]. If Qmin ∈ [60, 80], minimum
contributions of type20 players are qmintype20 = etype20 and therefore lower than those of
type30 and type40 players, qmintype30 = q
min
type40 =
1
n−1(Q
min − etype20). Following this logic,
if Qmin ∈ [80, 90], minimum contributions are given by qmintype20 = etype20 < qmintype30 =
etype30 < qmintype40 =
1
n−2(Q
min − etype20 − etype30).
In the eqcont scheme, type20 and type30 players have a weakly dominant strategy to
suggest Qmini = E. For them, the marginal benefit from increasing their group’s bind-
ing minimum contribution level exceeds its costs for all Qmini ∈ [0, E]. Choosing
Qmini < E would either reduce their own payoff if they set the binding minimum,
or would not change the payoff if their minimum proposal was not pivotal. Following
this intuition, type40 players have a weakly dominant strategy to choose Qmini = 78
since their marginal payoff is only positive if Qmin ≤ 80.12 Since the smallest pro-
11In our experiment, integer multiples of three are required for Qmin.
12Mathematically, the weakly dominant strategy of type40 players is to choose Qmin = 80, but the min-
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posal is binding and we assume agents to choose an equilibrium strategy which max-
imizes their payoff in all subgames, an equilibrium that comprises those strategies
which are weakly dominant in all subgames, i.e., a subgame perfect equilibrium in
weakly dominant strategies, is characterized by Qmin = 78 with qmintype20 = 20 and
qmintype30 = q
min
type40 = 29. Given that qi = q
min
i , this results in individual payoffs of
pitype20 = 46.8, pitype30 = 47.8 and pitype40 = 57.8 and, consequently, an aggregated
group payoff of Π = 152.4.13
Equal-payoff scheme (eqpay) - If a rule-based contribution scheme aims at reaching equal-
ity in payoffs among all group members and if all types of players have different
initial endowments but the same marginal benefits from the public good, equating
pitype20 = pitype30 = pitype40 and solving for qmini implies that
qmini = ei −
1
n
(E−Qmin)
for sufficiently high group provision levels. Note that in the eqpay scheme, the de-
sired aggregated provision level Qmin may not entirely allow for a payoff equaliza-
tion since we do not take a direct redistribution of initial endowments between group
members into account and qmini ∈ [0, ei]. This implies that payoff equalization among
all group members could be achieved if Qmin ∈ [30, 90]. If Qmin < 30, payoffs are
equalized as far as possible. More formally, if Qmin ∈ [9, 30], qmintype20 = 0 and qmintype30 =
qmintype40 = ej − 1n−1(etype40 + etype30 − Qmin). If Qmin ∈ [0, 9], qmintype20 = qmintype30 = 0 and
qmintype40 = Q
min. For instance, if Qmin = 24, this scheme would require qmintype20 = 0,
qmintype30 = 7 and q
min
type40 = 17. But nevertheless, payoff equality is not reached due
to the endowment heterogeneity. If qi = qmini individual payoffs are then given by
pitype20 = 34.4, pitype30 = pitype40 = 37.4.
In the eqpay scheme, we expect all players to suggest full contribution levels, i.e.,
Qmini = E. type20 and type30 players have a weakly dominant strategy to suggest
Qmini = E. By anticipating the weakly dominant strategy of type20 and type30 players,
type40 players also maximize their payoff by suggesting Qmini = E. This allocation
would lead to individual minimum contributions of qmintype20 = etype20, q
min
type30 = etype30
and qmintype40 = etype40, given that qi = q
min
i it determines equal individual payoffs for all
group members of pitype20 = pitype30 = pitype40 = 54 and a group payoff of Π = 162.14
imum group provision level has to be an integer multiple of three. Therefore, the weakly dominant
strategy is to choose the greatest integer multiple of three below 80.
13An illustration is provided in Figure 2.5 in the appendix.
14The payoff function of type40 players is not monotonically increasing in Qmin. Therefore, depending
on their beliefs about the other players’ proposals, the best response of type40 players is to propose
Qmintype40 = 0 or Q
min
type40 = E . We assume type40 players to anticipate the weakly dominant strategies
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Table 2.1: Theoretical predictions according standard preferences
Qmin qtype20 qtype30 qtype40 Π pitype20 pitype30 pitype40
VCM 0 0 0 0 90 20 30 40
eqcont 78 20 29 29 152.4 46.8 47.8 57.8
eqpay 90 20 30 40 162 54 54 54
propcont 90 20 30 40 162 54 54 54
Note: Qmin: binding minimum group contribution level; qtype20 (qtype30) (qtype40): contribution of type20
(type30) (type40) players; Π: group payoff; pitype20 (pitype30) (pitype40): payoff of type20 (type30) (type40)
players.
Proportional-contribution scheme (propcont) - If a rule-based contribution scheme requires
individual contributions to be proportional to the players’ initial endowment, indi-
vidual minimum contribution levels are given by
qmini =
ei
E
Qmin.
Thus, the binding minimum proposal, Qmin, is distributed among group members ac-
cording to their proportion of the total endowment, implying that individual min-
imum contributions increase with players’ initial endowments. In this case, all players
have a weakly dominant strategy to suggest full contribution levels, i.e., Qmin = E,
since their marginal benefit from increasing the group’s minimum contribution level
exceeds its costs for all Qmin ∈ [0, E]. This allocation is a subgame perfect equilibrium
in weakly dominant strategies and would lead to individual minimum contributions
of qmintype20 = etype20, q
min
type30 = etype30 and q
min
type40 = etype40. Furthermore, given that
qi = qmini individual payoffs are pitype20 = pitype30 = pitype40 = 54 and the aggregated
group payoff is Π = 162. Thus, assuming that subjects behave according to standard
theory and that they play their own minimum contribution level, i.e., qi = qmini , we can
derive the following hypothesis 1 regarding groups’ payoffs:
Hypothesis 1: Aggregate payoffs
Πeqpay = Πpropcont > Πeqcont > ΠVCM = 90.
We summarize the theoretical predictions for all contribution schemes in Table 2.1.
of their group members and since their payoff is maximized by Qmintype40 = E then, we expect type40
players to propose full contributions.
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2.3.2 Multi-Phase Game
In the first stage of the Multi-Phase Game, the collective-choice phase, subjects anonym-
ously vote for one of the proposed rule-based contribution schemes (eqcont, eqpay, and
propcont). We investigate two different voting mechanisms, namely majority and unan-
imity rule voting, each comprising three rounds of voting. After each round of voting,
all group members are informed about the voting behavior of their group members
and on whether an agreement was reached. In order to adopt an agreement, a rule-
based contribution scheme has to receive two out of three votes (majority rule vot-
ing) or three out of three votes (unanimity rule voting). If the sufficient majority is
obtained, the corresponding burden sharing rule is subsequently implemented in all
periods of the contribution phase. In each period of the contribution phase, all play-
ers have to suggest a minimum group provision level. The corresponding costs are
distributed among the members according to the burden sharing rule chosen in the
collective-choice phase. If a majority cannot be obtained in the collective-choice phase,
participants play the VCM. We summarize our experimental design in Table 2.2.
According to standard preferences, we expect type20 and type30 players to vote for
the eqpay and propcont schemes more frequently when compared to the eqcont scheme.
This can be explained by their expected payoffs which are comparatively higher in the
eqpay and propcont schemes (see Table 2.1). In contrast, for type40 players, the highest
expected payoff appears in the eqcont scheme. Therefore, we expect type40 players to
vote for the eqcont scheme more frequently when compared to the eqpay and propcont
scheme, at least under majority voting. Even though the highest expected payoff for
type40 players can be obtained under the eqcont scheme, where these players determine
the minimum contribution level (Qmintype40 = Q
min = 78), type40 players may adjust
their voting behavior and more frequently opt for an eqpay or propcont scheme which
are clearly preferred by type20 and type30 players in order to avoid ending up in a
VCM. Since the VCM is expected to be payoff-dominated by all rule-based contribution
schemes, we expect participants to prefer any rule-based contribution scheme over a
VCM and that subjects try to agree upon a joint burden sharing agreement.15
Furthermore, we expect an agreement to be more easily achieved under majority than
under unanimity rule voting, and that groups agree on the eqpay and propcont schemes
more frequently compared to eqcont. This has a simple statistical reason. Assum-
ing that individuals make a random choice, the probability of reaching an agreement
after three periods would amount to 0.99 under majority and to 0.30 under anonymity.
15In a situation where type20 and type30 players suggest eqpay under unanimity voting, the VCM might
emerge as an equilibrium if type40 players do not expect the two other types to follow their weakly
dominant strategies. Consequently, the best response of type40 players is to propose Qmintype40 = 0,
which corresponds to the VCM.
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Table 2.2: Experimental design
Voting Contribution scheme Phases No. of subjects
(groups)
Single-Phase Game
- VCM Contribution 45 (15)
- eqpay Contribution 45 (15)
- eqcont Contribution 45 (15)
- propcont Contribution 48 (16)
Multi-Phase Game
Majority VCM, eqpay, eqcont or
propcont
Collective-choice
and contribution
87 (29)
Unanimity VCM, eqpay, eqcont or
propcont
Collective-choice
and contribution
93 (31)
However, in case players vote according to standard preferences, the clear dominance
of the majority rule in terms of agreement formation might be counteracted if type40
players under unanimity vote more frequently for the eqpay or propcont rules, which
are also preferred by type20 or type30 players.
By relaxing the assumptions of standard preferences and allowing for other-regarding
preferences, it can be expected that type40 players also vote for the eqpay scheme. One
prominent theory of other-regarding preferences, which also allows simple utility cal-
culations, is the inequality version model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) (F&S). They
formalize the idea of inequality aversion by adding a disutility from disadvantageous
inequality (weighted by parameter αi) and a disutility from advantageous inequal-
ity (weighted by parameter βi) to a standard linear utility function. F&S themselves
present the mean values β = 0.315 and α = 0.85 for the inequality aversion para-
meters, which they both derive from individual behavior in ultimatum games. Blanco
et al. (2011) use modified ultimatum and dictator games in order to obtain similar in-
equality aversion parameters. In their distribution (n = 61), 56% of all subjects can be
characterized by βi > 0.5, and 33% of the participants have βi > 0.67. In our case,
for βi > 0.67, a type40 player prefers eqpay over the alternative burden sharing rules.
For type30 and type40 players with βi ≥ 0 and αi ≥ 0, eqpay at least weakly domin-
ates the alternatives.16 Therefore, we can summarize our expectations in the following
hypothesis:
16A detail description is provided in Section 2.6.2 in the appendix.
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Hypothesis 2: Voting in the collective-choice phase of the Multi-Phase Game
(a) According to standard preferences, type20 and type30 participants vote for the
eqpay and propcont schemes more frequently than for the eqcont scheme. In con-
trast, type40 players vote for the eqcont scheme more frequently.
(b) Participants prefer any rule-based contribution scheme to a VCM and therefore
shall try to reach an agreement. They agree on the eqpay or propcont scheme more
frequently than on the eqcont scheme, and an agreement is more frequently ob-
served under majority than under unanimity rule voting.
(c) By allowing for other-regarding preferences, it can be expected that type40 play-
ers vote for the eqpay scheme more frequently than for the eqcont and propcont
schemes.
Furthermore, in our experiment, the collective-choice institution itself becomes a treat-
ment variable for distinguishing whether a contribution scheme is implemented exo-
genously by the experimenter or endogenously by the voting of the subjects. In or-
der to distinguish between exogenously and endogenously implemented contribution
schemes, we add the prefix ex- (i.e., ex-VCM, ex-eqcont, ex-eqpay, and ex-propcont) for
the exogenous case and the prefix end- (i.e., end-VCM, end-eqcont, end-eqpay, and end-
propcont) for the endogenous case. From a standard theoretical point of view, there
should be no difference in the behavior in exogenously and endogenously implemen-
ted contribution schemes. But as already discussed in the literature review in Section
2.2, previous experimental studies have shown that the choice of an institutional set-
ting itself can affect the level of cooperation in social dilemma situations. We are inter-
ested whether the democratic premium persists in endogenously determined burden
sharing mechanisms. In order to disentangle these alternative predictions, our hypo-
thesis H3 is as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Endogenous and exogenous choice of contribution schemes
Πex−i = Πend−i whereby i = VCM, eqcont, eqpay, propcont
2.3.3 Laboratory protocol
The experiment was run in July 2013 at the MaXLab laboratory of the University of
Magdeburg in Germany. We used ORSEE (Greiner 2015) for recruiting participants
and z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007) for programming. We recruited 363 students
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from different disciplines. Each student took part in one of 16 sessions, each one com-
prising between 21 and 24 subjects. On average, a session lasted about 60 minutes. In
each session, we randomly created up to eight groups of three players with different
initial endowments. Moreover, each group consisted of one type20, type30 and type40
player. All players remained in the same group and maintained their type throughout
the whole experiment. During the collective-choice phase, subjects received informa-
tion on the type classifications of other players and the outcome of the voting within
their group. During the contribution stage, information on individual contributions
to the public good, payoffs and corresponding average values within the group were
transmitted via screen. Participants were not aware of their exact partners and the
experiment did not allow any direct communication between participants.
At the beginning, participants received a set of experimental instructions which in-
cluded written descriptions, numerical examples, and control questions. Furthermore,
participants could make use of a simulator on their screen in order to verify the numer-
ical examples, to answer control questions and to simulate different contribution de-
cisions.17 A session of the Single-Phase Game comprised 12 periods of the public goods
game, the first two periods being practice. Additionally, in the Multi-Phase Game, the
collective-choice phase with a maximum of three voting rounds preceded the public
goods game. At the end of each session, one non-practice period of the public goods
game was randomly chosen in order to determine individual earnings. The exchange
rate between Euro and LD was 1:3. On average, participants earned 14.70 Euro. No
additional show-up fee was paid.
2.4 Results
Our experimental design enables us to analyze the performance of different burden
sharing rules being endogenously implemented by agents themselves both to an exo-
genously implemented VCM and to a setting where allocation schemes are predeter-
mined by an agenda setter. While agenda setting appears not to be feasible - or at least
highly controversial - in many situations, an endogenous institution formation faces
the risk of coordination failure, i.e., it includes the risk that an agreement cannot be
reached and therefore, that no institutional framework will be implemented at all. Fol-
lowing our main research question, that is to analyze whether efficiency gains from
exogenously implemented schemes persist in a setting with institution formation, the
sequence discussing our experimental results explicitly focuses on the comparison of
payoffs and does not always reflect the order within the experiment.
17Instructions and screenshots are provided in the appendix.
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Table 2.3: Implemented contribution schemes in the Multi-Phase Game
Majority rule voting Unanimity rule voting Total
VCM 1 (3.5) 13 (41.9) 14 (23.3)
eqcont 3 (10.3) 2 (6.5) 5 (8.3)
eqpay 18 (62.1) 10 (32.3) 28 (46.7)
propcont 7 (24.1) 6 (19.4) 13 (21.7)
Total 29 (100) 31 (100) 60 (100)
Note: Contribution schemes chosen by a group serve as one observation. If a sufficient majority, two
out of three (majority rule voting) or three out of three (unanimity rule voting), cannot be obtained after
the third voting round, participants play the VCM. Percentages in parentheses.
In a first step, we study the voting behavior in the Multi-Phase Game (Section 2.4.1).
Subsequently, we compare payoffs from endogenously implemented contribution sch-
emes at the aggregate level (i.e., including both groups that either managed to reach an
agreement or who failed to agree upon a joint burden sharing rule) to a predetermined
VCM (Section 2.4.2). We further examine differences in payoff levels in exogenously
and endogenously implemented burden sharing schemes. In order to further elabor-
ate potential differences in payoff levels, we additionally discuss individual contribu-
tion decisions (Section 2.4.3) and how they are related to minimum group contribution
levels (Section 2.4.4).
2.4.1 Voting behavior
Analyzing voting behavior in the Multi-Phase Game reveals that almost 4 out of 5
groups successfully implement a joint burden sharing scheme (see Table 2.3). Re-
markably, we find that approximately one third of all agreements (21 groups, 35%)
are already established in the first voting round. As expected in hypothesis hypothesis
2b, a common agreement is more easily obtained under majority (97%) than under
unanimity rule voting (58%) ( p < 0.01, Fisher’s exact test).
Observation 1: Despite expected differences in preferences on how to share the costs
of providing a public good the majority of all groups successfully manages to
agree upon a common burden sharing rule. Approximately one third of them
obtain an agreement already in the first voting round. The equal-payoff scheme is
the most frequently chosen burden sharing mechanism. If participants however
fail to reach an agreement in the first voting round, they opt for the equal-payoff
scheme less frequently, but rather for a proportional contribution scheme in the
remaining two voting rounds.
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In accordance with our theoretical prediction formulated in hypothesis 2a, we indeed
find the preferred allocation rule to be dependent on subjects’ initial endowments (see
Figure 2.1 ). By considering all three rounds of the collective-choice phase, we find that
agents do not randomly choose one of the proposed rule-based contribution schemes.
Instead, the probability of an agent to opt for the eqpay scheme is significantly de-
creasing in the initial endowment (type20: 71%, type30: 46%, type40: 20%) (p < 0.01,
Binomial test). Furthermore, type40 players vote for the eqcont scheme more often than
other group members (type20: 9%, type30: 12%, type40: 50%) (p < 0.01, Binominal test).
The propcont scheme is most frequently chosen by type30 players (type20: 20%, type30:
42%, type40: 29%) ( p < 0.05, Binominal test). We find that eqpay is the burden sharing
rule which is most frequently chosen in a successful agreement, being implemented
in nearly half of the cases (p < 0.01, Binomial test). The propcont scheme is taken by
22% and the eqcont scheme by 8% of all groups. Finally, 23% of all groups fail to reach
consensus (see Table 2.3).
At first glance, standard theory of rational and selfish behavior performs considerably
well when looking at subjects’ voting behaviors. However, the dominance of the eqpay
scheme, emerging in 62% of all cases under majority voting and still in 32% under un-
animity voting (see Table 2.3), cannot be explained by standard theory but may rather
coincide with other-regarding preferences. In particular, as indicated in hypothesis 2c,
the decision behavior of type40 players opting for eqpay may be driven by inequality
aversion (e.g., F&S). If we assume that players prefer a burden sharing rule being at
least at one minimum group contribution level payoff dominant and that players try
to directly reduce inequality by implementing binding minimum contribution levels,
i.e., not by implementing voluntary contributions exceeding the binding minimum
contribution level, type40 players prefer the eqpay to the eqcont as well as the propcont
schemes for a sufficiently high level of disutility from advantageous inequality.18
Coordination failure could either reflect divergent preferences or, since direct commu-
nication was not allowed, a coordination problem, meaning that group members are
per se willing to form an agreement but simply fail to vote for a certain burden shar-
ing rule at the same time so that the required majority is not obtained. We find that
agents change their voting behavior in case they fail to reach an agreement in the first
round of the collective-choice phase. Especially under unanimity voting, type20 play-
18See Section 2.6.2 in the appendix for detailed description. We are aware that inequality might also be
indirectly reduced by voluntarily exceeding the required individual minimum level. For instance,
type40 players might have an incentive to contribute more than required in order to reduce inequality.
Anticipating this, type20 and type30 players might have an incentive to reduce the binding minimum
contribution order to free ride on the voluntary contributions of the type40 player. However, we focus
on the case where players try to directly reduce inequality by implementing a binding minimum
contribution level.
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Figure 2.1: Individually chosen rule-based contribution schemes
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Note: Individually chosen rule-based contribution scheme in all three rounds of the collective-choice
phase of the Multi-Phase Game by types.
ers vote for the eqpay scheme less frequently and thus, more frequently for propcont.
As discussed in our theoretical predictions, type40 players seem to adjust their voting
behavior under unanimity over time. While 61% of these players vote for the eqcont
scheme in the first round, this share drops to 24% in the third round and the propcont
scheme is selected in most cases by these types (57% of the votes). We do not observe
this adjustment under majority voting. One possible explanation is that type40 players
become aware of their pivotal position under unanimity and accordingly adjust their
voting behavior after the first round in order to avoid ending up in a VCM.
2.4.2 Payoffs
Figure 2.2 illustrates average payoffs for each endogenously and exogenously imple-
mented contribution scheme.19 Across all periods, average aggregated payoffs for all
groups who take part in the Multi-Phase Game, including those groups who fail to reach
an agreement (end-all) amount to 46.6 LD. When considering all periods of the contri-
bution phase, average payoff levels are not statistically different between the groups
who take part in the Multi-Phase Game and those who participate in the exogenously
implemented VCM (end-all: 46.6 vs. ex-VCM: 44.0, p-value: 0.128, Mann-Whitney U
(MW-U) test). If we give groups more time for coordination and only consider the
last five periods, the difference between the Multi-Phase Game (end-all: 46.9) and ex-
VCM (41.8) becomes more pronounced and significant (p-value < 0.05, MW-U test).
Moreover, aggregated payoffs under an endogenously induced institution formation
(end-all) resemble the benefits from the different burden sharing rules obtained in the
19Detailed summary statistics are provided in Table 2.4
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Figure 2.2: Payoffs by treatments
1 2 3 4 5 6 6 8 7 10
30
35
40
45
50
55
Period
Av
era
ge
 pa
yo
ff
Exogenously & endogenously implemented
ex-VCM ex-eqpay
ex-eqcont ex-propcont
end-all
1 2 3 4 5 6 6 8 7 10
30
35
40
45
50
55
Period
Av
era
ge
 pa
yo
ff
Endogenously implemented
end-VCM end-eqpay
end-eqcont end-propcont
Note: Average payoffs in each period (excluding trial periods) of the game serve as one observation.
On the left: payoffs in all exogenously implemented contribution schemes separately and the average
of all endogenously implemented contribution schemes. On the right: payoffs in all endogenously
implemented contribution schemes separately.
Single-Phase Game (ex-eqcont: 47.0, ex-eqpay: 47.2, ex-propcont: 49.4). Thus, enabling an
endogenous institution formation on a joint burden sharing agreement is preferable
to a situation where contributions to the public good are provided in a decentralized
manner (ex-VCM). Moreover, institution formation is equally preferred to externally
determined burden sharing rules. This latter observation may be driven by two im-
portant behavioral responses to the voting mechanism in our experiment.
Observation 2: Average payoffs under endogenous institution formation at an ag-
gregate level (end-all), i.e., including those groups that did not reach an agree-
ment, are higher than in a predetermined VCM in the last five periods. Compared
to the benefits from the exogenously imposed burden sharing rules, endogenous
institutions reveal similar payoffs at an aggregate level.
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, a broad majority of the groups manages to agree upon
a joint distribution rule and individuals on average may simply contribute at similar
rates in contrast to the exogenous case. Considering the endogeneity premium, we par-
ticularly investigate whether efficiency levels from those groups who reach consensus
help to outweigh efficiency losses from coordination failure and if these efficiency gains
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differ across endogenously implemented burden sharing agreements. We study payoff
levels in the different burden sharing schemes, both in the Single- and the Multi-Phase
Game. We first summarize the results of the exogenously implemented contribution
schemes and subsequently compare these findings to the agreement formation. Sim-
ilar to previous findings on the minimum contribution mechanism (e.g., Kesternich
et al. 2014), group payoffs are higher in rule-based contribution schemes than in the
ex-VCM (44.0), if they are adopted by an agenda setter (see Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2).
Averaged over all periods and agents, payoffs are highest in the ex-propcont setting
(49.4). They amount to 47.0 in ex-eqcont and to 47.2 in ex-eqpay. Our regression analysis
reveals that the exogenously implemented propcont burden sharing schemes increase
efficiency as opposed to a ex-VCM (p-value < 0.05, Table 2.5 - Column 3).20 Thus, the
observed behavior is at least partly in accordance with hypothesis 1.
In case of an endogenous institution formation, substantial efficiency gains can be real-
ized if the end-eqpay (51.1) scheme is implemented. Payoffs are lowest if groups fail
to reach a burden sharing agreement and consequently have to play end-VCM (36.5)
(see Figure 2.2 and Table 2.4). We find that the average payoffs per group are signific-
antly higher in case one of the three rule-based contribution schemes (eqcont, eqpay, or
propcont) is adopted than in case none of the schemes does receive a sufficient majority
(p-value< 0.05, MW-U test ( last five periods) and Table 2.5 - Column 1).
Furthermore, our regression analysis reveals that payoffs in endogenously implemen-
ted contribution schemes show different trends over time, depending on the contri-
bution scheme implemented. We find decreasing payoffs in case coordination upon a
joint burden sharing scheme has failed. In contrast, if one of the three proposed burden
sharing rules is endogenously implemented, we observe positive trends over periods
(Table 2.5 - Column 2). In addition, we find that type40 and type30 players receive
significantly higher payoffs than type20 players in all contribution schemes, either en-
dogenously or exogenously implemented. However, these differences in payoffs are
particularly pronounced in the VCM, and they are reduced in case a burden sharing
rule is implemented (Table 2.5 - Columns 2 and 4).
20A series of random-effects regression models is used in order to determine the payoffs of individuals.
The discussion of the results is based on standard errors computed at group level. We consider
individual level random effects, i.e., one observation of one individual corresponds to the panel
variable and the period defines the time variable. All in all, our econometric analysis comprises
3630 observations. Due to missing sociodemographic information, we had to remove three out of
the 366 participants from our economic analysis. Regarding the remaining 363 subjects, we have one
observation for each of the 10 payoff-relevant periods.
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Table 2.5: Random effects regressions of payoffs per subject
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
piit piit piit piit piit piit piit piit
Contribution
scheme
all all all all VCM eqcont eqpay propcont
Implementation end end ex ex end &
ex
end &
ex
end &
ex
end &
ex
eqpay 14.09***
(1.61)
16.72***
(2.66)
3.53
(2.67)
2.79
(3.71)
eqcont 9.09**
(3.96)
8.69
(5.47)
3.25
(2.44)
−3.34
(4.03)
propcont 11.28***
(2.40)
10.97** 5.51**
(2.60)
4.05
(4.12)
voting −7.38***
(2.59)
−1.67
(4.00)
3.43*
(1.86)
−1.47
(2.49)
period 0.14
(0.10)
−0.64***
(0.12)
−0.10
(0.13)
−0.88***
(0.17)
−0.77***
(0.11)
0.32**
(0.13)
0.22
(0.15)
0.30**
(0.15)
eqpay x period 0.97***
(0.18)
0.88**
(0.37)
eqcont × period 0.81***
(0.19)
1.25***
(0.24)
propcont × period 1.20***
(0.24)
0.98***
(0.25)
type30 3.13***
(0.75)
7.14***
(2.25)
3.90***
(0.66)
6.00***
(1.56)
6.01***
(1.48)
4.01***
(1.06)
1.78***
(0.65)
2.02**
(0.93)
type40 7.38***
(1.15
19.24***
(1.64)
7.84***
(1.12)
11.93***
(2.83)
15.32***
(1.72)
11.56***
(1.33)
2.35***
(0.68)
4.59***
(1.38)
eqpay × type30 −5.95***
(2.26
−3.37*
(1.88)
eqpay × type40 −17.55***
(1.87
−8.66***
(3.11)
eqcont × type30 −3.26
(3.01)
−1.03
(1.81)
eqcont × type40 −8.33**
(3.39
0.41
(3.11)
propcont × type30 −4.71*
(2.55)
−3.74*
(1.93)
propcont × type40 −13.92***
(2.47
−8.05**
(3.40)
Note: Table 2.5 continues on the next page.
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Table 2.5 (continued)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
piit piit piit piit piit piit piit piit
Contribution
scheme
all all all all VCM eqcont eqpay propcont
Implementation end end ex ex end &
ex
end &
ex
end & e end &
ex
male 2.45**
(1.13
1.63 1.30
(1.15)
1.73
(1.18)
0.37
(2.28)
2.36
(1.51)
1.82**
(0.89)
2.38
(1.64)
exp −0.03
(0.07
−0.02
(0.07)
0.14*
(0.07)
0.17**
(0.07)
−0.03
(0.12)
0.10
(0.12)
0.11*
(0.06)
0.09
(0.11)
Constant 31.52***
(1.93)
30.72*** 38.54***
(2.53)
40.20***
(3.41)
41.16***
(3.34)
38.02*** 42.74***
(2.04)
43.45***
(2.47)
Observations 1800 1800 1830 1830 870 600 1290 870
Number of
Groups
180 180 183 183 87 60 129 87
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for group clusters. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
piit: individual payoff of subject i in each period (excluding the trial periods); eqcont (eqpay, propcont) =
1 if subject i played eqcont (eqpay, propcont), 0 else; voting = 1 if subject i played the Multi-Phase Game, 0
else; period = period of contribution phase; type30 (type40) = 1 if subject i is type30 (type40), 0 else; male
= 1 if subject i is male, 0 if female; exp = number of experiments subject i has taken part in MaXLab.
Columns 1 and 2 consider observations from all endogenously implemented contribution schemes (end-
VCM, end-eqcont, end-eqpay, and end-propcont). Columns 3 and 4 consider all observations from exo-
genously implemented contribution schemes (ex-VCM, ex-eqcont, ex-eqpay, and ex-propcont). Column 5
considers observations from the endogenously and exogenously implemented VCM (end-VCM and ex-
VCM). Column 6 considers observations from the endogenously and exogenously implemented eqcont
(end-eqcont and ex-eqcont). Column 7 considers observations from the endogenously and exogenously
implemented eqpay (end-eqpay and ex-eqpay). Column 8 considers observations from the endogenously
and exogenously implemented propcont (end-propcont and ex-propcont).
An endogenous institution formation affects payoff levels in the different burden shar-
ing schemes. If participants decide to implement the eqpay scheme, payoffs are signific-
antly higher than in the exogenously implemented counterpart (p-value< 0.05, MW-U
test). With respect to the eqcont and propcont schemes, we cannot confirm that endo-
genously implemented institutions have an impact on efficiency levels. In contrast, we
find that payoffs are significantly lower if no consensus is reached and players end up
in an uncoordinated action than in a VCM being exogenously implemented (p-value
< 0.05, MW-U test). Thus, hypothesis H3 has to be rejected. This observation emphas-
izes the risk of negotiation failures. The results of our regression analysis repeatedly
confirm these findings (see Table 2.5 - Columns 5 to 7).
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Observation 3: Average payoffs in an equal-payoff scheme are higher if this scheme
is implemented by voting compared to a situation where it is exogenously imple-
mented. If no consensus on a joint distribution rule is reached and agents end up
in an uncoordinated action, they earn less than in the exogenously implemented
VCM.
It could be argued that the differences in payoff levels between endogenously and
exogenously implemented contribution schemes are driven by a self-selection effect
described by Dal Bó et al. (2010). They show that cooperative subjects can separate
themselves from uncooperative participants via voting and choosing treatments. We
do not deny a possible self-selection effect in our experiment, but according to this ar-
gument, a sample selection effect should be relatively weak if groups already agreed
on a common allocation rule in the first round of the collective-choice phase. By con-
sidering solely these groups and by focusing on the eqpay scheme, we find that voting
still has a positive impact on payoff levels. Average payoffs in groups that agree on
the eqpay scheme in the first voting round amount to 50.4 and are higher than in the
exogenously implemented eqpay scheme (47.2). In this sense, we argue that our results
are in line with the existing literature on the democratic premium and that they are at
least partly driven by an effect of the endogenous choice rather than solely by a sample
selection effect.
The allocation schemes clearly differ in the distribution of their benefits among the
different players. Nevertheless, there is evidence that in case of exogenously imple-
mented contribution schemes, the propcont scheme at least weakly payoff-dominates
all other contribution schemes. Compared to the other contribution schemes, type20
(47.2) and type30 (49.5) players receive their highest payoff in ex-propcont. Even though
type40 players earn the most across all periods if all players have to contribute the
same amount (53.2), this is not statistically different from their payoff in the ex-propcont
scheme (51.6).
Observation 4: If an agenda setter determines the distribution rule exogenously, an
allocation rule requesting proportional contributions from the different types of
players leads to the highest average payoff per group across all periods and at
least weakly payoff-dominates all other burden sharing rules. In case of an en-
dogenous institution formation, groups benefit most if they agree upon an equal-
payoff scheme.
Considering the endogenously implemented contribution schemes, the analysis re-
veals a different picture: The eqpay scheme leads to the highest average payoffs but is
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Figure 2.3: Contributions by treatments
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Note: Average group contributions in each period (excluding the trial periods) of the game serve as
one observation. On the left (right): contributions in the exogenously (endogenously) implemented
contribution schemes.
not payoff-dominant compared to the other contribution schemes. In addition, type20
(50.3) and type30 (51.3) players receive their highest payoff in eqpay compared to all
other schemes. Once again, type40 (52.7) players benefit most in the eqcont scheme.
The difference between eqcont and eqpay (51.5) is significant for type40 players (p-value
< 0.1, MW-U test).
2.4.3 Contributions
In this part, we focus on contribution behavior in order to explore the differences in
payoff levels in more detail. Figure 2.3 reports average group contribution levels for
each either endogenously or exogenously implemented contribution scheme.
In the Single-Phase Game, if we focus on the last five periods, the contributions to the
public good of all types of different players are higher in all burden sharing schemes
than in the VCM (see Figure 2.3 and Table 2.4). As already discussed in the previous
section, ex-propcont achieves the highest efficiency gains resulting from the highest av-
erage contributions (24.3). In this scheme, contributions from both type30 (24.2) and
type40 players (32.1) are higher than in all other schemes. The contributions of type20
players in ex-propcont (16.6) exceed those in ex-eqpay (13.6) but are marginally lower
than in ex-eqcont (16.7). In the exogenous case, welfare gains in the ex-propcont scheme
are particularly driven by increases in contributions from type30 and type40 players.
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Figure 2.4: Binding minimum group contributions by treatments
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Note: Average binding group minimum contribution levels in each period (excluding the trial periods)
of the game serve as one observation. On the left (right): contributions in the exogenously (endogen-
ously) implemented contribution schemes.
How are these findings related to the observations from endogenous institution form-
ation? propcont achieves similar average contribution levels in the Single- and in the
Multi-Phase Game (24.3 vs. 22.5, p-value: 0.397, MW-U test). This also applies to the
eqcont scheme (21.2 vs. 20.3, p-value: 0.769, MW-U test). In contrast, average contri-
bution levels increase in the eqpay scheme (21.5 vs. 26.3, p-value< 0.000) and collapse
in the VCM (17.5 vs. 8.1, p-value< 0.000, MW-U test). In eqpay, all types of players
contribute more to the public good than in the exogenous case if they agree upon this
distribution rule. Moreover, total contributions are higher than in any other endogen-
ously implemented burden sharing scheme.
2.4.4 Minimum group contribution levels
We now examine binding minimum group contribution levels (see Figure 2.4 and Table
2.6) and individual minimum proposals in order to explore the voting effect of the
eqpay scheme. As indicated by the contribution behavior of participants and their cor-
responding payoffs, we find that the average binding minimum group contribution
level is higher in case the eqpay scheme is endogenously implemented (76.6) than in
case the same scheme is exogenously implemented (61.4) (p-value< 0.1, MW-U test).
In contrast, for propcont, we find that binding minimum group contribution levels tend
to be higher if the rule is exogenously imposed (69.5 vs. 66.7), however the difference
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Table 2.6: Summary statistics - binding minimum group contribution levels
ex-eqcont end-eqcont ex-eqpay end-eqpay ex-propcont end-propcont
All periods
Qmin 61.14 60.66 61.44 76.55 69.51 66.67
qmintype20 16.57 15.46 12.03 16.04 15.45 14.82
qmintype30 21.25 21.31 20.31 25.39 23.17 22.22
qmintype40 23.32 23.89 29.10 35.12 30.89 29.63
Last five periods
Qmin 64.5 62.20 63.30 79.98 70.50 70.85
qmintype20 17.24 15.37 13.12 17.06 15.67 15.74
qmintype30 22.57 22.12 20.89 26.55 23.50 23.62
qmintype40 24.68 24.71 29.29 36.38 31.33 33.49
Note: Average binding group and individual minimal contribution levels in for all 10 periods (exclud-
ing trial periods). Qmin: average binding minimum group contribution levels; qmintype20 (q
min
type30 ) (q
min
type40):
average binding contribution levels of type20 (type30) (type40) players. Exogenously implemented con-
tribution schemes get the prefix ex- (i.e., ex-eqcont, ex-eqpay and ex-propcont), endogenously implemented
contribution schemes get the prefix end- (i.e., end-eqcont, end-eqpay and end-propcont).
is not statistically significant (p-value: 0.839, MW-U test).
By focusing on groups who failed to coordinate at the entire contribution level, we find
that type40 players predominantly set the binding minimum group contribution level
in eqpay (ex-eqpay: 41.8%, end-eqpay: 50.6%). More precisely, we find that type40 play-
ers make the smallest proposals for the binding minimum group contribution level on
average, independent from the method of implementation. In case the eqpay scheme
is chosen in the collective-choice phase, they propose a binding contribution level of
81.2 on average. In case the scheme is implemented exogenously, they propose a con-
tribution level which amounts to 73.9 on average. Moreover, type30 players suggest
an average binding contribution level of 83.6 in the endogenously implemented and
77.2 in the exogenously implemented case; type20 players suggest amounts of 85.7 and
77.9, respectively. All types of players increase their average proposals in case the eqpay
scheme is endogenously determined by contrast with the exogenously implemented
eqpay scheme. In contrast, when looking at propcont, minimum contribution proposals
are about five LD lower from each type of player under voting compared to the situ-
ation where an agenda setter implements the distribution rule. type40 players propose
a binding minimum contribution level of 73.6 on average (79.1 in ex-propcont), type30
players suggest 77.1 (82.9 in ex-propcont) and type20 players 74.2 (79.7 in ex-propcont).
There is one speculative explanation for this observation, stating that groups need
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more time for coordination in the endogenously implemented propcont scheme. If
groups agree on an eqpay scheme, binding group contribution levels tend to increase
immediately from the first period onwards. In contrast, when looking at the endo-
genously implemented propcont rule, group contribution levels are lower compared
to end-eqpay. They remain rather constant in the first five periods, start to increase
from the sixth period onwards and exceed group contribution levels determined by
the exogenously implemented propcont rule only in the second half of the contribution
phase (see Figure 2.4). One possible explanation could be that groups in the endogen-
ously implemented propcont scheme are comparatively heterogeneous with respect to
their preferred burden sharing rule. This occurs since the propcont scheme is most fre-
quently implemented if coordination in the first rounds of the collective-choice phase
fails. In this sense, we argue that the heterogeneity of groups in the endogenously
implemented propcont scheme limits cooperation gains - at least in the first half of the
contribution phase where players act rather cautious in order to learn more about their
group members.
2.5 Summary and concluding remarks
In this experiment, we investigate whether the endogenous choice of different rules on
how to share the costs of providing a public good affects individual contribution beha-
vior. While agenda setting appears not to be feasible - or at least highly controversial
- in many situations, endogenous institution formation faces the risk of coordination
failure. At the aggregate level, i.e., including both groups that reach consensus upon a
joint burden sharing rule and groups that fail to agree upon a common scheme, our res-
ults show that those participants who face a voting decision receive, on average, higher
payoffs than participants in an exogenously implemented VCM. Moreover, they do not
earn less than participants in any externally implemented burden sharing rule. This is
driven by two important results. At first, despite different preferences for how to share
the costs of providing a public good among heterogeneous agents, we find that groups
manage to agree upon a common burden sharing rule in most cases. Second, endo-
genously and exogenously implemented rule-based contribution schemes are effective
in increasing the level of contributions to the public good. While we observe this pos-
itive effect of an endogenous institutional choice on contributions to the public good,
there is also a negative effect. If group members fail to agree upon a rule-based con-
tribution scheme in the collective-choice phase of the Multi-Phase Game, they have to
play the VCM. In this endogenously implemented case, contributions are lower than in
case the VCM is exogenously implemented. Regarding the endogenously implemen-
ted VCM, one can speculate that group members are disappointed about the outcome
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of the election and behave accordingly uncooperative. Nevertheless, the low contri-
bution levels in this scheme may also be driven by a sample selection effect induced
by the collective-choice phase of the Multi-Phase Game. In our experimental design,
we cannot exclude that the endogenously implemented VCM “collects” all uncooper-
ative participants who failed to implement a common rule-based contribution scheme.
Therefore, our results indicate that an endogenously induced formation on a joint bur-
den sharing agreement offers both chances and risks, depending on whether or not an
agreement is reached. However, our results show that institution formation does not
harm overall payoffs at the aggregated level. In particular, average payoffs are higher
if agents face the opportunity to agree upon a joint burden sharing rule compared to an
uncoordinated action. This observation may reveal interesting conclusions for a local
agenda-setter as it shows that the benefits of the choice between different appropriate
designed burden sharing rules do outweigh the risks.
As a matter of course, this implication has to be treated with caution because our exper-
imental design shows at least one limitation since it automatically enforces the binding
minimum contribution levels. Therefore, our design does not take into account that
sovereign agents may deviate from initially accepted contribution patterns. However,
any burden sharing mechanism in our experimental design only implements provi-
sion levels that all players have agreed upon previously. In addition, in the Multi-Phase
Game, players perceiving to be “overruled” by their group members are always able to
block any further cooperation by suggesting low minimum group contribution levels
to the public good. The lowest common denominator principle therefore ensures that
all subjects have veto power. Moreover, the perception on what constitutes a fair bur-
den sharing norm may differ across countries and societies. Whether our results can be
transferred to subjects with different cultural backgrounds remains an open question
and deserves further research. In addition, to bring our experimental design closer to
international negotiations with many players being involved, larger group sizes with
players of different types might be taken into account in future research. Furthermore,
one potentially meaningful extension would be to relax the assumption that all agents
are fully informed about the cost and benefits from investing into the public good, i.e.,
the voting procedure could take place behind a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971).
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Figures
Figure 2.5: Theoretical predictions according to standard preferences
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Note: Binding minimum group contribution levels on x-axis and corresponding payoffs for each player
per group (type20, type30, type40) on the y-axis. Players are assumed to choose and propose the min-
imum group contribution level which maximizes their payoff. Dotted lines indicate type-specific equi-
librium quantities and corresponding payoffs.
2.6.2 Voting behavior and other regarding preferences
F&S introduce the idea that actors may be averse to inequality. They formalize the
idea of inequality aversion by introducing the following utility for player i, given the
payoffs for all other players j:
Ui(pii,pij) = pii − αiN − 1max{pij − pii, 0} −
βi
N − 1max{pii − pij, 0}.
For αi,βi > 0, this implies that player i derives disutility from inequality. The second
term in the utility function represents disutility from disadvantageous inequality (in
case of pij > pii, weighted by αi), while the third term reflects disutility from advant-
ageous inequality (in case of pii > pij, weighted by βi). F&S assume βi < 1 and αi ≥ βi.
By assuming that participants prefer the burden sharing rule which leads at least at
one minimum group contribution level Qmin ∈ [0, 90] to a strict higher expected payoff
in comparison to the other rules, the preference order for the different types of players
with standard preferences is as follows:
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Figure 2.6: Voting behavior according to standard and other-regarding preferences
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Note: Binding minimum group contribution levels on x-axis and corresponding payoffs for each rule-
based contribution scheme (eqcont, eqpay and propcont) the y-axis separately for type20, type30 and type40
players. Upper half (lower half): according to standard preferences (other-regarding preferences).
type20 pii,eqpay > pii,propcont > pii,eqcont
type30 pii,eqpay > pii,propcont > pii,eqcont
type40 pii,eqcont > pii,propcont > pii,eqpay.
Assuming standard preferences, type20 and type30 players would, thus, vote for eqpay
and type40 players for eqcont. These are the predictions we derived in Section 2.3 al-
though here we relaxed the assumption that participants take only equilibrium min-
imum contribution levels into account and assume that all possible minimum contri-
bution levels Qmin ∈ [0, 90] are considered. Figure 2.6 shows in the upper section
the expected payoffs for the different types of players in the different burden sharing
rules and illustrates the voting behavior. This pictures changes if we allow for inequal-
ity aversion and compare F&S utility values. In particular, if we assume βi = 0.67,
type40 players are indifferent between eqpay and the other schemes, and both other
types strictly prefer eqpay. For values βi > 0.67, all types of players strictly prefer
eqpay. This holds independent from the value for αi. Figure 2.6 shows in the lower sec-
tion the utility values for the different types of players in the different burden sharing
rules by assuming a F&S utility function with βi = 0.8 and αi = 0.
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2.6.3 Instructions
[Translated from German]†
General information [For all participants]
Please read the instructions carefully and contact us by opening the door or giving a
hand signal if you have any questions. Please do not talk to each other and do not use
any electronic devices such as mobile phones, smart phones, or the like throughout
the whole experiment. In the experiment you are now taking part in, you can earn
money depending on your decisions and those of your teammates. Your payoff from
the experiment is calculated in LaborDollars (LD) and the exchange rate between €
and LD is 1:3, i.e., 3 LD equals 1 €. During the experiment, you make your decisions
anonymously. Only the experimenter will know your identity and your data will
be treated confidentially. This experiment consists of two parts that will be carried
out consecutively: (1) voting and (2) game. Please read the rules of the game in the
following. After that, you will get details about the voting procedure.
Rules of the Game
Three players will take part in the game, i.e., apart from you, there are two other play-
ers. All in all, your group of three players has an initial endowment of 90 LD. One
of the players is provided with an initial endowment of 20 LD (“type20” in the fol-
lowing). Another player (“type30“) is provided with an initial endowment of 30 LD
and another one is provided with an initial endowment of 40 LD (“type40“). Whether
you are type20, type30, or type40 will be drawn by lot and announced before the vot-
ing. Your task in the game (which is the same for your teammates in your group) is
to decide what amount of LD you are willing to contribute to a joint project. Your
contribution, q, to the project can range between 0 and 20 LD if you are type20. Your
contribution can range between 0 and 30 LD if you are type30 and between 0 and 40
LD if you are type40.
The individual payoff (in LD) for each one of the three players is derived as follows:
Payoff = (initial endowment of player – contribution of player) + 0.6·(total sum of
contributions by all players)
Assume you are type20, then your payoff (in LD) is:
Payoff = (20 – your contribution) + 0.6·(total sum of contributions by all players)
That means, if, for example, the other two players contribute a total of 70 LD and you
contribute 10 LD to the project, then your payoff is
Payoff = (20 – 10) + 0.6·(70 + 10) = 58
†Explanatory notes are given in square brackets.
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Whereas, if the other two players contribute a total of 70 LD and you contribute noth-
ing, your payoff is
Payoff = (20 – 0) + 0.6·(70 + 0) = 62
If you are type30, your payoff (in LD) is:
Payoff = (30 – your contribution) + 0.6·(total sum of contributions by all players)
If you are type40, your payoff (in LD) is:
Payoff = (40 – your contribution) + 0.6·(total sum of contributions by all players)
Multi-Phase Game [Only for participants in the Multi-Phase Game]
The game has two stages. In stage 1, you decide which minimum contribution, Qmin,
the group shall make. The other players in your group state as well which minimum
contribution, Qmin, they would like to have for the group. The minimum of the sugges-
tions, min(Qmin), is set as the minimum contribution of the group. Then in stage 2,
you decide about your contribution, q, to the project, whereby for every player a lower
limit, qmin, for the individual contribution is calculated from min(Qmin) according to a
specific rule. There are three rules to vote from:
Rule 1 “Equal Contribution“: qmin is determined from min(Qmin) so that the min-
imum contributions, qmin, of all players are as equal as possible* so that every player
contributes at least one third of the group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), i.e.,
qmin = 13 min(Qmin).
Rule 2 “Equal Payoff“: qmin is determined from min(Qmin) so that the payoffs off all
players are equal or at least adjusted as far as possible.*
Rule 3 “Proportional Contribution“: qmin is determined from min(Qmin) so that the
minimum contributions, qmin, of all players are proportional to their initial endow-
ment. I.e., the higher the initial endowment the higher is the minimum contribution,
qmin, to the joint project by the player.
Examples for the rules 1-3 with a minimum contribution of the group min(Qmin) = 45.
Rule 1 “Equal
Contribution”
Rule 2 “Equal Payoff” Rule 3 “Proportional
Contribution”
Lower limit of
contribution
Payoff Lower limit of
contribution
Payoff Lower limit of
contribution
Payoff
Type20 15 32 5 42 10 37
Type30 15 42 15 42 15 42
Type40 15 52 25 42 20 47
Note: We assume each player chooses their lower limit as the contribution, i.e, q = qmin.
*Please note that the adjustment is subject to the condition that the minimum contribution of the group
to the joint project is reached.
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Please use the simulator to understand the examples. On your screen you will find
an Excel file named “simulator”. You can enter your desired minimum contribution
of the group, min(Qmin), in the simulator. For each rule (rule 1 “Equal Contribution”,
rule 2 “Equal Payoff”, rule 3 “Proportional Contribution”) the individual minimum
contributions, qmin, and the corresponding payoffs to each player as well as the pay-
off to the group are calculated. Please note that only the corresponding minimum
contributions are calculated, i.e. the minimum contribution of the group, min(Qmin),
is distributed to the players according to the different rules. Of course, you can also
contribute more than the calculated minimum contribution, but only as long as your
contribution does not exceed your initial endowment. The game consists of ten sep-
arate rounds, in which you always play the same game, you remain the same type
and you interact with the same two participants. In each round, you will be informed
about the proposals of the minimum contribution (Qmin1 to Qmin3), the contributions
(q1 to q3) and the payoffs (payo f f1 to payo f f3) of all players in your group as well as the
average values (D). At the end of the experiment you will receive the payoff of one of
the ten rounds in € (3 LD = 1 €). The round that will be disbursed is chosen randomly.
Therefore, in each round, you should act as if it was relevant to disbursement. In the
beginning, there will be two trial rounds which are not relevant to disbursement.
Voting
The members of a group decide for themselves which rule will be applied for the dis-
tribution of the group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin). The voting is a majority
vote [alternative wording for unanimity rule voting: the voting is a unanimity rule]
(between rule 1 “Equal Contribution”, rule 2 “Equal Payoff” and rule 3 “Proportional
Contribution”), i.e. if at least two of the [alternative wording for unanimity rule vot-
ing: if all of the] three group members vote for the same rule, it will be applied. There
is a maximum of three voting rounds. If there is no rule that has received at least two
of the three votes after the third voting, the game will be played without stage 1, i.e.,
no minimum contribution is determined and each player just states their contribution
to the project and the payoffs will be determined as mentioned above. Illustration 1
shows course of the experiment in a nutshell.
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Illustration 1:
Phase 2:
contribution phase
Stage 1: 
minimum stage
Stage 2:
 individual 
contribution stage
Start End
Phase 1: 
collective-choice phase
drawing and 
announcement of 
types
Control Questions (please answer, use the simulator if necessary)
• Assume, the three players have stated 10, 20 and 30 respectively as the pro-
posal for the minimum contribution. What is the group’s minimum contribution
min(Qmin)? The group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), is: _______
• Assume, the group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), to the project is 30. What
is your minimum contribution and payoff if you have agreed on the follow-
ing rules, if all the players contribute their minimum contribution and you are
type20? (Tip: Use the simulator)
Rule 1 “Equal
Contribution”
Rule 2 “Equal
Payoff”
Rule 3
“Proportional
Contribution”
My minimum
contribution qmin
My payoff
• Assume, you could not agree on a rule in your group. Afterwards you make as
a type30 a contribution of 20 LD. The other two players contribute 0 LD and 10
LD. What is your payoff? My payoff is: ________
• We have the same situation as in 3.) and the other players in your group have
contributed their whole initial endowment to the project. Which of the following
contributions gives you the highest payoff as a type40? (please tick) O 0 LD O 10
LD O 20 LD O 40 LD
• We have the same situation as in 3.) and the other players in your group have
contributed their whole initial endowment to the project. Which of the following
contributions gives the group the highest payoff if you are a type40? (please tick)
O 0 LD O 10 LD O 20 LD O 40 LD
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Single-Phase Game [Only for participants in the Single-Phase Game]
[Only for participants in the exogenously implemented voluntary contribution mechanism (ex-
VCM)]
In order to ease you the calculation, you will find an Excel file names “simulator”
on your screen. For example, you can enter suggestions for your contribution and
the contributions of the other group members into the simulator. The payoffs to each
player as well as the payoff to the group are calculated.
[Only for participants in the exogenously implemented rule-based contribution schemes (ex-
eqcont, ex-eqpay, ex-propcont)]
The game has two stages. In stage 1, you decide which minimum contribution, Qmin,
the group shall make. The other players in your group state as well which minimum
contribution, Qmin, they would like to have for the group. The minimum of the sug-
gestions, min(Qmin), is set as the minimum contribution of the group. Then in stage 2,
you decide about your contribution, q, to the project, whereby for every player a lower
limit, qmin, for the individual contribution is calculated from min(Qmin) according to a
specific rule. The following rule will be applied:
[Only for participants in the exogenously implemented equal contribution rule (ex-eqcont)]
Rule “Equal Contribution“: qmin is determined from min(Qmin) so that the minimum
contributions, qmin, of all players are as equal as possible* so that every player contrib-
utes at least one third of the group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), i.e., qmin =
1
3 min(Qmin).
Examples for the rule “Equal Contribution” with a minimum contribution of the group
min(Qmin) = 45.
Rule “Equal
Contribution”
Lower limit of
contribution
Payoff
Type20 15 32
Type30 15 42
Type40 15 52
Note: We assume each player chooses their lower limit as the contribution, i.e, q = qmin.
[Only for participants in the exogenously implemented equal payoff rule (ex-eqpay)]
Rule “Equal Payoff“: qmin is determined from min(Qmin) so that the payoffs off all
players are equal or at least adjusted as far as possible.
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Examples for the rule “Equal Payoff” with a minimum contribution of the group
min(Qmin) = 45.
Rule “Equal Payoff”
Lower limit of
contribution
Payoff
Type20 5 42
Type30 15 42
Type40 25 42
Note: We assume each player chooses their lower limit as the contribution, i.e, q = qmin.
[Only for participants in the exogenously implemented proportional contribution rule (ex-
propcont)]
Rule “Proportional Contribution“: qmin is determined from min(Qmin) so that the
minimum contributions, qmin, of all players are proportional to their initial endow-
ment. I.e., the higher the initial endowment the higher is the minimum contribution,
qmin, to the joint project by the player.
Examples for the rule “Proportional Contribution” with a minimum contribution of
the group min(Qmin) = 45.
Rule “Proportional
Contribution”
Lower limit of
contribution
Payoff
Type20 5 42
Type30 15 42
Type40 25 42
Note: We assume each player chooses their lower limit as the contribution, i.e, q = qmin.
[Only for participants in the exogenously implemented rule-based contribution schemes (ex-
eqcont, ex-eqpay, ex-propcont)]
Please use the simulator to understand the examples. On your screen you will find an
Excel file named “simulator”. You can enter your desired minimum contribution of
the group, min(Qmin), in the simulator. For the rule “Equal Contribution” [alternative
wording for ex-eqpay: “Equal Payoff”] [alternative wording for ex-propcont: “Proportional
Contribution”] the individual minimum contributions, qmin, and the corresponding
payoffs to each player as well as the payoff to the group are calculated. Please note
that only the corresponding minimum contributions are calculated, i.e. the minimum
contribution of the group, min(Qmin), is distributed to the players according to the
different rules. Of course, you can also contribute more than the calculated minimum
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contribution, but only as long as your contribution does not exceed your initial endow-
ment. The game consists of ten separate rounds, in which you always play the same
game, you remain the same type and you interact with the same two participants.
[Only for participants in the exogenously implemented voluntary contribution mechanism (ex-
VCM)]
In each round, you will be informed about the contributions (q1 to q3) and the payoffs
(payoff 1 to payoff 2) of all players in your group as well as the average values (D).
[Only for participants in the exogenously implemented rule-based contribution schemes (ex-
eqcont, ex-eqpay, ex-propcont)]
In each round, you will be informed about the proposals of the minimum contribution
(Qmin1 to Qmin3), the contributions (q1 to q3) and the payoffs (payo f f1 to payo f f3) of all
players in your group as well as the average values (D).
[Only for participants in the Single-Phase Game]
At the end of the experiment you will receive the payoff of one of the ten rounds in €
(3 LD = 1 €). The round that will be disbursed is chosen randomly. Therefore, in each
round, you should act as if it was relevant to disbursement. In the beginning, there
will be two trial rounds which are not relevant to disbursement.
Control Questions (please answer, use the simulator if necessary) [Only for parti-
cipants in the Single-Phase Game]
• Assume that your contribution as Type40 to the joint project is 20 LD. The contri-
butions of the two other group members are 0 and 10 LD. What is your payoff?
My payoff is ________________
• Assume that your contribution as a Type20 to the joint project is 0 LD. The contri-
butions of the two other group members are 10 and 20 LD. What is your payoff?
My payoff is ________________
• Assume all the other players in your group have contributed their whole initial
endowment to the project. Which of the following contributions gives you the
highest payoff as a type40? (please tick) O 0 LD O 10 LD O 20 LD O 40 LD
• Assume all the other players in your group have contributed their whole initial
endowment to the project. Which of the following contributions gives the group
the highest payoff if you are a type40? (please tick) O 0 LD O 10 LD O 20 LD O
40 LD
[Only for participants in the exogenously implemented rule-based contribution schemes (ex-
eqcont, ex-eqpay, ex-propcont)]
• Assume, the three players have stated 10, 20 and 30 respectively as the pro-
posal for the minimum contribution. What is the group’s minimum contribution
min(Qmin)? The group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), is: _______
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[Only for participants in the exogenously implemented equal contribution rule (ex-eqcont)]
• Assume, the group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), to the project is 30. What
is your minimum contribution and payoff in the “Equal Contribution” rule, if all
the players contribute their minimum contribution and you are type20? (Tip: Use
the simulator)
Rule “Equal
Contribution”
My minimum
contribution qmin
My payoff
[Only for participants in the exogenously implemented equal payoff rule (ex-eqpay)]
• Assume, the group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), to the project is 30. What
is your minimum contribution and payoff in the “Equal Payoffs” rule, if all the
players contribute their minimum contribution and you are type20? (Tip: Use
the simulator)
Rule “Equal
Payoffs”
My minimum
contribution qmin
My payoff
[Only for participants in the exogenously implemented proportional contribution rule (ex-
propcont)]
• Assume, the group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), to the project is 30. What
is your minimum contribution and payoff in the “Proportional Contributions”
rule, if all the players contribute their minimum contribution and you are type20?
(Tip: Use the simulator)
Rule
“Proportional
Contributions”
My minimum
contribution qmin
My payoff
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General information [For all participants]
If you have answered all the questions, please give us a sign. We will then check your
answers. The game will start (with explanations on the screen) when all participants
have answered the control questions correctly.
Good luck! The MaXLab-Team
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2.6.4 Screenshots
[Translated from German]†
Screenshot of the collective-choice phase of the Multi-Phase Game (majority rule voting)
Screenshot of the contribution phase of the Multi-Phase Game (eqcont)
†Explanatory notes are given in square brackets.
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3 Ratchet up or down? An experimental investigation
of global public good provision in the United
Nations Youth Associations Network
A previous version of this chapter has appeared as:
Gallier, C., M. Kesternich, A. Löschel and I. Waichman (2017). Ratchet up or down?
An experimental investigation of global public good provision in the United Nations
Youth Associations Network. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 17-071.
This article can be downloaded via
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp17071.pdf
Abstract: From a current perspective, the Paris Agreement is not sufficient to limit the
global mean temperature to below 2°C above pre-industrial level as intended. The
Agreement stipulates that parties review, compare, and ratchet up efforts to com-
bat climate change over time. Within this process, commitments heavily depend on
what has been already achieved and this status-quo represents an important refer-
ence point serving either as commitment advice or potential threat. We present an
experimental study that is specifically designed to incorporate the effect of a status-
quo via pre-existing contribution levels under endowment heterogeneity in a game, in
which participants make voluntary contributions to a public good. Our participants
are sampled from the United Nations Youth Associations Network, representing par-
ticipants from 51 countries. Members from developed and developing countries take
decisions against the background of different initial levels of endowments and pre-
existing contributions. Our analysis indicates that starting with ambitious pre-existing
contribution levels can foster aggregate mitigation levels. Falling behind status-quo
contribution levels by reducing the public good appears to be a strong behavioral bar-
rier. These observations might provide support for the basic structure of the Paris
Agreement with Nationally Determined Contributions and the possibility to adjust
them, even if a downward revision of national targets may not be precluded.
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3.1 Introduction
During the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21) in 2015 and its res-
ulting Paris Agreement, 195 countries agreed to set out a global action plan to avoid
dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial level. The agreement is based on “bottom-up” Nationally Determined Con-
tributions (NDCs), which are voluntarily imposed, not legally binding and, finally, not
enforceable.21
Recent assessments evaluating the effects of current mitigation policies raise doubts
that countries are on track to meet the globally agreed target (UNFCCC 2015b). Con-
sequently, as formulated already in Article 3 of the Paris Agreement, “[t]he efforts of
all Parties will present a progression over time [. . . ]” (UNFCCC 2015a) to ratcheting up
and crank up ambitions over time. As a dynamic review mechanism, the global stock-
take assesses the achievements of the parties under the Agreement and its long-term
goals every five years, starting in 2023 (UNFCCC 2015a, Article 14).22
That is, countries will review, compare and potentially adjust their efforts periodically
during the stocktake. In that respect, Article 4.11 states “A Party may at any time ad-
just its existing [NDC] with a view to enhancing its level of ambition, [. . . ]” (UNFCCC
2015a). It shows that parties are not required to stick to a particular NDC once submit-
ted but may replace existing policies with alternative approaches. The important point
is that while a downward revision of existing NDCs is very likely to provoke stark cri-
ticism of the international community, in principal it remains a legally available option
under the Paris Agreement (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2017). Countries’
future commitments will therefore depend on their individual assessment of what has
been already achieved, both by themselves and the other countries. The status-quo
of already achieved emission reductions may serve as a typical reference point, which
may either advice countries to show commitment and strengthen their ambitions or
appears as potential threat leading countries to reverse actions already undertaken.
In fact, again, while countries are encouraged to increase their ambitions during the
stocktake, an adjustment of the NDCs to less ambitious emission reduction targets
may also be possible. The decision of the current US government to withdraw from the
21One of the core elements of the Agreement consists in encouraging parties to submit individual
pledges for achieving substantial emission reductions at the national level to make efforts trans-
parent and comparable. However, there is scepticism whether countries will deviate from their sov-
ereign commitments (e.g., Barrett and Dannenberg 2016).
22The parties agreed on the global stocktake as central review mechanism to access collective progress
towards the globally agreed target. The global stocktake should provide countries with information
for strengthening their ambitions and submitting new NDCs in the two years following the stock-
take. In 2018, stock of international efforts is taken for the first time. The results of this assessment
are then used to inform the decisions on more ambitious NDCs, which have to be submitted by 2020.
This will be followed with a global stocktake every five years (Article 14).
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Paris Agreement and to reverse policies initiated by the previous government serves
as an example for the latter case. The question is then: ratchet up or down during the
stocktake?
To address this question, we experimentally investigate the impact of the status-quo
on future climate actions with the possibility of increasing and decreasing ambition
levels under wealth heterogeneity, i.e., poor and rich countries, in the negotiations.
Our experimental design builds upon the canonical public good games (e.g., Ledyard
1995; Chaudhuri 2011) to capture the tension between the individual interest to free
ride on contributions of other group members and the joint interest to provide the
public good, i.e., the global mitigation target, at a social optimal level. We thereby focus
on individuals’ pre-existing climate mitigation actions, which have been implemented
exogenously. To capture the effect of the status-quo, participants in our experiment
choose their actions against the backdrop of these pre-existing mitigation efforts.
Previous experimental studies devoted to the global climate tragedy account for pre-
existing efforts by restricting the choice of players in a way that they can only add on
top of what has been already achieved (e.g., Milinski et al. 2008; Tavoni et al. 2011;
Barrett and Dannenberg 2012; 2014). By contrast, our experimental design allows for
both increasing and decreasing ambition levels compared to the status-quo; most im-
portantly players can undo existing efforts by taking pre-existing contributions from
the public good. In case decisions are mutually exclusive (i.e., either only give or take
from the status-quo), some studies find that such status-quo framing matters (e.g., An-
dreoni 1995; Park 2000; Khadjavi and Lange 2015; Gächter et al. 2017), while others
do not observe that it changes behavior (e.g., van Dijk and Wilke 1997; Sell and Son
1997; Cubitt et al. 2011; Dufwenberg et al. 2011; Cox et al. 2013). A recent such study
by Gächter et al. (2017) reveals that differences between giving and taking frames are
associated with a decrease in reciprocity in take decisions and the mixed results can
be traced back to individual differences in attitudes and beliefs. In a setting where
the status-quo allows for both, ratcheting up and down pre-existing contributions, van
Soest et al. (2016) find that cooperation collapses where participants can give and take
compared to a pure giving frame, while Khadjavi and Lange (2015) do not observe
differences. However, all these studies do not address heterogeneities between the
parties, a crucial feature and a major source of ongoing controversies in climate change
negotiations.
In our experiment we take differences in wealth into account and divide participants
into two groups to reflect the persisting dichotomy between rich (“Annex-I”) and poor
(“Non-Annex-I”) countries in current international climate policy.23 Even though the
23We are aware of one public good experiment with heterogeneous players extending the strategy set
59
Ratchet up or down?
Paris Agreement tries to avoid this bilateral structure, it continues to be of crucial im-
portance to climate change negotiations (Tørstad and Sælen 2017). Building up on the
reference point in a setting with an intermediate public good provision level compared
to the standard giving setting with no taking option our experimental design thereby
provides a more differentiated view on a potential contribution norm or burden shar-
ing mechanism. Pre-existing provision levels thereby may either serve as coordination
advice (since they might suggest a focal point for a possible contribution norm) or ap-
pear as a potential threat if parties undo climate action already implemented in the
past, e.g., if they fear that other group members will contribute too little.
Another novelty of our study is that we investigate the impact of the status-quo on
future climate actions for the case of poor and rich players and also capture the in-
ternational dimension of global public goods (e.g., Barrett 2010) by collaborating with
the United Nations Youth Associations Network (UNYANET). We recruited 139 indi-
viduals from 51 different countries. Wealth heterogeneity was implemented such that
group members from a developing country start with a lower endowment than mem-
bers from developed countries.24
Our results reveal that starting with pre-existing public goods provision levels and al-
lowing both for giving and taking decreases contributions (i.e., additional efforts bey-
ond the status-quo) compared to the standard giving frame. We find that both poor and
rich agents contribute around 30% of their disposable endowment to the public good
in both settings. However, reducing pre-existing contributions by taking out of the
group account appears to be a strong behavioral barrier for the vast majority of parti-
cipants. Consequently, in our setting, public goods provision is higher when starting
with a pre-determined contribution level compared to a pure giving frame. While our
experimental results cannot be generalized and directly inform international climate
negotiations, we provide the important insight that the mere existence of a status-quo
plays an important role for cooperation. The majority of individuals tend to abstain
from exploiting or reversing existing public goods provision if they have the oppor-
to taking (see McCarter et al. 2011). In case participants differ with respect to wealth, it is shown that
highly endowed subjects are more likely to give to the public good, while low endowed subjects are
more likely to take from the public good. While this study provides valuable first insights, the exper-
iment does not include a pure giving frame and, therefore, does not allow for comparing potential
differences in efficiency levels between these two different institutions.
24One might argue that the personal wealth status rather than the wealth status of the respective home
country matters for the individual contribution decision in the public goods game. Since delegates in
real negotiations typically are expected to represent their countries‘ views rather than their personal
interests, we are confident that assigning players different roles based on the economic circumstances
of their home country instead of considering personal wealth or income status provides a proper
way to address our research question. Moreover, we control for the personal wealth status in our
regression analysis without finding any significant impact of the personal income on the outcome
variables.
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tunity to do so. This observation might provide support for the basic structure of the
Paris Agreement with Nationally Determined Contributions and the possibility to ad-
just them, even if a downward revision of national targets might not be precluded.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the exper-
imental design and procedure of the study. Results are presented in Section 3.3. A
concluding discussion is provided in Section 3.4.
3.2 Experimental design and procedure
Our experiment is built upon a standard 4-player public goods game. To implement
the status-quo with pre-existing contributions, we adopt the design developed by Khad-
javi and Lange (2015) for the case of poor and rich parties. We distinguish between two
treatment conditions: a pure giving condition (GIVE) without any pre-existing contri-
butions and a condition allowing for both giving and taking of pre-existing efforts
(GITA). In both conditions, each group consists of two poor and two rich agents. Rich
agents receive an initial endowment of 30 tokens, while poor agents receive an initial
endowment of 10 tokens. In the public goods game, every player has to decide how
many tokens to keep for herself and how many tokens to contribute to the group ac-
count, reflecting the group climate change mitigation efforts. Each player earns 0.4
token for each token invested in the group account, regardless of whether she con-
tributed to the group account. Under these parameters, it is in individuals’ material
self-interest to keep the entire endowment in their private account, however, from the
group’s perspective, it is socially optimal if the entire endowment of all group mem-
bers is invested into the public account.
The only difference between GIVE and GITA is that in the first case the entire endow-
ment is initially assigned to the individuals, and hence the status-quo public good pro-
vision is zero. By contrast, in GITA, 40% of the initial endowment (i.e., 12 tokens and
4 tokens for the rich and poor players, respectively) is initially allocated to the public
good. Hence, in this treatment the status-quo of contributions is 40% of the individual
initial endowment and players have the opportunity to increase contributions to the
public good beyond the status-quo, to maintain the current levels, or even to undo
efforts by taking existing contributions out of the public account.
Given our parameters and assuming standard preferences, the unique Nash equilib-
rium in dominant strategies is identical in both treatments: zero public good provi-
sion. In GIVE players should give nothing to the public good and, accordingly, in
GITA agents are expected to undo existing efforts by taking all contributions out of the
group account.
To capture the international dimension of the global climate tragedy, we conducted
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Figure 3.1: Subject pool by country and Human Development Index
Human Development Index :
less than 0.4
0.4 – 0.5
0.5 – 0.6
0.6 – 0.7
0.7 – 0.8
0.8 – 0.9
more than 0.9
Afghanistan(7), Albania(1), Austria(18), Bahrain(1), Belgium(2), Bhutan(1), Bulgaria(1), Cameroon(1), China(1), Colombia(2), 
   Croatia(1), Czech Republic(1), Ethiopia(2), Finland(1), France(2), Gambia(7), Germany(16), Greece(1), Hungary(2),  
     India(1), Indonesia(1), Kazakhstan(3),  Kenya(2), Kyrgyzstan(2), Macedonia(2), Mongolia(1), Montenegro(1), 
      Nepal(2), Netherlands(1), Nigeria(4), Norway(1), Peru(1), Philippines(1), Poland(1), Romania(6), 
      Serbia(7), Slovenia(3), Somalia(6), South Africa(1), Sweden(2), Switzerland(5), 
      Syrian Arab Republic(1), Tajikistan(2), Tanzania(1), Turkey(1), Turkmenistan(1), 
      Uganda(2), Ukraine(3), United Kingdom(1), United States(3), Uzbekistan(2)
Note: Countries with a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.7 and above are considered as countries
with a high or very high human development (i.e., developed). Countries with a HDI below 0.7 are
considered to have a medium or low development (i.e., developing). Red circles of different diameter
indicate where participants come from. The larger the circles, the more participants come from the
respective country.
the experiment in collaboration with the United Nations Youth Associations Network
(UNYANET). The aim of UNYANET is to strengthen the collaboration between its
members, the UN and further international organizations, e.g., by organizing Model
United Nation (MUNs) sessions.25 Individual members of the network were contac-
ted by the national organizations via email, inviting them to take part in a scientific
study on individual decision making conducted in collaboration with UNYANET. The
email was distributed via UNYANET‘s official communication network. Participants
were informed that they could earn an additional individual earning depending on
their decisions and the decisions of their peers. In addition, participants knew that
UNYANET receives a show-up fee of 2 US-Dollars for each participant. Subjects were
informed that 10 percent of all participants were randomly selected after the exper-
iment to receive their payment. We did not disclose any further information of the
context or the aim of the experiment at this stage of the study.
As a first step, UNYANET members who followed the link in the invitation email had
25Further information on the UNYANET network are provided in the appendix.
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to complete an online registration in order to be able to participate in the experiment.
During the registration, participants had to provide socio-demographic information
(age, sex, income, education, religion, nationality, and residence). This information
was required to assign high and low endowments to participants from developed and
developing countries, respectively.26 After the registration, participants received an
individual email with a unique access code and could take part in the online exper-
iment. Conducting the experiment via the internet offered advantages for our study
(e.g., Eckel and Wilson 2006; Horton et al. 2011). Most importantly, using the internet
enabled us to conduct the experiment synchronously at different sites, which provides
the opportunity of comparing individual decisions across regions and countries.
In total, 139 UNYANET members from 51 countries followed our invitation and took
part in our online experiment. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of participants ac-
cording to countries and the respective economic development. Before entering their
allocation decision, individuals were guided through detailed instructions on the pro-
cedure, and a set of numerical examples.27 We use an ex-post protocol to match par-
ticipants into groups of four players and to calculate group contribution levels and
payoffs.28 The average payment for the selected participants was a purchasing power
equivalent to $25 in the respective countries. After the allocation decision, we asked
participants to answer questions thereby eliciting their attitudes, e.g., towards trust
and climate change.
The characteristics of the participants from developed and developing countries are
displayed in Table 3.1. In both samples the average age is 25, and around 50% are
students (no significant differences between the samples). However, the share of fe-
male participants is lower in developing countries than in developed countries (36%
vs. 53%, p-value: 0.057, χ2-test). In addition, participants from developed countries
are more likely to define themselves as belonging to a lower income group within their
home countries than participants from developed countries (3.14 vs. 2.52, p-value:
0.000, Mann–Whitney U test). As to personal attitudes, we find a considerably higher
trust level (47% vs. 20%, p-value: 0.002, χ2-test) for participants from developed coun-
tries than for participants from developing countries (47% of the participants from
developed countries agree with the statement that "most people can be trusted", but
only 20% of all participants from developing countries). Moreover, it appears that
participants from developing countries assign a higher weight to the need for fight-
ing climate change than participants from developed countries (4.53 vs. 4.88, p-value:
0.004, Mann–Whitney U test). We take into account these individual characteristics
26Details on the classification and assignment are provided in the appendix.
27We provide experimental details, invitation letters, instructions, and screenshots in the appendix.
28Details on the matching protocol are provided in the appendix.
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Table 3.1: Sample characteristics
Developed
countries
Developing
countries
Participants (in #) 89 50
Age (in years) 25.6 25.9
Female (in %) 52.8 36.0
Student (in %) 57.3 48.0
Income (category) 2.86 3.48
City (category) 3.1 2.82
Trust (in %) 47.1 20.0
Importance of climate
protection (category)
4.53 4.88
Note: "Age" (in years); "Female" (female dummy); "Student" (student dummy); "Income": 1 indicates
the lowest and 5 the highest income group in the participant’s country, based on self-assessment; "City":
grew up in big city (1) to rural village (4); "Trust": % of indicating “Most people can be trusted”; "Im-
portance of climate change protection": importance of fighting climate change: not important (1) to very
important (5).
and differences between the two subsamples, which might affect decision behavior, by
adding them as explanatory variables within our regression analysis provided in the
following section.
3.3 Results
Figure 3.2 illustrates our results for individual contributions (i.e., efforts beyond the
status-quo) and individual provision levels (i.e., including both the status-quo and in-
dividual contributions) across treatment conditions.29 We find that average individual
contributions in GITA (4.6 tokens) fall below those in GIVE (7.0 tokens). Regression
analyses of the data show that these differences are significant (Table 3.3 – column 1,
p-value: 0.024). While participants contribute less in GITA, the vast majority abstains
from undoing pre-existing contribution levels. Only 10% take out of the public good,
which suggests that falling behind the status-quo appears to provoke a strong beha-
vioral barrier in our experiment. Further evidence for this argument can be found by
focusing on full free-riding behavior. In GITA, not a single individual fully free-rides.
In GIVE, 4.4% of all participants act purely selfishly, i.e., zero contributions (4.35% vs.
0.00%, p-value: 0.120, Fisher’s exact test).
By looking at the relative contributions (i.e., in percentage of disposable endowment),
29Detailed summary statistics are provided in Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Individual contributions and provisions by treatments and types
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Note: Individual contributions (i.e., efforts beyond the status-quo) to the public good (left) and provision
levels (i.e., including both the status-quo and individual contributions) (right) in absolute terms across
treatments (GIVE vs. GITA) aggregated for both types of players (all) as well as separately for rich and
poor players. The horizontal lines show the range of individual contributions (provisions). Outliers are
presented separately. The ends of the “box” indicate the lower and upper values of the interquartile
range, i.e., the middle 50 percent of the variable.
we find that participants contribute, on average, around one third of their disposable
endowment to the climate account in both treatments GIVE and GITA (GITA: 32% vs.
GIVE: 33%, p-value: 0.985, Mann-Whitney U test).
We now analyse the behavior of rich and poor players separately. Average contributions
from rich players in GITA (6.2 tokens) fall below that in GIVE (8.9 tokens) (p-value:
0.071, Table 3.3 – column 2). Only 6.7% of the rich participants reduce existing climate
mitigation efforts (see Table 3.1). In this line, neither the share of contributors (91.1%
vs. 93.2%, p-value: 0.513, Fisher’s exact) nor the share of participants choosing the
most selfish option (0% vs. 6.8%, p-value: 0.117, Fisher’s exact) differs significantly
between GITA and GIVE. Poor participants decide to transfer only about half of the
amount in GITA than in GIVE (1.8 vs. 3.6, p-value: 0.003, Table 3.3 – column 2). But
also for them, the possibility to fall behind the pre-existing contribution level appears
to be a strong behavioral barrier. 16% of the poor participants decide to undo pre-
existing contribution levels. Neither the share of givers (100% vs. 84.0%, p-value:
0.110, Fisher’s exact) nor the share of strong free riders (0% vs. 0%) differ significantly
across treatments for poor agents. Comparing the absolute reductions in individual
contributions for both types between GITA and GIVE (rich: -1.9 vs. poor: -2.6) does not
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics - individual contributions and provisions
Developed
(rich)
Developing
(poor)
GIVE GITA GIVE GITA
Mean contribution level 8.86 6.24 3.64 1.76
% of contributions < 0 - 6.67 - 16.00
% of contributions = 0 6.82 2.22 0.00 0.00
% of contributions > 0 93.18 91.11 100.00 84.00
% of endowment 29.53 20.80 36.40 17.60
% of disposable endowment 29.53 34.67 36.40 29.33
Mean provision level 8.86 18.24 3.64 5.76
Note: Individual contributions (i.e., efforts beyond the status-quo) to the public good (upper part) and
provision levels (i.e., including both the status-quo and individual contributions) (lower part) in abso-
lute terms across treatments (GIVE vs. GITA) separately for rich players from developed countries and
poor players from developing countries.
reveal any significant differences in our sample (captured by interaction term GITA x
Poor, p-value 0.739, Table 3.3 – column 2).
There is statistical evidence that higher trust levels increases giving, but this holds only
for rich players (p-value: 0.001, Table 3.3 – column 3). The remaining control variables
(age, female, student, income and city) do not significantly affect our results.
Even though GITA reduces individual contributions compared to GIVE (4.6 vs. 7.0, p-
value: 0.024, Table 3.3 – column 1), average individual provision levels (i.e., including
both the status-quo and individual contributions) in GITA are about twice as high as
in GIVE (13.8 vs.7.0, p-value: 0.000, Table 3.3 – column 4; Figure 3.2 – right-hand side).
As discussed, participants in GITA hardly reduce their status-quo contributions. More
precisely, in GIVE and in GITA rich (30% vs. 35%, p-value 0.406, Mann-Whitney U
test) and poor (29% vs. 36%, p-value 0.411, Mann-Whitney U test) players contribute
on average around 30% of their disposable income to the public good. Individual
provision levels both for rich players (18.2 vs. 8.9, p-value 0.000, Table 3.3 –column 5)
and poor players (5.8 vs. 3.6, p-value 0.000, Table 3.3 – column 5) are, therefore, higher
in GITA than in GIVE.
The private provision of public goods among heterogeneous agents always raises is-
sues on a fair burden sharing, i.e., who should bear the costs of providing the pub-
lic good? We now compare provision at the group level (see Figure 3.3). Groups in
GIVE contribute on average 25 tokens to the public good. The two poor players per
group contribute together 7 tokens and the two rich players contribute 18 tokens. Con-
66
Ratchet up or down?
Table 3.3: Individual contributions and provisions
Individual
contribution levels
Individual
provision levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GITA -2.33**
(1.02)
2.62*
(1.44)
-2.74*
(1.51)
6.81***
(1.22)
9.38***
(1.44)
9.26***
(1.51)
Poor -5.22***
(1.23)
-4.02*
(2.14)
-5.22***
(1.23)
-4.02*
(2.14)
GITA x Poor 0.74
(1.57)
1.54
(1.65)
-7.26***
(1.57)
-6.46***
(1.65)
Trust 5.31***
(1.60)
5.31***
(1.60)
Trust x Poor -5.11***
(1.73)
-5.11***
(1.73)
Climate 0.11
(1.04)
0.11
(1.04)
Climate x Poor 0.08
(1.35)
0.08
(1.35)
Age 0.04
(0.12)
0.04
(0.12)
Female -0.39
(1.02)
-0.39
(1.02)
Student -0.50
(1.29)
-0.50
(1.29)
Income -0.87
(0.63)
-0.87
(0.63)
City 0.36
(0.49)
0.36
(0.49)
Constant 6.97***
(0.801)
8.86***
(1.14)
7.71
(4.76)
6.97***
(0.80)
8.86***
(1.14)
7.71
(4.76)
R-squared 0.037 0.184 0.334 0.184 0.520 0.603
AIC 895.234 887.155 768.232 945.941 876.155 768.234
Observations 139 139 122 139 139 122
Note: OLS regressions, with robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
Dependent variable are participants’ individual contribution to the public good in Model (1) – (3) and
the corresponding provision level in Model (4) – (6).
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Figure 3.3: Public good provisions at group level by treatments and types
1 square = 1 token
1 square = 1 token
poor - private account
poor - public account
rich - public account
rich - private account
poor - private account
poor - public account 
poor - status-quo
rich - status-quo
rich - public account
rich - private account
GIVE
GITA
Note: Each square corresponds to one token contributed to the public good on average per group in
GIVE (GITA) on top (below). Squares are highlighted in different colors for different participants (poor
participants from developed countries in blue vs. rich participants from developing countries in red). In
GITA, also initial contribution levels are highlighted separately.
sequently, nearly 28% of all contributions are provided by poor participants and the
remaining 72% by their rich partners, which shows that participants coordinate on an
equalizing redistribution that offsets the initial differences in endowments. This trend
is even more pronounced in GITA, where two rich players contribute 12 tokens to the
public good and the two poor players contribute 4 tokens. Taking into account the
status-quo level (8 tokens for the poor and 24 tokens for the rich players), the over-
all provision level increases to 48 tokens per group. Therefore, 75% of the total pub-
lic good level is provided by the rich agents. This is remarkable since rich players’
status-quo contribution was already three times higher beforehand compared to the
poor players’ levels. We thus find that an institutional design which is build on pre-
existing provision levels characterizing the status-quo – even though the taking option
fully ensures cooperation to be voluntarily – generates higher benefits than a pure giv-
ing frame even if players differ with respect to their initial wealth.
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3.4 Summary and concluding remarks
The Paris Agreement arguably gives new hope to climate change negotiations (e.g.,
Bodansky 2016) but from a current perspective, it seems insufficiently ambitious to
limit the global mean temperature increase to 2°C (UNFCCC 2015b). According to
Article 3 of the Agreement, the global efforts to combat climate change at a danger-
ous level will experience a progression over time. As a dynamic mechanism to review
the voluntarily implemented NDCs of the different Parties, the global stocktake as-
sesses the achievements of the international community every five years, starting in
2023 (UNFCCC 2015a, Article 14). As countries will review, compare and potentially
adjust their efforts periodically during this process, their future commitments depend
on what has been already achieved. This status-quo reflects an important reference
point serving either as a commitment advice for strengthening the ambition or even
revising it downwards.
We experimentally investigate the impact of the status-quo on future climate actions
in a stylized negotiation setting reflecting the persisting dichotomy (Tørstad and Sælen
2017) between rich (“Annex-I”) and poor (“Non-Annex-I”) countries. Our results stress
the importance of the status-quo for cooperative behavior. The analysis suggests that
starting with pre-existing mitigation levels can foster aggregate mitigation levels. An
important insight is that falling behind the pre-determined status-quo builds a strong
behavioral barrier. The vast majority of players tends to abstain from reversing exist-
ing mitigation efforts. Of course, our experimental setup reflects only one particular
aspect of the global stocktake as a review mechanism, namely its potential to affect
players‘ cooperative behavior via the status-quo. Low and highly endowed agents
contribute around 30% of their disposable endowment to the climate account both in a
setting with and without pre-determined contribution levels. Consequently, a status-
quo comprising 40% of the initial wealth resulting in an increase in overall ambition
levels. The possibility to revise contributions later might have led to more ambitious
contribution levels initially (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2017). Given
our results, the higher pre-determined contribution levels might indeed result in more
climate mitigation efforts. The robustness of this finding against the background of
different pre-existing contribution levels provides an avenue for future research.
Finally, whether the global stocktake process fosters the implementation of the Paris
Agreement and increases overall climate actions will also depend on a variety of dif-
ferent factors, which we did not consider in our experiment including, e.g., strategic
behavior over multiple periods, sequential decision making, and an open and non-
anonymous discussion about targets and intentions. This provides an interesting and
important route for further research.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Experimental details
Payoffs and treatments The material incentive for each agent i, pii, is given by the
following equation:
pii = wti − ati + h(
n
∑
j=1
etj +
n
∑
j=1
atj).
Where wti is i’s endowment in treatment t, a
t
i ∈ Ati represents the transfer of i in treat-
ment t, Ati is the corresponding strategy set, h denotes the per capita return to the
public good with 0 < h < 1 < hn and eti is i’s initial allocation to the public good
in treatment t. We choose n = 4 and h = 0.4. Agents differ with respect to their
initial endowment. Each group consists of two rich agents and two poor agents. Rich
agents receive an initial endowment of 30 tokens and poor agents, in contrast, receive
an initial endowment of 10 tokens. Our experiment design consists of two treatments
summarized in Table 3.4. Treatments differ in the initial allocation to the public good,
eti , the endowment w
t
i , and the corresponding action set available A
t
i . We use a pure
giving frame (GIVE) as baseline. In this voluntary contribution mechanism, no initial
allocations to the public good are made (eGIVEpoor = eGIVErich = 0). Consequently, agents
are endowed with wGIVEpoor = 10 and wGIVErich = 30 and have the following actions sets:
aGIVEpoor ∈ [0, 10] and aGIVErich ∈ [0, 30]. In our second treatment, agents can either add to
or subtract from the public good. In this giving and taking (GITA) frame, both rich
and poor agents made an initial contribution of 40% of their endowment to the public
good, i.e., eGITApoor = 4 and eGITArich = 12. In GITA, the remaining endowments are given
by wGITApoor = 6 and wGITArich = 18 and, consequently, poor agents can decide on transfers
between −4 and 6 tokens (aGITApoor ∈ [−4, 6]) and rich agents between −12 and 18 tokens
(aGIVErich ∈ [−12, 18]).
Data collection and matching Participants were recruited within the United Na-
tions Youth Associations Network (UNYANET). UNYANET is the international um-
brella organization of the United Nations (UN) Youth and Students associations with
members from Europe, Asia, Africa and America. It was founded in 2011 and is seated
in Geneva, Switzerland (for further information, see http://unyanet.org/). An invit-
ation letter was distributed via the national contact points to the respective national
members by email. Members who followed the link in the email first had to com-
plete a pre-registration, providing some sociodemographic information (age, sex, in-
come, education, religion, nationality, and residence). We used this information to
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Table 3.4: Experimental design
Endowment Initial contribution Action space
GIVE
poor wGIVEpoor = 10 eGIVEpoor = 0 aGIVEpoor ∈ [0, 10]
rich wGIVErich = 30 e
GIVE
rich = 0 a
GIVE
rich ∈ [0, 30]
GITA
poor wGITApoor = 10 eGITApoor = 4 aGITApoor ∈ [−4, 6]
rich wGITArich = 30 e
GITA
rich = 12 a
GITA
rich ∈ [−12, 18]
Note: Groups consist of two poor and two rich agents each. Poor and rich agents receive an endowment
of 10 and 30 tokens, respectively. In GIVE, no initial contributions to the public good are made. Poor
agents can decide to transfer between 0 and 10 tokens. Rich agents can decide to transfer between 0 and
30 tokens. In GITA, poor and rich agents made an initial contribution to the public good of 4 and 12
tokens, respectively. Poor agents can decide to transfer between -4 and 6 tokens. Rich agents can decide
to transfer between -12 and 18 tokens.
assign participants to the different subgroups, i.e., assigning low and high endow-
ment to participants from developing and developed countries, respectively. After
the pre-registration, members received an email with a unique access code to start the
online experiment immediately. This procedure ensured that each participant could
take part only once in the study. We used LimeSurvey, a free open source software
tool (for further information, see https://www.limesurvey.org), for programming the
pre-registration and the experiment. The design was optimized for either the use of a
personal computer, a laptop, a tablet, or a smartphone. We used an ex-post protocol
to match participants into groups of four players. Groups always consisted of two
participants from developing countries and two participants from developed coun-
tries. Since our sample does not consist of participants from developing and developed
countries in equal parts, we have re-matched participants to determine payoffs for all
participants. Participants, also those who have been re-matched, have been paid once.
For re-matched participants it was randomly determined which group levels were con-
sidered to calculate payoffs. All payments were adjusted for purchasing power parity.
Assignment to treatments and classification of subjects Based on the information
from the pre-registration, we assigned low and high endowments to participants from
developing and developed countries, respectively. The classification into developed
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and developing countries was carried out using the Human Development Index (HDI).
The HDI combines life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators to
rank countries according to their human development. Countries with a HDI of 0.7
and above are considered as countries with a high or very high human development.
Countries with a HDI below 0.7 are considered to have a medium or low development.
Consequently, participants from a country with a HDI below 0.7 are assigned to be poor
and receive an initial endowment of 10 tokens. By contrast, participants from a country
with a HDI of 0.7 and above are assigned to be rich and receive an initial endowment
of 30 tokens. Afterwards, participants were randomly assigned to treatments (GIVE
or GITA), which was done independently after the information in the pre-registration
stage.
Statistical analysis In our one-shot experiment, we treated ati (the transfer of indi-
vidual i in treatment t) as an independent observation. Assigning participants to treat-
ments (GIVE or GITA) and types (poor or rich) results in the following number of ob-
servations: 69 observations in GIVE (44 rich and 25 poor) and 70 in GITA (45 rich and
25 poor). Statistical inference is based on linear regression models with robust standard
errors and indicator variables for being assigned to GITA (GITA=1if subject is assigned
to GITA, 0 otherwise) and poor (poor = 1 if subject is assigned to poor, 0 otherwise).
Table 3.3 presents results from different model specifications.
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3.5.2 Instructions
Invitation letter (pre-registration) - First page
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) Mannheim 
Registered Office: Mannheim ·  Local Court Mannheim HRB 6554 
Chairwoman of the Supervisory Board: Minister Theresia Bauer MdL 
Executive Directors: Prof. Dr. Clemens Fuest, Thomas Kohl 
Baden-Württembergische Bank ·  BIC: SOLADEST600 ·  IBAN: DE04600501017496502782 ·  VAT-No. DE188318292 
L 7, 1 ·  68161 Mannheim ·  Germany 
Mailing address: 
P.O. Box 10 34 43 ·  68034 Mannheim ·  Germany 
Phone +49(0)621/1235-01, Fax -222 
www.zew.de ·  www.zew.eu 
Mannheim, January 13, 2016 
Distinguished delegate, 
in cooperation with the United Nations Youth Associations Network (UNYANET), the Centre for 
European Economic Research (ZEW) is carrying out an 
online-study on individual decision making. 
Details concerning the research agenda and the results of the study will be circulated among all 
registered persons subsequently to the study. 
Why should I participate? 
The success of our study crucially depends on a high participation rate among UNYANET members 
from all over the world. The more delegates participate in the study, the better the insights we 
obtain from our analysis. Therefore, your personal participation in this survey is very important for the 
success of our research project. 
Furthermore, you can earn money:
To support the activities of your network, UNYANET will receive 2 US-Dollars for each participant.
Additionally, you can earn an individual payment. Whether you will get an individual payment and 
how much you will get depends on two factors: (i) Your decision in the study as well as the 
decisions of other participants. (ii) After all participants have made their decisions, we randomly 
select 10 percent of all participants who will receive their individual payment. These selected 
participants will receive an individual payment of about 50 US-Dollars on average.
How can I become a participant?
In a first step we invite you to register at: 
http://www.zew.de/onlinestudy-registration 
using a computer or smartphone. Completing the registration will take no more than 5 minutes of 
your time. Please note that we are looking for a balanced sample. That means depending on the 
number of registrations, it might be the case that not all of the registered persons will be able to 
participate in the study in the end. If you have been selected to participate in the study, you will 
receive your personal log-in details within the next 14 days via email. Otherwise all your data will be 
deleted subsequently to the study. 
Contact: 
Carlo Gallier 
Telefon +49 (0)621/1235-338 
Telefax +49 (0)621/1235-226 
E-Mail onlinestudy@zew.de 
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Invitation letter (pre-registration) - Second page
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) Mannheim 
Registered Office: Mannheim ·  Local Court Mannheim HRB 6554 
Chairwoman of the Supervisory Board: Minister Theresia Bauer MdL 
Executive Directors: Prof. Dr. Clemens Fuest, Thomas Kohl 
Baden-Württembergische Bank ·  BIC: SOLADEST600 ·  IBAN: DE04600501017496502782 ·  VAT-No. DE188318292 
L 7, 1 ·  68161 Mannheim ·  Germany 
Mailing address: 
P.O. Box 10 34 43 ·  68034 Mannheim ·  Germany 
Phone +49(0)621/1235-01, Fax -222 
www.zew.de ·  www.zew.eu 
What happens to my personal data? 
Your data will be used solely for scientific purposes and will be treated anonymously as well as 
confidentially. Only researchers of ZEW will know the participants’ identity and data will be utilized 
in accordance with the personal data protection legislation.  
Who is behind this study? 
The Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, Germany is a non-profit and 
independent research institute. Founded in 1990 on the basis of a public-private initiative in the 
Federal State of Baden-Württemberg in co-operation with the University of Mannheim, ZEW is one of 
Germany’s leading economic research institutes, and enjoys a strong reputation in Europe. This 
online-study on individual decision making is part of a larger research project funded by the 
German Leibnitz Association. More information about ZEW is available at http://www.zew.eu. 
Do you have any questions left?  
We are glad to help you with any questions or inconveniences. Do not hesitate to contact: 
onlinestudy@zew.de. Please note that details concerning the research agenda and the results of 
the study will be distributed among all registered persons as soon as the study is completed.  
Thank you, distinguished delegate, for your support of our research project! 
Yours sincerely, 
Carlo Gallier 
Dr. Martin Kesternich 
Prof. Dr. Andreas Löschel 
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Invitation email (experiment)
Dear [NAME], 
Many thanks for your interest in participating in our study. Please use the following link to start the 
study:  
www.zew.de/onlinestudy-2016 
Your personal log-in details are: [CODE] 
Please remember, this study is carried out by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in 
cooperation with the United Nations Youth Association Network (UNYANET).To support the activities of 
your network, UNYANET will receive 2 US-Dollar for each participant. Additionally, you can earn an 
individual payment. Whether you will get an individual payment and how much depends on your 
decisions in the study as well as on the decisions of other participants. Furthermore, after all participants 
have made their decisions, we randomly select 10 percent of all participants who will receive the 
individual payment. These selected participants will receive an individual payment of about 50 US-Dollar 
(adjusted for purchasing power parity) on average. 
If you have any question, do not hesitate to contact us (onlinestudy@zew.de). 
Yours sincerely, 
Carlo Gallier 
Dr. Martin Kesternich 
Prof. Dr. Andreas Löschel 
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Instructions and questionnaire
[Brackets are used to indicate the alternative wording [DEVELOPED vs. DEVELOPING] and
parameters [GIVE vs. GITA] used in the different treatments.]†
- Screen 1 -
Welcome!
Dear [Name],
Thank you very much for your interest in contributing to our research. You can start
the Online-Study immediately. Prior to participating, please read through the most
important information briefly summarized here:
• Participation will take no more than 10 minutes of your time.
• The study consists of both a decision task and a questionnaire.
• You will receive detailed information on the decision task during the study.
• All explanations are carried out as described:
– By "money" we mean real amounts of money which will be paid out.
– By other “participants” we mean real members of the UNYANET network
who participate in this study just like you.
Note: Please always use the provided buttons and not your internet browser for nav-
igation. Otherwise a successful completion of the study cannot be guaranteed.
Please click "Next" to learn more about the expense allowance.
- Screen 2 -
Your expense allowance consists of two parts: For each complete participation, UN-
YANET receives a fixed amount of 2 US-Dollars. Additionally, an individual payment
can be obtained in the decision task. Whether you will receive the individual payment
and how much you will get, depends on two factors:
1. Your decision in the study as well as the decisions of other participants.
2. After all participants have made their decisions, we randomly select 10 percent
of all participants who will receive their individual payment.
Please click "Next" to learn more about the expense allowance.
- Screen 3 -
We now start the explanation and the procedure of the decision task. Please carefully
read through the following instructions.
Explanation and procedure of the decision task
†Explanatory notes are given in square brackets.
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In this section, you have the chance to determine your individual payment.
Who is involved in the study? We create groups of four participants; in addition to
you there are three other participants in your group. Members of your group are from
a variety of countries. We categorize countries according to the Human Development
Index (HDI) published by the United Nations Development Programme. The HDI
is a summary of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a
long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The
HDI divides countries into four different groups. For our study, we classify countries
of “very high human development” and “high human development” as developed
countries and we classify countries of “medium human development” and “low hu-
man development” as developing countries. Like you one other participant is from
a [DEVELOPED: developed] [DEVELOPING: developing] country. The two remain-
ing participants are, in contrast, from [DEVELOPED: developing] [DEVELOPING: de-
veloped] countries.
The decision you will make affects both you and the other members of your group.
Therefore, your individual payment will be influenced by both your decision and the
decisions of the other group members. Please note, that all other members of your
group possess exactly the same amount of information and face the same decision as
you do.
What is the decision task? During the study your individual payment is calculated in
tokens. Subsequently to the study your payment will be converted from tokens into
US-Dollars at the following exchange rate:
1 Token = 1.5 US $ [adjusted for purchasing power parity]
Please note, the value of one token is the same in all countries. [GIVE: In this decision
task, you and the other member of your group from a [DEVELOPED: developed] [DE-
VELOPING: developing] country possess an initial endowment of [DEVELOPED: 30]
[DEVELOPING: 10] tokens in a private account. The two remaining participants from
[DEVELOPED: developing] [DEVELOPING: developed] countries possess, in contrast,
an initial endowment of [DEVELOPED: 30] [DEVELOPING: 10] tokens in their private
accounts. Your task is to decide on the transfer of tokens between your private account
and the group account: That is how many of the [DEVELOPED: 30] [DEVELOPING:
10] tokens in your private account you transfer to the group account. You will be asked
to indicate your transfer on a slider as shown below. If you move the slider to the
right, you decide to transfer tokens from your private account to the group account.
Please note, your transfer can be between 0 and [DEVELOPED: 30] [DEVELOPING:
10] tokens (only integer numbers).] [GITA: In this decision task, you and the other
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member of your group from a [DEVELOPED: developed] [DEVELOPING: develop-
ing] country possess an initial endowment of [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6]
tokens in a private account. The two remaining participants from [DEVELOPED: de-
veloping] [DEVELOPING: developed] countries possess, in contrast, an initial endow-
ment of [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6] tokens in their private accounts. In
addition, there are 32 tokens in a joint group account shared by all members of your
group. Your task is to decide on the transfer of tokens between your private account
and the group account: That is how many of the [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING:
6] in your private account you transfer to the group account and how many of the
32 tokens you leave in the group account respectively. Your transfer is related to the
group account as described below: A positive transfer is a transfer of tokens from your
private account to the group account. Respectively, a negative transfer is a transfer of
tokens from the group account to your private account. You will be asked to indicate
your transfer on a slider as shown below. If you move the slider to the left, you decide
to transfer tokens from the group account to your private account (negative transfer).
If you move the slider to the right, you decide to transfer tokens from your private
account to the group account (positive transfer). Please note, you are from a [DE-
VELOPED: developed] [DEVELOPING: developing] country and your transfer can be
between [DEVELOPED: -12] [DEVELOPING: -4] and [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOP-
ING: 6] tokens (only integer numbers). Participants from [DEVELOPED: developing]
[DEVELOPING: developed] countries can transfer [DEVELOPED: -4] [DEVELOPING:
-12] and [DEVELOPED: -12] [DEVELOPING: -4] and [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOP-
ING: 6] [DEVELOPED: 6] [DEVELOPING: 18] tokens (only integer numbers).]
How do the accounts differ from each other? Your individual payment depends on
your decision as well as on the decisions of the other three group members according to
the rules explained below. You receive a payment from tokens in your private account
and you and the other three group members receive a payment from tokens in the
group account.
• Private account: It’s only you who can transfer tokens from your private account
to the group account or vice versa. For every token which is in your private
account, you will receive 1 token. The other three group members do not receive
any payment from your private account. However, every participant equally
owns a respective private account.
• Group account: Apart from you, the other three group members can also trans-
fer tokens from their private account to the joint group account. For every token
which is in the group account, you and the other three group members will re-
ceive a payment of 0.4 tokens.
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Your total individual payment consists, consequently, of two parts: Part one: the
amount of tokens in your private account, and Part two: the payment from the group
account.
Please click "Next".
- Screen 4 -
Examples
Before deciding on your transfer, this page will provide you with two examples of
different transfers and how these decisions affect payments.
Example 1: [GIVE: Assume you are Participant A. You are from a [DEVELOPED: de-
veloped] [DEVELOPING: developing] country. You decide on a transfer of 2 tokens
from your private account to the group account. Participants B decides to transfer 2
tokens from its private account to the group account. C decides to transfer 3 tokens and
D decides to transfer 1 token. The group account now contains 8 (2+2+3+1) tokens. Ac-
cording to the rules, this amount of tokens is multiplied by 0.4 and all group members
benefit equally from it. Consequently, everybody receives 3.2 tokens from the group
account. Your total individual payment is given by your initial endowment minus
your transfer plus the payment from the group account: [DEVELOPED: 30] [DEVEL-
OPING: 10]-2+3.2= [DEVELOPED: 31.2] [DEVELOPING: 11.2].] [GITA: Assume you
are Participant A. You are from a [DEVELOPED: developed] [DEVELOPING: devel-
oping] country. You decide on a transfer of 2 tokens from your private account to the
group account. Participants B decides to transfer 2 tokens from its private account to
the group account. C decides to transfer 3 tokens and D decides to transfer 1 token.
The group account now contains 40 (32+2+2+3+1) tokens. According to the rules, this
amount of tokens is multiplied by 0.4 and all group members benefit equally from it.
Consequently, everybody receives 16 tokens from the group account. Your total in-
dividual payment is given by your initial endowment minus your transfer plus the
payment from the group account: developed [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6] -
2+16= [DEVELOPED: 32] [DEVELOPING: 20] tokens.]
Example 2: [GIVE: Assume you are Participant A. You are from a [DEVELOPED: de-
veloped] [DEVELOPING: developing] country. You decide on a transfer of 6 tokens
from your private account to the group account. Participants B decides to transfer 2
tokens from its private account to the group account. C decides to transfer 3 tokens
and D decides to transfer 1 token. The group account now contains 12 (6+2+3+1)
tokens. According to the rules, this amount of tokens is multiplied by 0.4 and all group
members benefit equally from it. Consequently, everybody receives 4.8 tokens from
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the group account. Your total individual payment is given by your initial endowment
minus your transfer plus the payment from the group account: [DEVELOPED: 30] [DE-
VELOPING: 10]-6+4.8= [DEVELOPED: 28.8] [DEVELOPING: 8.8].] [GITA: Assume
you are Participant A. You are from a [DEVELOPED: developed] [DEVELOPING: de-
veloping] country. You decide on a transfer of 2 tokens from the group account to your
private account. Participants B decides to transfer 2 tokens from its private account to
the group account. C decides to transfer 3 tokens and D decides to transfer 1 token.
The group account now contains 36 (32-2+2+3+1) tokens. According to the rules, this
amount of tokens is multiplied by 0.4 and all group members benefit equally from it.
Consequently, everybody receives 14.4 tokens from the group account. Your total in-
dividual payment is given by your initial endowment minus your transfer plus the
payment from the group account: [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6] -(-2)+14.4=
[DEVELOPED: 34.4] [DEVELOPING: 22.4] tokens.]
Please click "Next".
- Screen 5 -
Contribution Decision
[GIVE: At this stage, you now have to decide upon your transfer. Please note, that the
other members of your international group also indicate their decisions. You have [DE-
VELOPED: developed] [DEVELOPING: developing] tokens in your private account.
Please indicate the amount of tokens you want to transfer: 0-[DEVELOPED: 30] [DE-
VELOPING: 10].] [GITA: At this stage, you now have to decide upon your transfer.
Please note, that the other members of your international group also indicate their
decisions. The group account contains 32 tokens and you have [DEVELOPED: 18]
[DEVELOPING: 6] in your private account. Note again, any negative transfer between
[DEVELOPED: -12] [DEVELOPING: -4] tokens and -1 is a transfer from the public ac-
count to your private account. Accordingly, any positive transfer between 0 and [DE-
VELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6] tokens is a transfer from your private account to the
public account.]
Confirm: Please confirm your choice by clicking “Next”.
- Screen 6 -
Belief Group 1: Irrespective of your own decision: What do you think is the transfer
chosen by the other group member from a [DEVELOPED: developed] [DEVELOPING:
developing] country? [GIVE: Please indicate the amount of tokens 0-[DEVELOPED:
30] [DEVELOPING: 10].] [GITA: Note again, any negative transfer between [DEVELOP-
ED: -12] [DEVELOPING: -4] and -1 is a transfer from the public account to the private
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account. Accordingly, any positive transfer between 0 and [DEVELOPED: 18] [DE-
VELOPING: 6] is a transfer from the private account to the public account.]
Belief Group 2: Irrespective of your own decision: What do you think is the transfer
chosen by the other group members from [DEVELOPED: developing] [DEVELOPING:
developed] countries? [GIVE: Please indicate the amount of tokens 0-[DEVELOPED:
10] [DEVELOPING: 30].] [GITA: Note again, any negative transfer between [DEVELOP-
ED: -4] [DEVELOPING: -12] and -1 is a transfer from the public account to the private
account. Accordingly, any positive transfer between 0 and [DEVELOPED: 6] [DEVEL-
OPING: 18] is a transfer from the private account to the public account.]
Please click "Next".
- Screen 7 -
Please use the following scale to indicate how much you agree with the following
statement:
• To me, the decision task was easy to understand. O Strongly disagree O Disagree
O Neutral O Agree O Strongly agree O No answer
- Screen 8 -
Please use the following scale to indicate how you classify yourself:
• In general, are you rather risk seeking or do you avoid to be exposed to risk? 0
(risk-averse) to 5 (prepared to take risks) O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4 O 5 O No answer
• Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
need to be very careful in dealing with people? O Most people can be trusted O
You need to be very careful O No answer
- Screen 9 -
Please indicate for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be
justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this scale:
• Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled. O Never justifiable
O Mostly not justifiable O Neutral O Mostly justifiable O Always justifiable O No
answer
• Avoiding a fare on public transport. O Never justifiable O Mostly not justifiable
O Neutral O Mostly justifiable O Always justifiable O No answer
• Cheating on taxes if you have a chance. O Never justifiable O Mostly not justifi-
able O Neutral O Mostly justifiable O Always justifiable O No answer
- Screen 10 -
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• Please classify the area where you grew up. O Big city O Small city O Rural
village O No answer
People see themselves and how they relate to the world differently. Using this scale,
can you indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following state-
ments about how you see yourself?
• I see myself as a world citizen. O Strongly disagree O Disagree O Neutral O
Agree O Strongly agree O No answer
• I see myself as part of the [home country] nation. O Strongly disagree O Disagree
O Neutral O Agree O Strongly agree O No answer
• I see myself as an autonomous individual. O Strongly disagree O Disagree O
Neutral O Agree O Strongly agree O No answer
- Screen 11 -
If you use the following products or services, do you use them to contact people living
in other parts of your country, or also people living in other countries?
• Postal mail. O Local area O Other parts of my country O Other countries O No
answer
• Phone. O Local area O Other parts of my country O Other countries O No answer
• Internet. O Local area O Other parts of my country O Other countries O No
answer
Consider the following geographical areas. How often do you travel, either for work
or for vacation, in each of them?
• To other countries within my continent. O Every week O Every month O Every
year O Less often O Never O No answer
• To other countries outside my continent. O Every week O Every month O Every
year O Less often O Never O No answer
How often do you do the following activity?
• Watch a television program or movie from a different country. O Every day O
Every week O Less often O Never O I do not have access O No answer
• Watch or listen to an international news source (CNN International, BBC World,
Euronews, etc.). O Every day O Every week O Less often O Never O I do not
have access O No answer
• Read an international news source (Time, The Economist, Le Monde, etc.). O
Every day O Every week O Less often O Never O I do not have access O No
answer
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- Screen 12 -
• Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? O Roman Catholic O Prot-
estant O Othodox (Russian/Greek/etc.) O JEW O Muslim O Hindu O Buddhist
O Do not belong to denomination O Other:
• Please use the following scale to indicate how religious you are (1: not religious
at all, 5: very religious). O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4 O 5 O No answer
- Screen 13 -
• Please use the following scale to indicate how important it is for you to own a
piece of land (1: not important at all, 5: very important). O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4 O 5 O
No answer
• Please use the following scale to indicate how important it is for you to maintain
small species at the Amazon forest in South America (1: not important at all, 5:
very important). O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4 O 5 O No answer
Using this scale, can you indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of
the following statements concerning principles underlying potential rules to allocate
climate change mitigation costs across countries:
• Countries with high income levels must pay a larger share of the costs than coun-
tries with low income levels. This option says that countries with greater ability
to pay should pay more. O Strongly disagree O Disagree O Neutral O Agree O
Strongly agree O No answer
• Countries with currently high emissions levels must pay a larger share of the
costs than countries with currently low emission levels. This option says that
those countries that are currently polluting more should pay more. O Strongly
disagree O Disagree O Neutral O Agree O Strongly agree O No answer
• Countries with a history of high emissions levels must pay a larger share of the
costs than countries with a history of low emissions. This option recognizes that
CO2 builds up in the atmosphere over many years. Thus, countries which pol-
luted more in the past should pay more because they caused more of the prob-
lem. O Strongly disagree O Disagree O Neutral O Agree O Strongly agree O No
answer
• Countries with emissions per person greater than an agreed amount must pay,
and they must pay more the higher their emission per person are. O Strongly
disagree O Disagree O Neutral O Agree O Strongly agree O No answer
83
Ratchet up or down? - Appendix
• Each country shall reduce its emissions by an equal percentage rate. That is, a
countries’ overall share in global emissions remains constant. O Strongly dis-
agree O Disagree O Neutral O Agree O Strongly agree O No answer
- Screen 14 -
Using this scale, can you indicate how important the following global challenges are
in your opinion:
• International efforts in combating climate change. O Very important O Important
O Neutral O Moderately important O Not important O No answer
• Securing world nutrition and eradicating poverty. O Very important O Important
O Neutral O Moderately important O Not important O No answer
• Combating epidemics. O Very important O Important O Neutral O Moderately
important O Not important O No answer
• Stabilizing the international financial system. O Very important O Important O
Neutral O Moderately important O Not important O No answer
• Combating terrorism. O Very important O Important O Neutral O Moderately
important O Not important O No answer
- Screen 15 -
What comes next?
After all participants have made their decisions, the ZEW research team will screen
all decisions. To support the activities of your network, UNYANET will receive 2 US-
Dollars for each participant. Furthermore, 10 percent of all participants will be ran-
domly selected and receive their individual payment. If you have been selected, you
will be informed via email subsequently to the study.
- Screen 16 -
Did you enjoy taking part in this study and do you want to participate in other sci-
entific studies of this type? We would be pleased to add your name to our member
database and would be happy to invite you to further studies. As a matter of course,
your data are not used for any other purposes. If you wish to withdraw your parti-
cipation offer at any point of time, your data will be directly unsubscribed from the
database.
Please click on "Yes", to add your name to our database.
- Screen 17 -
Thank you for your time and support! Do you have any questions left? Our research
team would be glad to help you. Do not hesitate to contact: onlinestudy@zew.de.
Please note details concerning the research agenda and the results of the study will be
circulated among all registered persons subsequently to the study.
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3.5.3 Screenshots
Screenshots of the contribution decision†
[poor player in GIVE]
[poor player in GITA]
†Explanatory notes are given in square brackets.
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4 Leveling up? An inter-neighborhood experiment on
parochialism and the efficiency of multi-level public
goods provision
A previous version of this chapter has appeared as:
Gallier, C., T. Goeschl, M. Kesternich, J. Lohse, C. Reif and D. Römer (2017). Leveling
up? An inter-neighborhood experiment on parochialsim and the efficiency of
multi-level public goods provision. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 17-012.
This article can be downloaded via
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp17012.pdf
Abstract: Many public goods can be provided at different spatial levels. Evidence from
social identity theory and in-group favoritism raises the possibility that where higher-
level provision is more efficient, subjects’ narrow concern for local outcomes (parochi-
alism) could harm efficiency. Building on the experimental paradigm of multi-level
public good games and the “neighborhood attachment” concept, we conduct an arte-
factual field experiment with 600 participants in a setting conducive to parochial be-
havior. In an inter-neighborhood intra-region design, subjects allocate an endowment
between a personal account, a local, and a regional public good account. The between-
subjects design varies across two dimensions: One informs subjects that the smaller
local group consists of members from their own neighborhood (“neighbors”). The
other varies the relative productivity at the two public goods provision levels. We find
evidence for parochialism, but contrary to our hypothesis, parochialism does not inter-
fere with efficiency. The average subject responds to a change in relative productivities
at the local and regional level in the same way, whether aware of their neighbors’ pres-
ence in the small group or not. The results even hold for subjects with above-median
neighborhood attachment and subjects primed on neighborhood attachment.
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4.1 Introduction
Public goods (PG) can be provided at different spatial levels. As a result, individuals
often have to make a decision not just whether to contribute to PG, but how much
to contribute at different levels: Should I contribute to wildlife conservation through
donating to a conservation area in my neighborhood when I could also contribute to
wildlife conservation through a regional wildlife initiative? Should I give more sup-
port to my local public radio station – or more to the national network? In the “level
problem”, individuals need to come to a decision whether and how much to contribute
at different levels, each involving groups of different size and differently sized benefits
of contributing for others - and for oneself.
The multi-level public goods game (ML-PGG) is an extension of the standard PGG
that experimental economists have been employing for some time now in order to
understand more about individual behavior in the level problem (Wachsman 2002; Wit
and Kerr 2002; Blackwell and McKee 2003; Buchan et al. 2009, Güth and Sääksvuori
2012; Fellner and Lünser 2014; Chakravarty and Fonseca 2017).30 While design details
differ, the unifying feature of all ML-PGG is the nested structure of social dilemmas:
Subjects can privately provide the PG in a smaller group at the lower level and in a
larger group at the upper level, and all the smaller groups are fully contained within
a larger group. This nested structure is what differentiates the ML-PGG from other
extensions of the standard PGG to multiple PGs (e.g., Cherry and Dickinson 2008; Falk
and Zehnder 2013; McCarter et al. 2014)31 and what allows the level problem to be
captured by design.
To the public economist, the ML-PGG offers an opportunity to re-examine the beha-
vioral economics of the level problem. The behavioral phenomenon at the heart of
the present paper is the possibility that individuals exhibit a narrow concern for their
own local group in the level problem, attaching a consequently lower weight to out-
comes for the larger group in which the local group is nested. Such parochial concerns
could interfere with the efficiency of individuals’ contribution decisions across the dif-
ferent levels in major ways, in particular if the provision of public goods technically
exhibits economies of scale over some relevant range. Such scale economies are a reg-
30More recently, the ML-PGG has also been applied in quantitative biology to study the evolution of
cooperation (Wang et al. 2011).
31ML-PGG designs so far capture the concurrence of PG dilemmas in two different ways. One set of
designs involves an allocation tasks for an experimental endowment not just between a private and
a single group account, but between a private and two group accounts that differ in group size,
marginal per-capita return, and other structural features (Blackwell and McKee 2003; Buchan et al.
2009; Fellner and Lünser 2014; Chakravarty and Fonseca 2017). The other set of designs retains the
standard allocation task between one private and one public account, but varies across treatments
the externalities that the public account generates to different groups (Engel and Rockenbach 2011;
Güth and Sääksvuori 2012).
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ular feature of public goods such as education (Brasington 2003), municipal services
(Reingewertz 2012), fire (Duncombe and Yinger 1993) and police services (Finney 1997)
and are commonly captured in ML-PGG by higher aggregate returns to contributing
to spatially higher levels. The implication is that “leveling up”, i.e., more contributions
going to the higher provision level, is in the interest of social efficiency (Buchan et al.
2009; Güth and Sääksvuori 2012; Chakravarty and Fonseca 2017) and that behavioral
mechanisms that impede “leveling up” impose a social cost. Parochialism, the object
of our present study, is an obvious candidate for such a mechanism.
The study of parochialism, i.e., favoring one’s own group at the expense of efficiencies
in the larger group, relates to the recent interest in economics in individuals’ social
identity or sense of group attachment (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Such attachment
has been shown to have significant impact on contribution decisions in the standard
PGG when the design allows group attachment to play a role. When subjects share a
social identity through a group, they tend to behave more cooperatively, than on aver-
age, towards those they recognize as group members and less cooperatively towards
outsiders.32 Evidence for such in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination can
sometimes be generated in standard PGGs in which the shared commonalities in the
group are “minimal” (e.g., Tajfel and Turner 1979; Bernhard et al. 2006; Chen and Li
2009)33 and most reliably in settings in which the shared social identity is naturally
grown through direct social interaction (e.g., Charness et al. 2007; Goette et al. 2006)
and in which it can lead to potentially significant efficiency losses (e.g., Bernhard et al.
2006; Ruffle and Sosis 2006). Our study of parochial behavior in the ML-PGG shares
with the existing literature on group attachment a focus on in-group favoritism, but
also differs because the nested architecture of the ML-PGG does not admit an out-
group. Instead, it features several in-groups of different size and distance to the con-
tributor. In such a setting, social identity very well might, but does not necessarily
affect PG contributions and create a conflict between parochialism and efficiency.
In the present paper, we build on previous ML-PGG experiments with an allocation
task between a personal account, a local public good account, and a regional public
good account in order to investigate the presence and magnitude of the “leveling up”
effect. We do so in the setting of an artefactual field experiment34 that is naturally
suited for parochialism to manifest itself and at the same time allows for a controlled
variation of both the relative productivities of PG provision at different levels and of
32In a setting conducive to discrimination against outsiders, Daskalova (2018) shows that the tendency
to discriminate is especially strong in case subjects decide collectively in groups sharing a common
identity.
33“Minimal” groups are defined by a group identity constructed around an arbitrary membership cri-
terion, such as assignment of a color or a shared taste in art (Turner et al. 1979).
34We follow the nomenclature of Harrison and List (2004) in this characterization.
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the awareness of a shared group attachment in the small (low level) group. The ideal
setting for parochialism to assert itself is one in which individuals exhibit attachment
to naturally grown groups at a local level, but not at a higher level. The experiment
implements this setting by offering a choice of providing the PG at two levels, the local
level being the neighborhood in which the subject lives and the regional level being the
region in which the subjects’ neighborhoods are all located. The affiliation of an indi-
vidual to a neighborhood has a distinguished history in the literature as an identifier of
attachment to a naturally grown group. Neighborhood affiliation is a well-established
component of social identity in social psychology and sociology. Having been intens-
ively studied for at least forty years35, neighborhood attachment correlates with other
measures of “local social capital”, the intensity of neighborhood ties, and the level of
involvement of subjects in informal social activities in the neighborhood (Ringel and
Finkelstein 1991; Moser et al. 2002; Bonaiuto et al. 2003; Brown et al. 2003; Lewicka
2005). Correspondingly, the neighborhood has since been used in economics as an
appropriate level at which to investigate parochialism in trust relationships (Falk and
Zehnder 2013; Meier et al. 2016), PG provision (Marschall 2004), and social dilemmas
in general (Falk and Zehnder 2013).
Neighborhood affiliation is also a particularly meaningful concept in the present con-
text because of the explicitly spatial nature of the ML-PG provision problem in our
experimental implementation. Numerous PGs are provided at the neighborhood level
because the neighborhoods in our experiment, municipal districts in German cities,
are political entities that have their own neighborhood associations, their own phys-
ical infrastructure of social interaction such as community halls, and send their own
delegates to the city council. The neighborhood therefore provides a direct connec-
tion to public decision-making in the real world. Attachment to one’s neighborhood
contrasts with that to one’s region, the other level of PG provision implemented in
our experiment. Emotional attachment to regions is generally weak (Lewicka 2011)
because regions are considered by their inhabitants to be more abstract (Tuan 1975),
spatially fuzzy (Laczko 2005), and often a product of government planning rather than
historically grown (Paasi 2003). All of these characteristics apply to the region that is
used as the higher provision level in our present experiment, providing the desirable
differential in attachment compared to the neighborhood level.
The controlled variation of the awareness of shared group attachment comes from two
treatment conditions, one in which subjects learn that the small group contains only
members of the subject’s own neighborhood and the other in which they do not. The
controlled variation in the relative productivities of PG provision at the local and re-
35See Lewicka (2011) for a survey.
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gional level comes from two treatments that differ in the marginal per-capital return
(MPCR) of the regional PG. Together with the recourse to naturally grown groups, this
two-by-two design allows us to answer whether parochialism interferes with greater
efficiency in ML social dilemmas. This gives rise to three distinct contributions: The
first is the exogenous variation of a naturally grown social identity, thereby going bey-
ond artificially induced (Beekman et al. 2017), minimal (Blackwell and McKee 2003;
Chakravarty and Fonseca 2017) and anonymous groups (Fellner and Lünser 2014) and
experiments without exogenous variation in place attachment (Buchan et al. 2009). The
second is the particular neighborhood-within-a-region setting that provides a naturally
grown multi-level structure allowing parochialism to assert itself at the local level. The
third is a design that answers to the need for a randomized assignment of subjects to
treatments in which both the salience of social identity and the relative contribution
productivities in the ML-PGG differ. This allows a clean disentangling of the social
identity dimension and the efficiency dimension, which is not possible on the basis of
existing evidence. Such disentangling is required, however, in order to isolate whether
social identity and efficiency (MPCR) interact negatively. Earlier experiments either
vary the MPCR of one of the two PGs (Blackwell and McKee 2003; Fellner and Lün-
ser 2014; Chakravarty and Fonseca 2017), vary the salience of the group affiliation at a
constant MPCR (Chakravarty and Fonseca 2017), or examine home-grown variations
in group affiliation (Buchan et al. 2009). Closest to our setting, Beekman et al. (2017)
conduct a laboratory experiment in which they induce conflicts between groups and
vary the relative productivity in a ML-PGG. None of the previous studies implements
the full factorial design with naturally grown groups and randomized assignment that
is required to test whether groups with a shared social identity at the local level re-
spond less to changes in the MPCR than those without a shared social identity.
The results presented in this paper are based on data collected in an artefactual field
experiment of the ML-PGG type in which over 600 participants decide online about
the private provision of concurrent and perfectly substitutable public goods at two
different levels. We have two main findings. First, we show that some of the results
from lab-based ML-PGG experiments (Blackwell and McKee 2003; Fellner and Lünser
2014; Chakravarty and Fonseca 2017; Beekman et al. 2017) successfully transfer to our
field setting, among them the MPCR effect: Increasing the MPCR of the regional PG
attracts higher contributions. Similarly, the level-wise allocation of private contribu-
tions to different PG levels is not fully socially efficient: As the previous laboratory
experiments, we find positive average contributions to the small group, even when the
large group PG generates higher total benefits. Our second and main finding is that
the strength of the MPCR effect does not vary with the presence of a naturally grown
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social identity in the small group. Comparing groups in which subjects were or were
not aware that the small group consisted of their local neighbors, we find that both
groups increased their contributions to the regional PG as the MPCR of the regional
PG increased. Importantly, this increase is not statistically smaller in the group where
neighborhood attachment was made public. In other words, a higher efficiency of the
regional PG was associated with a leveling up of contributions by subjects, and the
leveling up was the same across groups, irrespective of whether subjects knew that the
small group consisted of their neighbors. This finding is robust. It holds on average,
but also for subjects with above-median neighborhood attachment and for subjects that
have been procedurally primed on their neighborhood attachment, even though both
types of subjects exhibit clearly more parochialism in their contributions to the smaller
group PG than the rest of the population. In our artefactual field experiment, therefore,
efficiency can be said to survive parochial bias.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the experi-
mental design and derives our theoretical predictions. Section 4.3 contains a detailed
description of the experimental protocol. We present the experimental results and ro-
bustness checks in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 provides a summary discussion of our main
findings and concludes.
4.2 Experimental design and theoretical predictions
4.2.1 Experimental design
Our experimental design implements a multi-level public goods game in which each
subject is a member both of a small group consisting of four members and of a larger
group of eight members. The larger group is composed of the small group of four plus
additional four members, who are all members of the other small group. In the par-
lance of ML-PGG, the smaller groups are therefore “nested” (e.g., Güth and Sääksvuori
2012) in the larger group, with two small groups of four making up one large group
of eight. In keeping with that literature, we will repeatedly refer in the paper (but not
the instructions) to the small group and its PG as local and contrast that with the larger
group and its PG being termed regional. Figure 4.1 illustrates the group composition.
The decision task for subjects is to allocate an initial endowment across three different
accounts: a private account that subjects retain for themselves, a PG that generates
benefits to the member’s local group only, and a PG that provides benefits to the entire
regional group. Formally, subject i’s payoff, pii, given the contribution decisions of all
remaining seven subjects, of which three are in subject i’s local group Li and four in the
other local group L−i of which i is not a member, can be expressed as
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Figure 4.1: Group composition
1
local 1
regional
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
local 2
Note: Numbers represent different subjects in the experiment. The larger (regional) group is composed
of two small groups (local 1 and local 2) of four subjects each.
pii = e− qli − qri + αl ∑
j∈Li
qlj + α
r ∑
j∈Li∪L−i
qrj
where e denotes the initial endowment, qli the contribution of subject i to the local
public good, and qri the contribution to the regional public good. α
l is the MPCR from
the local public good and αr denotes the MPCR from the regional public good. The
respective MPCRs fulfill the standard requirements for a social dilemma, with αl < 1
and 4αl > 1 for the local as well as αr < 1 and 8αr > 1 for the regional group.
The treatment conditions and parametric implementation of the design are summar-
ized in Table 4.1 for stage 1 of the experiment and Figure 4.5 in the appendix provides
a schematic diagram of the two-stage procedural implementation plus the number of
subjects in each treatment. Table 4.1 shows that the experimental treatments vary along
two dimensions, MPCR and social identity.
We start with the two MPCR conditions that vary the productivity of the regional PG.
Subjects are randomly assigned to one of these conditions at the outset of the exper-
iment and remain in the same MPCR condition until the end. As in Blackwell and
McKee (2003), there are two MPCRs for the regional good while the MPCR for the
local PG is always set at αl = 0.5. The total benefits (TB) of a one unit contribution to
the local PG across the entire regional society of eight are therefore held constant at 2
units.36 Condition LOW features a regional MPCR of αr = 0.25 and corresponding TB
of 2. In condition LOW, therefore, the TB of the local and the regional PG are the same
36With αl = 0.5, a contribution to the local PG of €1 by one subject generates €0.5 for four subjects in the
local group only and therefore a total benefit of €2 for the entire group of eight.
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while the price of contributing is lower in the local PG.37 Condition HIGH features an
MPCR of αr = 0.5, a corresponding TB of 4, which is larger than the TB of the local
good, but the same price of contributing.38
The second treatment dimension, social identity, is implemented in two stages, corres-
ponding to two consecutive decision tasks for each subject. In both stages, the treat-
ment consists of whether subjects receive information that they share a group attach-
ment with the members of the smaller and the larger group. The group attachment
for the smaller group is residence in the same neighborhood, for the larger it is resid-
ence in the same region. The neighborhoods in the experiment are municipal districts,
i.e., political entities with a typical population of several thousand inhabitants and an
area of around five square kilometers that elect their own representatives to the city
council. The region in the experiment is a metropolitan area including various cities
and straddling several states with a population of over two million and in which the
neighborhoods are located. The region does not function as a political entity. Four
subjects from the same district are always combined in a small group. In a large group,
two small groups from two different cities within the metropolitan are matched. In the
condition LABEL, subjects learn that the small group contains three other individuals
that reside in the subject’s own neighborhood and that the large group contains those
three plus four individuals that reside in the same region as the subject. Subjects as-
signed to the treatment condition NOLABEL, on the other hand, are neither informed
that the three other members of the smaller group share a common neighborhood with
the subject nor that individuals in the larger group reside in the same region. Jointly,
the two treatment dimensions of MPCR and social identity allow us to identify how
contributions in a ML-PGG respond to naturally occurring forms of social identity.
Subjects take one allocation decision in stage 1 of the experimental session. There is
no feedback after stage 1. The session then continues with stage 2, which is essentially
a repeat of stage 1, but preceded by a priming task that follows the natural identity
stimulation approach by Li et al. (2017) and Chen et al. (2014). First, subjects complete
a questionnaire that contains a set of seven questions about their neighborhood and
their involvement in neighborhood activities to make subjects’ local identity salient.
Second, subjects fill in a writing task in response to an open-ended question in order to
gain a positive connotation of living in their neighborhood or the metropolitan region.
There are two versions of the open-ended question. Given our interest in parochial
37The price of giving for the individual contributor is the opportunity cost of contributing to the PG. At
an MPCR of 0.5, the contributor receives €0.5 in PG for every €1, corresponding to a price of €0.5. At
an MPCR of 0.25, the contributor only receives €0.25 and the price is €0.75.
38At αr = 0.25 (αr = 0.5), a contribution to the regional PG of €1 by one subject generates €0.25 (€0.5)
for eight subjects in the regional group and therefore a total benefit of €2 (€4) for the entire group of
eight.
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Table 4.1: Experimental design - Stage 1
Treatment Local Public Good (LGP) Regional Public Good (RPG)
# αl TBl # αr TBr
LOW-NOLABEL 4 0.5 2 8 0.25 2
LOW-LABEL 4 0.5 2 8 0.25 2
HIGH-NOLABEL 4 0.5 2 8 0.5 4
HIGH-LABEL 4 0.5 2 8 0.5 4
Note: Small (local) groups consist of four subjects each. Large (region) group consist of eight subjects.
αl (TBl) is the MPCR (total benefit) from the local public good. ar (TBr) is the MPCR (total benefit) from
the regional public good. In LABEL subjects are informed that the small (local) group contains other
individuals from their own neighborhood and that the large (regional) group contains those three plus
four individuals from the same region. In NOLABEL subjects are neither informed that the three other
members of the small group are from their own neighborhood nor that individuals in the large group
are from the same region.
preferences, the analysis of stage 2 decisions uses observations from the majority of
subjects (74%) assigned to the local prime version in which subjects list positive aspects
of living in their specific neighborhood.39 After completing the writing task, subjects
take their stage 2 allocation decision. To determine final payoffs to subjects, the group
decision of one regional group in one of the two stages was randomly selected and the
corresponding pay-offs computed at the end of the experiment.40
4.2.2 Hypotheses
In a sequence of two one-shot ML-PGG, purely selfish individuals are predicted to al-
locate their entire endowment to their private account in both decisions. Given the
parameter choices of the design, this prediction holds for all four treatment conditions,
irrespective of the level of the MPCR (LOW or HIGH) and of the social identity inform-
ation (LABEL or NOLABEL). The behavior of the average subject in PGG experiments,
however, is not consistent with the assumption of purely selfish preferences (e.g., Led-
yard 1995; Zelmer 2003; Chaudhuri 2011). This also holds for behavior in the ML-PGG
for which previous experiments have found that individuals exploit the free-riding op-
portunities present in the ML-PGG to a significantly lower degree than predicted in the
standard Nash equilibrium of purely selfish players (e.g., Blackwell and McKee 2003;
Güth and Sääksvuori 2012; Fellner and Lünser 2014).
39The remaining 26% of subjects were assigned to the regional prime version in which they listed positive
aspects of living in the metropolitan area.
40To prevent spillover or licensing effects, subjects are informed at the beginning of the experiment
about these procedures.
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The levels of cooperation observed in the ML-PGG can be traced back to well under-
stood structural factors that explain cooperation in the linear PGG such as the MPCR.
The conclusive evidence from the standard PGG that higher MPCRs induce higher
contributions (e.g., Isaac et al. 1984; Ledyard 1995; Zelmer 2003; Chaudhuri 2011) car-
ries over to ML-PGG. Like in the standard PGG, a higher MPCR increases efficiency
through a higher productivity and, at the same time, a lower price of giving (Andreoni
and Miller 2002). Group size, another structural factor, has been shown to have either
no or at best a slightly positive effect on contributions in experiments involving the
standard PGG (e.g., Isaac et al. 1994; Nosenzo et al. 2015; Diederich et al. 2016). In light
of these results, previous findings from the ML-PGG that the small group receives
higher contributions on average when its TB are the same as those of the larger group
(Blackwell and McKee 2003; Fellner and Lünser 2014; Chakravarty and Fonseca 2017)
are not in themselves evidence of a local bias, but may simply affirm that contributions
in the PGG respond to the MPCR, but are largely irresponsive to group size. The find-
ing that increasing the MPCRs for contributions to the larger-group PG leads to higher
contributions (Blackwell and McKee 2003; Fellner and Lünser 2014) is also in line with
these previous findings. Group size invariance can similarly explain the result that
even at identical MPCRs for the smaller and larger group, contributions to the smaller
group do not fall to zero (Blackwell and McKee 2003; Chakravarty and Fonseca 2017).
Given the broad empirical support for a significant and positive MPCR effect, our first
hypothesis is that an artefactual field experiment will validate the core findings of pre-
vious ML-PGG lab experiments. Comparing stage 1 contributions of subjects that face
a lower MPCR for the regional PG (ar = 0.25) than for the local PG (al = 0.5) with stage
1 contributions of subjects that face equal MPCRs in both PGs (ar = al = 0.5), we pre-
dict a higher average share of endowments going to the regional PG when MPCRs are
the same (and TB are higher). This would be in line with the results by Blackwell and
McKee (2003) in a design with “minimal groups” and by Fellner and Lünser (2014) in a
design without group identity and would reaffirm the dominance of the MPCR effect:
The productivity of contribution to the regional public good is higher for the higher
MPCR while the price of contribution is lower. Both mechanisms render contributing
to the regional PG more attractive for subjects with social preferences, whether aware
or unaware of a shared common identity. Applied to the design of the present experi-
ment, this validation test leads to the following formulation.
Hypothesis 1 (leveling up): Average contributions to the regional public good will be
higher in the HIGH MPCR treatment compared to the LOW MPCR treatment.
In other words, contributions are predicted to respond positively to increases in the
MPCR for a PG benefiting the larger group, and the positive MPCR effect is expected
95
Leveling up?
to be present both in settings in which subjects are aware of a shared neighborhood
affiliation and in which they are not. The comparison of contributions that form the
core test of hypothesis 1 therefore delivers a validation check on previous findings
in the ML-PGG paradigm that have varied the MPCR of the regional PG both under
anonymity and using minimal groups.
Following the validation exercise implicit in testing hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2 homes
in on the core issue of this paper: Does a shared social identity in a subgroup of subjects
engaged in a ML-PG provision problem lead to changes in contribution behavior that
can unambiguously be judged to interfere with efficiency? In other words, does a
parochial bias lead to efficiency losses in the level problem and if so, how big are these
losses? Our strategy for establishing the presence and size of a parochial bias in the
present ML-PGG is to examine the interaction effect between the shift in the MPCR in
the regional good and the disclosure of a shared social identity in the local group. This
strategy presents a clean test for the question how ML-PG provision is affected by a
potential parochial bias on account of activated social identity and is a key step towards
the question of efficiency.41 Parochial altruism predicts that, relative to subjects in an
anonymous setting, subjects aware of a shared local neighborhood affiliation attach
greater weight to local outcomes (Bernhard et al. 2006) and will therefore have less of
an inclination to level up in response to a higher MPCR for the regional PG. A shared
social identity, in other words, prevents subjects’ from leveraging a higher MPCR into
a higher provision of PGs to the same extent as when identity is not revealed. Applied
to the present experimental design, this tests formulates as
Hypothesis 2 (leveling up with social identity): The interaction effect between the
MPCR treatment and the LABEL treatment is predicted to be negative: Relat-
ive to subjects without knowledge of their group composition, subjects aware
that the local public good benefits exclusively their neighbors increase the con-
tributions to the higher level by less when the MPCR of the regional public good
increases.
The test of hypothesis 2 establishes the core result of our experiment. The remaining
41An alternative approach could be based on a simple comparison of contribution levels to the local and
regional PG across social identity treatments at constant MPCR for the regional PG. A strategy based
on comparing levels across the LABEL/NOLABEL treatment is not sufficient, however. The LOW
MPCR treatment is a poor setting for a comparison because the TBs of the local and the regional
account are identical such that any combination of contributions to the local and regional PG that
leaves their sum broadly unchanged has the same impact on total provision. Comparing levels in
the HIGH MPCR treatment, on the other hand, is complicated by evidence from previous experi-
ments that even in anonymous group settings, the local PG attract significant contributions despite
its lower TBs. This sets a high baseline for an additional parochial bias to assert itself. Comparing
total benefits across MPCRs is also problematic since productivity is exogenously higher in the HIGH
MPCR condition.
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three hypotheses add robustness.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 do not focus on the presence of the interaction effect, but its
strength. We expect to find heterogeneity across subjects in how they respond to the
disclosure of a common local affiliation among members of the small group. Subjects
will be heterogeneous along a multitude of dimensions. The dimension of interest
in the present design is a predisposition towards parochialism, and we explore two
sources of predisposition. One predisposition is home-grown: We predict that among
subjects who articulate a strong attachment to their own neighborhood in the post-
questionnaire (henceforth “local patriots”), the change in contributions to the regional
PG caused by an increased MPCR for the regional good is less than the change among
the other subjects when they are in the LABEL treatment. No such effect should be
present in the NOLABEL treatment. The reasoning is the same as that underlying
hypothesis 2, with the only difference that subjects predisposed to parochialism are
expected to exhibit a stronger form of the interaction effect. This conjecture is captured
in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 (local patriots): The negative interaction effect between the MPCR treat-
ment and the LABEL treatment is predicted to be greater in absolute terms for
subjects who articulate high concern for members of their neighborhood com-
pared to those who articulate low concern: Local patriots that are aware that
their contributions to the local group benefit their "neighbors" are less inclined
than others to level up when the MPCR of the regional public good increases.
The second source of predisposition toward parochial choices, namely through prim-
ing, provides the content of our fourth hypothesis. The priming procedure that sub-
jects take prior to their stage 2 decision follows Li et al. (2017) and Chen et al. (2014)
and is designed to activate an existing place attachment in subjects’ mind. Subjects
that have undergone the local prime version of the procedure and are then assigned to
the LABEL condition in the social identity treatment are therefore expected to exhibit a
stronger concern for how their allocation decisions in stage 2 impact on members of the
small group. The predictions for locally primed subjects are then essentially the same
as in the case for a home-grown predisposition for parochialism: On average, subjects
in the LABEL condition will increase their contributions towards the regional PG less
as its MPCR doubles than subjects in the NOLABEL condition, who are unaware that
the small group contains their “neighbors”.
Hypothesis 4 (priming effect): The negative interaction effect between the MPCR treat-
ment and the LABEL treatment is predicted to be greater in absolute terms for
subjects who have undergone the local priming procedure. After local priming,
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subjects that are aware that their contributions to the local group benefit their
"neighbors" are less inclined than others to level up when the MPCR of the re-
gional public good increases.
4.3 Experimental setting and procedure
The inter-neighborhood intra-region experiment recruited participants from a total of
four municipal districts, two each from two cities in Germany, Heidelberg and Man-
nheim, that are located within 25 km of each other in the same region, the Rhine-
Neckar metropolitan region. Heidelberg, with a population 150,000, consists of 15
municipal districts; Mannheim, with a population of 330,000, consists of 17 districts.
The recruitment procedure involved the distribution of around 12,000 invitation letters
via mail to up to 3,000 randomly selected households in each of the four districts.42 The
letter invited the receiving household to have one member of voting age take part in
a scientific study on decision making, conducted by the University of Heidelberg and
the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim. The announced par-
ticipation reward was set at €5. Subjects were informed that they could earn additional
individual payments in the course of a 15-minute study. No other information on the
context of the study was given in this initial invitation letter.
A total of 616 individuals from Heidelberg (323) and Mannheim (293) took part in the
online experiment. They did so by following a link in the invitation letter with their
personal electronic device.43 To log in and start the experiment, participants entered
an individual access code provided in the invitation letter. The access code prevented
participants from taking part in the study more than once. After going through a series
of detailed instructions on the procedures, the decision task, and a set of numerical
examples, participants made their decisions.44 The average participant completed the
experiment in approximately 15 minutes. We used an ex-post matching protocol to
calculate final payoffs.
The participation payment was set at €5. The initial endowment was set at €8. Par-
ticipants earned an average of €18.38, which at 15 minutes average completion time
compares favorably with the equivalent average hourly wage. Individual payments
42Since one district (Bahnstadt) is considerably smaller than the other three districts, we distributed
invitation letters to all 2,000 households living in this district. We provide a translated version of the
invitation letter in the appendix.
43The programming was completed in LimeSurvey, a free open source software tool. The design was
optimized for either the use of a personal computer, a laptop, a tablet, or a smartphone. In addition
to the conventional link, the invitation letter contained a QR code to facilitate access to the online
experiment.
44We provide a diagram of the experimental procedures, the invitation letter, instructions, and screen-
shots in the appendix.
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were implemented by sending households a payment card which is good for cash
in many large retail chains, petrol stations, and online shops.45 Payment cards were
charged with the individualized payments and sent out by mail four weeks after the
conclusion of the experiment. All specifics regarding the payment procedure were dis-
closed to subjects prior to their first decision.
As part of the experimental procedure, subjects completed a post-questionnaire after
the first decision task. The questionnaire collected information on characteristics of
place attachment. We combine five measures commonly used in the place attachment
literature into a score of participants’ local identity (local identity index). These met-
rics are (1) whether participants deliberately decided to live in their neighborhood;
whether they feel (2) happy, (3) proud, and (4) comfortable to be living in their neigh-
borhood; and (5) how well they feel they identify with their neighborhood. Responses
to each item were made on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).
The local identification score was calculated by standardizing responses to all five
items and summing. At the end of the experiment, subjects completed another ques-
tionnaire collection information on core demographics (age, sex, income, education, reli-
giousness), duration of residence in the region (years region) and the municipal district
(years neighborhood).46
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Full sample
We begin our analysis by describing the pooled data from the stage 1 decision across all
treatments and participants. There, 32.8% of the sample contribute their full endow-
ment either to the local (LPG) or the regional public good (RPG) and leave nothing
in their private account. 6.1% of participants allocate their entire endowment to their
private account. In line with the overwhelming evidence in PGG experiments, it is
modal behavior to contribute some, but not all of the endowment to PGs. This can also
be seen in Figure 4.2, which plots participants’ average contribution decisions to their
private account and the LPG and RPG across all four treatment conditions.
Hypothesis 1 conjectures that the artefactual field experiment will replicate a core find-
ing of previous laboratory experiments, namely that a higher MPCR for the regional
good causes significantly higher contributions by subjects. We test hypothesis 1 by
comparing contributions to the RPG at different MPCRs in both the NOLABEL and
45This procedure allowed us to pay subjects in an incentive compatible way without having to person-
ally interact with them which would be problematic both for reasons of anonymity and logistics.
46Table 4.6 in the appendix reports the descriptive statistics of the post-questionnaire broken down by
municipal districts.
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Figure 4.2: Average contributions - full sample
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Note: Average contributions to private, local, and regional account in the NOLABEL (upper half) and
LABEL (lower half) of LOW (left) and HIGH (right) for the whole sample. Confidence intervals at the
95%-level.
the LABEL conditions. In the NOLABEL treatment, contributions to the RPG are signi-
ficantly higher from an MPCR of 0.5 compared to an MPCR of 0.25 (2.9 vs. 4.6, p-value:
0.000, Mann-Whitney U (MW-U) test). The same is true in the LABEL treatment (2.8
vs. 4.4, p-value: 0.000, MW-U test). These tests are summarized in
Result 1 (leveling up): There is a positive MPCR effect: Average contributions to the
regional public good are significantly higher in the HIGH MPCR treatment com-
pared to the LOW MPCR treatment.
We note in passing that the positive MPCR effect observed in this experiment is a sub-
stitution effect between the two PGs. The average share of endowment allocated to the
private account does not change significantly across the MPCR conditions (NOLABEL:
2.3 vs. 2.1, p-value: 0.309, MW-U test; LABEL: 2.3 vs. 2.1, p-value: 0.343, MW-U test).
Average contributions to the LPG are significantly lower, however (NOLABEL: 2.8 vs.
1.3, p-value 0.000, MW-U test; LABEL: 2.9 vs. 1.5, p-value: 0.000, MW-U test). This ob-
served substitution from the LPG to the RPG is well in line with the findings of Fellner
and Lünser (2014), but contrasts with Blackwell and McKee (2003) who find that con-
tributions are substituted from the private account towards the non-excludable public
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good.47
Having validated one of the key findings from lab-based ML-PGG experiments in an
artefactual field setting in result 1, we now turn to testing hypothesis 2, which forms
the core of the paper. Following hypothesis 2, we expect that the strength of the MPCR
effect will be smaller in the LABEL condition, which invokes naturally occurring social
identity, compared to the NOLABEL condition, which does not even invoke minimal
group identity. First note that, for the average subject, the effect of invoked social iden-
tity on contributions to the LPG is rather mild and fails to reach statistical significance
(LOW: 2.8 vs. 2.9, p-value: 0.266, MW-U test; HIGH: 1.3 vs. 1.5, p-value: 0.363, MW-U
test). This finding might be driven by individual differences in place attachment. In
this section, we focus on the average subject before investigating potential differences
in subject’s place attachment and their impact on the MPCR effect in more detail in
Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3. The test of hypothesis 2 is essentially a difference-in-difference
test in which we compare whether the MPCR effect (the difference between LOW and
HIGH MPCR) differs between the NOLABEL and LABEL condition. In the NOLA-
BEL condition, the MPCR effect gives rise to an increase of €1.8 in contributions to
the RPG, in the LABEL condition to an increase of €1.7, which is smaller. The differ-
ence between the MPCR effects is not statistically significant, however (p-value: 0.766,
F-test). Invoking social identity had therefore no significant effect on the average sub-
ject’s responsiveness to an increase in the MPCR of the RPG.48 This is summarized
in
Result 2 (leveling up with social identity): The inclination to level up is not affected
by the revelation of neighborhood ties: For the average subject there is no statist-
ical difference in the strengths of the MPCR effect, i.e., revealing a shared social
identity does not significantly change the increase in the contributions to the re-
gional public good when its MPCR increases.
The non-parametric test of hypothesis 2 is supported by regression analysis. Table 4.2
reports the results of an OLS model of participants’ contributions to either the private,
local, or regional account. The baseline are the contributions of subjects assigned to a
treatment without social identity invoked (NOLABEL) and at an MPCR of 0.25 for the
47As already noticed by Fellner and Lünser (2014), the results of Blackwell and McKee (2003) have to
be interpreted with some caution as they are derived from only one independent observation per
treatment.
48Beekman et al. (2017) induce conflicts to create out-group hostility and deepen in-group favoritism in
a ML-PGG. They hypothesize that the effect of an increase in the MPCR might be smaller in cases
where groups have previously competed against one another than in cases where groups share no
previous interaction. However, they do not report statistical tests on size differences in treatment
effects. Potential differences to our results would not be surprising, since we abstain from inducing
conflicts and instead concentrate on a setting where preexisting identities might play a role.
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Table 4.2: Individual contributions - full sample
1 2 3 4 5 6
qp ql qr qp ql qr
Private Local Regional Private Local Regional
HIGH -0.27
(0.260)
-1.49***
(0.212)
1.76***
(0.309)
0.26
(0.263)
-1.61***
(0.215)
1.87***
(0.311)
LABEL -0.08
(0.241)
0.14
(0.244)
-0.07
(0.282)
-0.04
(0.249)
0.07
(0.252)
-0.03
(0.296)
HIGH x LABEL 0.09
(0.367)
0.06
(0.309)
-0.16
(0.444)
0.08
(0.377)
0.22
(0.317)
-0.23
(0.456)
Constant 2.33***
(0.169)
2.78***
(0.169)
2.88***
(0.188)
3.09***
(0.606)
2.59***
(0.547)
2.33***
(0.736)
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Neighborhood FE no no no yes yes yes
# of observations 616 616 616 602 602 602
Note: OLS regressions, qp, ql , qr ∈ [0, 8], with robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05
and ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Statistically significant results reported above are robust to jointly estimating regres-
sions (2), (3) and respectively (5), (6) as seemingly unrelated regression equations. Controls: age, female,
income, education, religious, years of residency in the neighborhood, years of residency in the metropolitan
region.
RPG (LOW). The dummy variable (LABEL) indicates assignment to treatment condi-
tion LABEL and the dummy variable HIGH assignment to a treatment with an MPCR
of 0.5 for the RPG. The variable of interest is the interaction term of the two dum-
mies (HIGH x LABEL), which captures whether contributions respond differently to a
change in the MPCR when participants share a common local affiliation. We estimate
both a simple model (first three columns of coefficients) as well as a richer model with
further controls (second three columns). The controls comprise individual character-
istics collected in the post-questionnaire: age, gender (female), income, years of education,
the degree of religious affiliation (based on a five-point Likert scale from 1 “not at all” to
5 “extremely”), the time of living in the respective neighborhood (neighborhood) and in
the metropolitan region (region). Furthermore, regressions in the second three columns
contain dummy variables for the different neighborhoods in order to take neighbor-
hood fixed effects into account.
The regression results reaffirm results 1 and 2: The coefficients associated with the
dummy variable HIGH show that at a higher MPCR, average contributions to the RPG
are higher and contributions to the LPG lower, supporting result 1. Also note that the
coefficients estimated for LABEL have the predicted sign (positive for the LPG, neg-
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ative for the RPG), but are small and statistically insignificant for all three accounts.
Hence, while the dummy capturing the interaction effect is also insignificant through-
out, supporting result 2 that there is no interaction effect, the overall relatively low
level of parochialism prompts us to challenge our findings by a series of robustness
checks.
4.4.2 Robustness check I: Pre-existing heterogeneity in place attachment
The experimental procedures introduce two sources of heterogeneity in predisposition
towards a local bias. One of the sources are pre-existing differences in place attach-
ment: Some citizens identify much more with their own neighborhood than others.
Following Candelo et al. (2017), the strength of social identity is essential, and for sub-
jects for whom place attachment is relatively unimportant for their social identity, re-
vealing a shared local affiliation may not be sufficient to induce a change in contribu-
tion behavior. Subjects with strong place attachment, on the other hand, may respond
more strongly than the average person to such information. This is important for two
reasons: One is that there are spatial contexts in which neighborhood attachment is
very prominent (such as sectarian cities with minimal intra-neighborhood mobility,
see, e.g., Meier et al. 2016). It is therefore useful to understand whether those for whom
place attachment is an important component of social identity differ in their propensity
to level up from the rest of the population. The other is that in real world settings in
which contribution decisions to PG often have a sequential dimension, heterogeneity
in the interaction effect could incite subjects with strong neighborhood attachment to
be the first to contribute to the local PG, thus conceivably setting in motion a path
towards parochialism that other participants subsequently follow (Vesterlund 2003;
Andreoni and Petrie 2004).
To test for the possibility of a heterogeneous interaction effect, we first identify the sub-
sample of subjects for whom place attachment is likely to matter most. This identific-
ation relies on a composite index that measures the degree of group identity based on
five questions concerning participants’ affiliation with the neighborhood. Those above
the median index value exhibit above-median place attachment.49 As a shorthand, we
refer to this group as “local patriots”. Figure 4.3 plots the contribution behavior of local
patriots in all four treatments.
As a first construct validity test, we find that local patriots, i.e., those that express
49Place attachment is measured as the degree to which individuals agreed to the following five items:
“deliberately decided to live in their neighborhood”, “happy to live in their neighborhood”, “proud
to live in their neighborhood”, “feel comfortable to live in their neighborhood”, and “perceive iden-
tification” with their neighborhood” each measured on a five-point likert scale from 1 “not at all” to
5 “extremely”.
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Figure 4.3: Average contributions - local patriots
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Note: Average contributions to private, local and regional account in the NOLABEL (upper half) and
LABEL (lower half) of LOW (left) and HIGH (right) for the subsample of subjects with above-median
place attachment (local patriots). Confidence intervals at the 95%-level.
above-median place attachment, exhibit a distinct contribution behavior compared to
the average subject discussed in the previous section. For example, local patriots con-
tribute significantly more to the LPG than subjects with a below median place attach-
ment, but only when a shared neighborhood affiliation in the small group is revealed
(LABEL), irrespective of the MPCR condition (LOW: 3.3 vs. 2.5, p-value: 0.013, MW-U
test; HIGH: 1.9 vs. 1.3, p-value: 0.003, MW-U test). Unaware of the shared neighbor-
hood in the small group (NOLABEL), their contribution behavior is indistinguishable
from the rest of the sample (LOW: 2.5 vs. 3.0, p-value: 0.176, MW-U test; HIGH: 1.3
vs. 1.3, p-value: 0.933; MW-U test).50 Local patriots therefore not only express above-
median place attachment, they also contribute significantly more to the LPG than other
subjects if and only if they know that the local group consists of neighbors.
In light of how local patriots’ contribution behavior differs from that of other sub-
jects, the presence and nature of the MPCR effect and the presence of an interaction
50This is consistent with the observation that local patriots also respond more strongly and statistically
significantly to the social identity treatment than others. Knowledge about a shared neighborhood in
the small group makes local patriots increase their contributions to the LPG by 1.2 (LOW MPCR, p-
value < 0.05) and by 0.6 (HIGH MPCR, p-value < 0.10) relative to those without strong neighborhood
attachment.
104
Leveling up?
effect between MPCR and social identity information are obvious next questions. Hy-
pothesis 3 predicts that this interaction effect will be present and, in light of result 2,
significantly negative. To answer these questions, we first test for the MPCR effect by
comparing in both social identity conditions the change in contributions to the RPG as
the MPCR of the RPG doubles. Doubling the MPCR raises contributions to the RPG
among local patriots by €1.7 (p-value: 0.000, MW-U test) without knowledge of shared
neighborhood (NOLABEL) and by €1.3 (p-value: 0.000, MW-U test) with knowledge
of shared neighborhood (LABEL). This finding reaffirms result 1: Local patriots also
exhibit the positive MPCR effect. Testing hypothesis 3 requires a comparison of the
MPCR effects across social identity treatment. Table 4.3 reports the coefficients of the
regression analysis conducted for the reduced sample. The results reaffirm the MPCR
effect (dummy HIGH) as well as the positive impact of revealed shared neighborhood
on contributions to the LPG. The interaction effect, however, does not deliver statistic-
ally significant results.51
Result 3 (leveling up by local patriots): For subjects with above-median place attach-
ment, revelation of neighborhood ties does not result in less leveling up: Despite
the fact that we find a positive label effect for the local patriots (i.e., higher aver-
age contributions to the local account among subjects in the LABEL treatment),
there is no statistical difference in the strengths of the MPCR effect.
Taken together, these findings have a number of implications. One is that the MPCR
effect and the parochial bias affect contributions independently. Local patriots behave
more cooperatively towards others when they are aware that others are also locals and
they respond to changes in the MPCR of a PG in the predicted way. However, their
response to a change in the MPCR is not modulated by parochialism. Put differently,
the parochialism observed in local patriots, as evidenced in higher contributions to the
LPG, is independent of how productive it is to provide the PG at a higher level.52 This
51This null result is not driven by our categorization of local patriots based on the above median identi-
fication. Applying stricter definitions of local patriots (such as the upper quartile of all participants)
does not alter our results and does not provide statistical evidence for a significant interaction effect.
52One might worry that the absence of an interaction effect between LABEL and HIGH among local
patriots is driven by the parametrization of our ML-PGG. In HIGH, the MPCRs (αl = αr = 0.5)
are equal for both the LPG and the RPG. Thus, subjects can benefit their close neighbors equally by
either contributing to the LPG or the RPG. Contributing to the RPG generates additional benefits
to non-neighbors at no cost to neighbors. This need not but might affect the intensity of a poten-
tial interaction effect depending on the importance of parochial motives. To examine this possibility
further, we conduct, as an additional robustness check, a complementary treatment (MIX) with ad-
ditional n = 116 subjects. In MIX, the LPG has an MPCR of 0.5 while the MPCR in the RPG differs
for neighbors (0.25) and non-neighbors (0.75). Contributing to the RPG therefore involves a trade-off
between overall efficiency levels and benefiting the local group. We report the results of this robust-
ness check in the appendix of the paper (Table 4.7). With respect to contribution patterns, there is
105
Leveling up?
Table 4.3: Individual contributions - local patriots
1 2 3 4 5 6
qp ql qr qp ql qr
Private Local Regional Private Local Regional
HIGH -0.49
(0.398)
-1.25***
(0.307)
1.74***
(0.472)
-0.43
(0. 399)
-1.33***
(0.318)
1.76***
(0.482)
LABEL -0.42
(0.341)
0.75**
(0.355)
-0.32
(0.416)
-0.45
(0.350)
0.77**
(0.377)
-0.32
(0.450)
HIGH x LABEL 0.59
(0.530)
-0.19
(0.448)
-0.40
(0.646)
0.51
(0.532)
-0.14
(0.474)
-0.37
(0.671)
Constant 2.47***
(0.261)
2.55***
(0.248)
2.99***
(0.299)
4.17***
(0.889)
1.93***
(0.779)
1.90***
(1.11)
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Neighborhood FE no no no yes yes yes
# of observations 302 302 302 294 294 294
Note: OLS regressions, qp, ql , qr ∈ [0, 8], with robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05
and ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Statistically significant results reported above are robust to jointly estimating regres-
sions (2), (3) and respectively (5), (6) as seemingly unrelated regression equations. Controls: age, female,
income, education, religious, years of residency in the neighborhood, years of residency in the metropolitan
region.
independence, in turn, adds robustness to the sample average that is reported in result
2: Since the parochial bias of local patriots does not interact with the MPCR effect, it
is clear that result 2, the zero effect on average, is not the outcome of countervailing
effects among those with strong and those with weak place attachment.
4.4.3 Robustness check II: Priming for place attachment
Despite relying on naturally occurring forms of social identity that are expected to af-
fect behavior more substantially than minimal group identity, a conceivable objection
to our experimental design could be a concern that it insufficiently stimulates an exist-
ing predisposition towards behaving parochially. If true, the results based on observed
behavior in the social identity treatments LABEL/NOLABEL would underestimate the
true effect of social identity. A robustness check based on pre-existing heterogeneity
in place attachment, as that conducted in the previous subsection, would not provide
again no interaction effect between LABEL and MPCR in this treatment conditions, neither for the
full sample (Table 4.7 - Panel A) nor for the subsample of local patriots (Table 4.7 - Panel B). We
are therefore confident that the absence of an interaction effect between HIGH and LABEL is not
exclusively driven by our parametrization of the MPCRs implemented in the HIGH treatment.
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Figure 4.4: Average contributions - after local prime
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Note: Average contributions in stage 2 to private, local and regional account in the NOLABEL | local
prime (upper half) and LABEL | local prime (lower half) of LOW (left) and HIGH (right) for the sample
restricted to locally primed subjects. Confidence intervals at the 95%-level.
a remedy if a social identity stimulus was indeed insufficient because the local pat-
riots subsample is defined relative to the sample median rather than to an absolute
benchmark.
To examine whether result 2 is robust against the possibility of an insufficient exper-
imental stimulus, we use observations from stage 2 of the experiment, i.e., after the
priming task. A total of 454 subjects underwent the local priming version that is of
interest here. As a first test, we compare the behavior between the LABEL and the
NOLABEL treatment in stage 2 across the MPCR conditions. Figure 4.4 plots the stage
2 contribution decisions across treatments for all locally primed subjects. As in the
previous tests, there is a strong MPCR effect on contributions to the RPG in the con-
trol group under the NOLABEL condition. Both size and significance of the effects are
comparable to the previous results, reaffirming result 1.53
Also, priming has the expected effect on contribution behavior, providing a manipula-
tion check on the priming procedure: Locally primed subjects in the LABEL treatment
53Contributions to the RPG increase significantly (2.7 vs. 4.5, p-value: 0.000) for a doubling of the MPCR
while contributions to the LPG decrease significantly (2.5 vs. 0.9, p-value: 0.000).
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Table 4.4: Individual contributions - full sample - after local prime
1 2 3 4 5 6
qp ql qr qp ql qr
Private Local Regional Private Local Regional
HIGH -0.21
(0.383)
-1.56***
(0.287)
1.77***
(0.416)
-0.28
(0.402)
-1.50***
(0.303)
1.78***
(0.435)
LABEL -0.31
(0.328)
0.57*
(0.323)
-0.26
(0.343)
-0.34
(0.345)
0.59*
(0.342)
-0.26
(0.368)
HIGH x LABEL -0.18
(0.472)
0.14
(0.378)
0.05
(0.528)
-0.08
(0.495)
-0.07
(0.396)
0.15
(0.554)
Constant 2.78***
(0.261)
2.50***
(0.255)
2.72***
(0.277)
3.15***
(0.756)
1.93***
(0.646)
2.92***
(0.911)
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Neighborhood FE no no no yes yes yes
# of observations 454 454 454 443 443 443
Note: OLS regressions, qp, ql , qr ∈ [0, 8], with robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05
and ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Statistically significant results reported above are robust to jointly estimating regres-
sions (2), (3) and respectively (5), (6) as seemingly unrelated regression equations. Controls: age, female,
income, education, religious, years of residency in the neighborhood, years of residency in the metropolitan
region.
have significantly higher average contributions to the LPG than the control group both
at a LOW MPCR (3.1 vs. 2.5, p-value: 0.054, MW-U test) and a HIGH MPCR (1.7 vs.
0.9, p-value: 0.001, MW-U test).54
Despite these effects, the interaction effect between an increase in the MPCR and invok-
ing social identity is again insignificant. Table 4.4 reports the results of the regression
analysis of the contributions decisions using the same estimation strategy as for Table
4.2 and Table 4.3. The results are similar to those for the restricted sample of stage 1
contributions by subjects with above-median place attachment presented in Table 4.3.
The coefficient estimates in Table 4.4 reaffirm a positive MPCR effect (dummy HIGH)
that leads to a substitution away from LPG to RPG. The results in Table 4.4 also confirm
the presence of a pro-local bias induced by the revelation of shared neighborhood affil-
iation (dummy LABEL): Contributions to the LPG are higher. At the same time, Table
4.4 also reaffirms the lack of an interaction effect: The change in contributions caused
by a doubling of the MPCR in the RPG is statistically indistinguishable between sub-
54While in LOW these additional contributions to the LPG accrue at the expense of lower contributions
to both the private account (-0.3) and the RPG (-0.2), in HIGH we find additional contributions to the
LPG primarily driven by lower contributions to the private account (-0.5) and a moderate decrease
in RPG contributions (-0.2).
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Table 4.5: Individual contributions - restricted sample - after local prime
1 2 3 4 5 6
qp ql qr qp ql qr
Private Local Regional Private Local Regional
HIGH -0.02
(0.524)
-1.99***
(0.441)
2.00***
(0.558)
-0.00
(0.565)
-2.06***
(0.485)
2.06***
(0.589)
LABEL -0.04
(0.465)
0.33
(0.490)
-0.28
(0.471)
0.04
(0.510)
0.27
(0.530)
-0.32
(0.512)
HIGH x LABEL -0.44
(0.663)
0.31
(0.561)
0.13
(0.724)
-0.52
(0.727)
0.30
(0.617)
0.23
(0.790)
Constant 2.58***
(0.359)
2.98***
(0.399)
2.44***
(0.380)
3.51***
(1.09)
2.41***
(0.930)
2.08*
(1.22)
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Neighborhood FE no no no yes yes yes
# of observations 229 229 229 225 225 225
Note: OLS regressions, qp, ql , qr ∈ [0, 8], with robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05
and ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Statistically significant results reported above are robust to jointly estimating regres-
sions (2), (3) and respectively (5), (6) as seemingly unrelated regression equations. Controls: age, female,
income, education, religious, years of residency in the neighborhood, years of residency in the metropolitan
region.
jects primed for neighborhood attachment to whom a shared neighborhood affiliation
in the local group is disclosed and primed subjects to whom it is not disclosed.
As a second test, we rerun the regression on a restricted sample of 229 subjects that
were allocated to the same social identity condition in both stages. This eliminates
a potential attenuation of the treatment effects in the NOLABEL treatment in stage 2
by subjects who were assigned to the LABEL treatment in stage 1 and were therefore
aware of the composition of the small group. Table 4.5 reports the results of this exer-
cise, which are in line with the evidence from the full sample.55 Jointly, these tests of
the effect of the local priming procedure on contributions leads to our final result.
Result 4 (no interaction effect through priming): For subjects who have undergone
the local priming procedure, revelation of neighborhood ties does not result in
less leveling up: Even though priming results in a positive label effect (i.e., higher
average contributions to the local account among subjects in the LABEL treat-
ment), there is still no statistical difference in the strengths of the MPCR effect
55Additional tests on other subsamples in which the first stage treatment assignment are taken into
account in various ways were also conducted. These tests reaffirm the results reported in the main
text.
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exhibited by subjects primed for place attachment across the social identity treat-
ment conditions.
This result also supports the previous finding that the MPCR and the social identity
effects are unrelated, even when the propensity for place attachment is procedurally
activated through a priming task.
4.5 Summary and concluding remarks
The starting point of this paper was the question whether naturally grown social iden-
tity, a well established source of biases in other-regarding behavior, also negatively
affects the efficiency of multi-level public goods provision due to parochial concerns.
Building on the experimental paradigm of the multi-level public goods game and the
well-established concept of neighborhood attachment, it tests whether subjects who
know that their contributions to the lower level public good specifically benefit their
neighbors respond less to a higher MPCR in the higher level public good than subjects
who are unaware of the shared neighborhood attachment.
Our evidence from an artefactual field experiment design brings three novel elements
to bear on the question. One element is the field context that favors naturally grown
social identity as a behavioral driver of parochial concerns. The second element is the
particular neighborhood-within-a-region setting that allows parochialism to naturally
assert itself at the local level. The third is a two-by-two design that varies both the
public good’s productivity across levels and the salience of social identity. This two-
by-two design makes disentangling both dimensions in a formal test possible. Jointly,
these elements confirm previous evidence that there is a positive MPCR effect in multi-
level public goods, but also that level-wise allocations of public goods contributions do
not efficiently respond to relative total productivities. Our results, including several ro-
bustness checks, show, however, that inefficiencies of level-wise allocations need not
reflect parochialism. Even though subjects with above-median neighborhood attach-
ment and subjects that have been procedurally primed on their neighborhood attach-
ment exhibit clear evidence of parochialism and behave more cooperatively towards
the local group if they know that the local group consists of neighbors, their response
to a change in the MPCR is statistically identical to a situation where local identity and
parochial bias cannot play any role by design. Most importantly, our results challenge
the hypothesis that a shared social identity in the smaller group makes the average
subject less responsive to a higher efficiency of contributing to the larger group. Paro-
chialism, in other words, does not stand in the way of efficiency. This result is robust
towards individual heterogeneity in social identity as it holds for subjects with above-
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median neighborhood attachment and subjects primed towards such attachment, even
though both groups exhibit clear evidence of parochialism. In sum, therefore, we find
that even naturally grown types of social identity do not necessarily imply a parochial-
ism penalty on efficiency in a situation in which public goods can be provided at more
than one spatial level.56
56Note that we are not claiming that the private provision of public goods will be efficient, which would
run counter to an overwhelming body of empirical and experimental evidence. We are only claiming
that social identity will not increase the inefficiencies inherent in the social dilemma of PG provision.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Figures
Figure 4.5: Illustration of the experimental procedure
LOW HIGH
LABEL NOLABEL Priming
(454 local prime
162 regional prime)
Registration
1
st Stage
2
nd
 Stage
Socio Demographic Questionnaire 
352 264
160 192 136 128
LABEL NOLABEL
NOLABEL
65 4859 43
LABEL
71 453786
NOLABELLABEL
157 82 124 91
616
Note: Schematic diagram of the experimental procedure and number of subjects in each treatment. At
the beginning of stage 1, subjects are randomly assigned to LOW or HIGH and to NOLABEL or LABEL.
Right after stage 1, subjects complete a questionnaire and a writing task to prime them on their local
(local prime) or regional (regional prime) common identity. In stage 2, subjects are again randomly
assigned to NOLABEL or LABEL. Finally, subjects complete a post-experimental questionnaire.
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4.6.2 Tables
Table 4.6: Sample characteristics
Total Heidelberg Mannheim
Bahnstadt Neuenheim Feudenheim Schwetzingerstadt
/ Oststadt
Subjects (in #) 616 146 177 109 184
Age (in years) 35.6 29.0 38.1 47.2 31.5
Female (in %) 45.7 47.9 48.9 42.6 42.6
Income (in EUR) 2,087 2,027 2,117 2,550 1,832
Education
(in years)
14.8 14.4 15.4 14.3 15.0
Religion 2.33 2.33 2.31 2.43 2.30
Region (in years) 17.5 7.4 19.5 35.2 13.2
Neighborhood
(in years)
8.9 1.6 10.8 20.6 5.9
Local Identity
Index
-0.04 -0.12 -0.05 0.29 -0.16
Local Patriots
(in %)
49 45 47 65 44
Note: “Age” (in years); “Female” (female dummy); “Income” (1-5): 1 indicates the lowest (up to 500
euro disposable net income per month) and 5 indicates the highest (4000 euro or more disposable net
income per month); “Education” (in years of education); Religion (1-5): 1 indicates no affiliation with
religious community and 5 indicates very high affiliation with religious community; “Region” (years
living in the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitian Region); “Neighborhood” (years living in city district); “Local
Identity Index” (-1-1): -1 indicates very low local place attachment and 1 indicates very high local place
attachment; “Local Patriots” (dummy for participants with above median “Local Identity Index”).
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Table 4.7: Individual contributions - complementary treatment
1 2 3 4 5 6
qp ql qr qp ql qr
Private Local Regional Private Local Regional
Panel A - Full sample
MIX 0.18
(0.39)
-0.74**
(0.29)
0.55
(0.44)
0.22
(0.40)
-0.69**
(0.29)
0.47
(0.46)
LABEL -0.08
(0.24)
0.14
(0.24)
-0.07
(0.28)
-0.01
(0.25)
0.09
(0.25)
-0.08
(0.30)
MIX x LABEL 0.22
(0.53)
0.45
(0.44)
-0.66
(0.60)
0.17
(0.53)
0.46
(0.44)
-0.63
(0.61)
Constant 2.34***
(0.17)
2.78***
(0.17)
2.88***
(0.19)
2.58***
(0.73)
2.65***
(0.68)
2.77***
(0.88)
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Neighborhood FE no no no yes yes yes
# of observations 468 468 468 454 454 454
Panel B - Local patriots
MIX -0.61
(0.50)
-0.46
(0.43)
1.07*
(0.64)
-0.57
(0.52)
-0.56
(0.42)
1.13*
(0.67)
LABEL -0.42
(0.34)
0.75**
(0.35)
-0.32
(0.42)
-0.49
(0.35)
0.77**
(0.38)
-0.28
(0.45)
MIX x LABEL 1.22*
(0.69)
-0.17
(0.61)
-1.05
(0.83)
1.34*
(0.70)
-0.11
(0.66)
-1.24
(0.86)
Constant 2.47***
(0.26)
2.55***
(0.25)
2.98***
(0.30)
4.20***
(1.07)
1.77***
(0.97)
2.03***
(1.33)
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Neighborhood FE no no no yes yes yes
# of observations 236 236 236 229 229 229
Note: OLS regressions, qp, ql , qr ∈ [0, 8]. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p <
0.05 and ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Statistically significant results reported above are robust to jointly estimating
regressions (2), (3) and respectively (5), (6) as seemingly unrelated regression equations. Controls: age,
female, income, education, religious, years of residency in the neighborhood, years of residency in the
metropolitan region. In MIX the MPCR for the LPG is set at αl = 0.5 and the total benefits (TB) of a
one unit contribution to the LPG is given by 2 units. The MPCR for the RPG differs between members
of the local group (neighbors) and members of the regional group from a different neighborhood (non-
neighbors). The MPCR for the RPG is given by αrneigbhor = 0.25 for neighbors and α
r
non−neighbor = 0.75
for non-neighbors. Therefore, contributing to the RPG in MIX involves a trade-off in term of benefiting
neighbors. A one unit contribution to the RPG corresponds to a TB of 4 units, which is larger than the
TB of the LPG.
114
Leveling up? - Appendix
4.6.3 Instructions
Invitation letter - First page [Translated from German]†
– Invitation –
June 2015
Invitation to participate in a scientific study
Dear Sir or Madam,
The University of Heidelberg and the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in 
Mannheim are jointly carrying out a scientific study on individual choice behaviour. This 
research project is funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. 
Your household has been chosen randomly to actively support our research project by 
participating in a 15-minute online survey. You will receive a reward of 5 euros for your 
participation in any case. The choices you will make in the online survey will further increase 
the amount of money. 
No special previous knowledge is required. Please note that only one person per household 
can participate in this study and this person needs to have attained full age.
You may immediately start with the online survey. To do so, please, register at the following 
website:
www.zew.de/umfrage2015
Your personal access key (valid until 28.06.2015) is: <<CODE>>
Please, contact Dr Daniel Römer if you have any questions by calling 0621/1235-214 or send 
an email to umfrage@zew.de. For further information, please, refer to the back of the page.
We are looking forward to your participation in this survey that surely is also of interest to 
you, and thank you very much for supporting this research project.
Prof Timo Goeschl, Ph.D.
Research Centre for Environmental 
Economics
Alfred Weber Institute of Economics
University of Heidelberg
Dr Daniel Römer 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 
Environmental Management
Centre for European Economic Research 
†Explanatory notes are given in square brackets.
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Invitation letter - Second page
Information sheet on content and procedure of the study
Who is organising this study?
This study is part of a joint research project of the University of Heidelberg and the Centre 
for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim. The University of Heidelberg is a 
public institute for education and research of the federal state Baden-Wuerttemberg. The 
ZEW is a non-profit research institute and member of the Leibniz Association. This research 
project is funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research.
How can I participate?
You may participate starting from today until at the latest 28.06.2015 (as long as the 
maximum number of participants has not been reached). You only need a device (e.g. 
computer, laptop, tablet or smartphone) with internet access and internet browser (e.g. 
Internet Explorer, Firefox, Safari, Chrome).
x Computer/laptop: To register, please, enter www.zew.de/umfrage2015 into the 
address bar of your internet browser. It leads you to the start screen where you 
need to enter your personal access key. The access key is on the first page of the 
invitation letter. This access key allows you to participate in the study one time 
only. The online survey starts immediately after you have entered the key.
x Tablet/smartphone: To register, please, enter www.zew.de/umfrage2015 into the 
address bar of your internet browser. Alternatively, you may also use an 
adequate app to read the QR code beside this paragraph. Both options lead you 
to the start screen where you need to enter your personal access key. The access 
key is on the first page of the invitation letter. This access key allows you to 
participate in the study one time only. The online survey starts immediately after 
you have entered the key.
What about my data?
The information you give is exclusively used for research purposes and analysed 
anonymously. Your personal data are exclusively used to transfer your reward to you and are 
neither related to the information given in the survey nor given to any third-party.
What influences the amount of reward I will receive?
Your reward consists of a standard reward and an additional reward. In any case, you will 
receive the standard reward of 5 euros for participating. The amount of the additional reward 
depends on your own choices and those of the other participants. 
How will I receive my reward?
We want to transfer your reward to you without you having to give us your bank data. 
Therefore, you will receive a shopping voucher by mail about 4 weeks after participating. 
The value of the voucher equals the total amount of your reward (standard reward of 5 euros 
plus additional reward). You may use the voucher in many different local stores and online 
shops to pay for your shopping (e. g. Galeria Kaufhof, Karstadt, Media Markt, Saturn – for 
the complete list of stores accepting the voucher, please, refer to this website: 
http://www.edenred.de/produkte/ticket-shopping-card/akzeptanzpartner.html)
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Instructions and questionnaire
[Translated from German. We use braces {} to indicate the alternative wording (LABEL vs.
NOLABEL) and parameters (HIGH vs. LOW) used in the different treatments. The term
city district (set in italics) stands for one of the four different municipal districts Bahnstadt,
Feudenheim, Neuenheim, and Schwetzingerstadt/Oststadt, depending on where the respective
participant lives. In the following, we show the wording for the LOW-NOLABEL as the bench-
mark case and as described above, we also show the deviations in the other treatments by using
square brackets.]†
- Screen 1 -
Welcome to our research study!
Dear participant, Thank you for showing interest in this research study. You can start
with the tasks immediately. On this screen you can find the most important informa-
tion regarding your participation:
• Participating takes on average 15 minutes.
• There are two tasks and some questionnaires.
• All tasks will be precisely explained to you in the course of the study.
• All instructions will be carried out as described:
– By “money” we mean real amounts of money which will be definitely paid
out to you.
– By “other participants” we mean real people who also participate in this
study just like you.
Note: Please always use the buttons provided and not your internet browser for navig-
ation because otherwise, a successful completion of the survey cannot be guaranteed.
- Screen 2 -
Your payment for participating consists of two parts: In any case, you will receive a
fixed amount of 5 euros if you complete both tasks and complete the questionnaires.
• In task 1 or task 2, an additional payment may emerge for you and the other
study participants.
• A random procedure (comparable with a coin flip) at the end of the study will
determine whether you receive the payment from either task 1 or task 2. Both
outcomes are equally likely.
• We will definitely select and pay out one of the two tasks. You will receive the
respective payment additionally to the fixed amount.
Thus, your total payment for participating in the study consists of the following:
†Explanatory notes are given in square brackets.
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Your total payment = 5 euros + payment from either task 1 or task 2
- Screen 3 -
Explanation and procedure of task 1
In this section, you can earn money in addition to the fixed amount.
Who are the other participants? All in all, 8 subjects actively take part in this de-
cision task, namely you and 7 more participants. {LABEL: Apart from you, 3 other
participants are, like you, inhabitants of city district. The other 4 participants are not
inhabitants of city district but are from another area located in the Rhine-Neckar Met-
ropolitan Region.}
What is your task? In this task, you and all other participants are provided with 8 euros
at your free disposal. Please note that you receive this amount of money in addition
to the fixed amount. Your task is to decide on how to distribute the 8 euros across
three different pots. Please note that the whole amount of 8 euros has to be distributed
completely to the three different pots. Please also note that the other participants face
the same decision situation as you do.
How do the pots differ from each other? At the end of the study, the total sum of
money allocated to all three pots is paid out to you and to the other participants ac-
cording to the rules explained below. It depends on the pot (A, B, or C) whether either
you, or you and 3 other participants, or you and 7 other participants benefit from the
payment. Additionally, the total sum of money allocated to a certain pot may be mul-
tiplied before any payment from this pot is received.
Pot A (private): Only you can put an amount of money into this pot. For every euro
that is contributed into this pot, you will receive 1 euro. The 7 other participants do
not receive any payment from your pot. However, every participant owns a respective
pot A as well.
Pot B (4 participants {LABEL: city district}): Apart from you, there are 3 more par-
ticipants {LABEL: from city district} (in total, 4 participants) who can put an amount
of money into this pot. Every euro which is contributed to this pot will be doubled
and the respective sum will be equally distributed to all 4 participants. For every euro
that is put into Pot B, you and the 3 other participants {LABEL: from city district} will
consequently receive 0.50 euro each. The other group, which also comprises 4 parti-
cipants, will not receive any payment from your Pot B. However, the other group owns
a respective Pot B as well.
Pot C (8 participants {LABEL: Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region}): Apart from you,
there are 7 other participants {LABEL: from the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region} (in
total 8 participants) who can put an amount of money into this pot. Every euro which
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is put into this pot will be doubled {HIGH: quadrupled} and the respective sum will
be equally distributed to all 8 participants. For every euro that is put into Pot C, you
and the 7 other participants {LABEL: from the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region} will
consequently receive 0.25 euros {HIGH: 0.50 euros} each.
If task 1 is chosen for payment, your total payment is composed of the following ele-
ments:
Total payment = 5 euro (lump sum) + 1.0 x (sum of euros of Pot A) + 0.5 x (sum of
euros of Pot B) + 0.25 {high: 0.50} x (sum of euros of Pot C)
- Screen 5 -
Please enter the amount of money you want to put into each of the three pots. Please
remember that you are provided with 8 euros at your free disposal for this task of
decision-making and you can decide on how to distribute this amount of money to the
three different pots. For this purpose, please fill out the fields by entering an amount
between 0 and 8 euros:
• Pot A (private): ___€
• Pot B (4 participants {LABEL: city district}): ___€
• Pot C (8 participants {LABEL: Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region}):___€
Pot A (private): Only you can put an amount of money into this pot. For every euro
that is contributed to this pot, you will receive 1 euro. The 7 other participants do not
receive any payment from your pot. However, each participant owns a respective pot
A as well.
Pot B (4 participants {LABEL: city district}): Apart from you, there are 3 more parti-
cipants {LABEL: from city district} (in total 4 participants) who can put an amount of
money into this pot. Every euro which is put into this pot will be doubled and the
respective sum will be equally distributed to all 4 participants. For every euro that is
put into Pot B, you and the 3 other participants {LABEL: from city district} will con-
sequently receive 0.50 euro each. The other group, which also comprises 4 participants,
will not receive any payment from your Pot B. However, the other group owns a re-
spective Pot B as well.
Pot C (8 participants {Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region}): Apart from you, there
are 7 other participants {from the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region} (in total 8 parti-
cipants) who can put an amount of money into this pot. Every euro which is put into
this pot will be doubled {HIGH: quadrupled} and the respective sum will be equally
distributed to all 8 participants. For every euro that is put into Pot C, you and the
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7 other participants {LABEL: from the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region} will con-
sequently receive 0.25 euros {HIGH: 0.50 euros} each.
- Screen 6 -
Before proceeding with task 2, we would like to gather some information about your
district.
- Screen 7 -
Now we would like you to answer the following questions.
• How strongly do you identify yourself with the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Re-
gion? Please choose one of the following answers: O Not at all O Slightly O
Moderately O 15 O Very O Extremely O No statement
• How strongly do you identify yourself with the district of city district? Please
choose one of the following answers: O Not at all O Slightly O Moderately O 15
O Very O Extremely O No statement
- Screen 8 -
Now we would like you to answer the following questions.
• Please indicate how much you, as an inhabitant of city district, agree with the
following statements.
– I deliberately decided to live in city district. Please choose one of the follow-
ing answers: O Not at all O Slightly O Moderately O 15 O Very O Extremely
O No statement
– I actively participate in local organizations and groups which mainly consist
of members who are inhabitants of city district. Please choose one of the
following answers: O Not at all O Slightly O Moderately O 15 O Very O
Extremely O No statement
– I am happy to live in city district. Please choose one of the following an-
swers: O Not at all O Slightly O Moderately O 15 O Very O Extremely O No
statement
– I participate in neighborhood activities together with other inhabitants of
city district. Please choose one of the following answers: O Not at all O
Slightly O Moderately O 15 O Very O Extremely O No statement
– Recently, many new inhabitants have moved to city district. Please choose
one of the following answers: O Not at all O Slightly O Moderately O 15 O
Very O Extremely O No statement
• Please describe the positive aspects of {LOCAL PRIME: city district. REGIONAL
PRIME: Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region} briefly in your own words. Answer
____
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- Screen 9 -
On the next screen, the second decision task starts. Please carefully read through the
following explanations as they describe how your payment and the payments of the
other study participants depend on your decision.
- Screen 10 -
Explanation and procedure of task 2
[See Screen 3]
- Screen 11 -
[See Screen 4]
- Screen 12 -
After you have made your decisions, we are interested in how you assess the behavior
of the other participants in task 2.
• Regardless of your own decision: In your opinion, which decision did the other
participants from your group {LABEL: from city district} make on average when
they faced the same decision situation as you did?
– Pot A: ___€
– Pot B: ___€
– Pot C: ___€
• Regardless of your own decision: In your opinion, which decision did the other
participants {label: from the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region} make on aver-
age when they faced the same decision situation as you did?
– Pot A: ___€
– Pot B: ___€
– Pot C: ___€
- Screen 13 -
Now we would like to know your opinion about the comprehensibility of the tasks.
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement:
• The instructions for the tasks were clear. Please choose one of the following an-
swers: O Not at all O Slightly O Moderately O 15 O Very O Extremely O No
statement
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• Regardless of your actual decision: How would you have distributed the 8 euros
to Pot A, Pot B and Pot C in task 2 if it had been your aim to maximize the total
payment for yourself?
– Pot A: ___€
– Pot B: ___€
– Pot C: ___€
• Regardless of your actual decision: How would you have distributed the 8 euros
to Pot A, Pot B and Pot C in task 2 if it had been your aim to maximize the total
payment for all 8 participants in the decision task?
– Pot A: ___€
– Pot B: ___€
– Pot C: ___€
- Screen 14 -
Thank you very much, you are almost done. Finally, we would like to ask you for some
personal details.
- Screen 15 -
Now we would like you to answer the following questions.
• Please indicate how much you, as an inhabitant of city district, agree with the
following statements.
– I am proud to live in the district of city district. Please choose one of the
following answers: O Not at all O Slightly O Moderately O 15 O Very O
Extremely O No statement
– I feel comfortable in the district of city district. Please choose one of the
following answers: O Not at all O Slightly O Moderately O 15 O Very O
Extremely O No statement
• Self-assessment of your personality: In general, are you a person willing to take
risks or are you more risk-averse? Explanation about the scale: 0 (risk-averse) to
5 (prepared to take risks) Please choose one of the following answers: O 0 O 1 O
2 O 3 O 4 O 5 O No statement
• What is your opinion about the following three statements?
– In general, people can be trusted. Please choose one of the following an-
swers: O Strongly agree O Disagree O Agree O Strongly agree O No state-
ment
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– Nowadays people are not reliable anymore. Please choose one of the follow-
ing answers: O Strongly agree O Disagree O Agree O Strongly agree O No
statement
– In dealing with strangers, it is better to be cautious before trusting them.
Please choose one of the following answers: O Strongly agree O Disagree O
Agree O Strongly agree O No statement
• Do you think that most people. . . Please choose one of the following answers:
– O . . . would take advantage of you if they had the possibility to do so. . .
– O . . . or would rather try to be fair to you?
– O No statement
• In your opinion, would you say that most of the time people... Please choose one
of the following answers:
– O . . . try to be helpful. . .
– O . . . or only pursue their own interests?
– O No statement
• Please specify your gender: Please choose one of the following answers: O Male
O Female
• How old are you? ______ years
• For how long have you been living in the Rhine-Neckar Metropolitan Region?
For approximately ___________years
• For how long have you been living in city district? For approximately _______________
years
• Do you consider yourself a member of a certain religious community? Please
choose one of the following answers: O Not at all O Slightly O Moderately O
Very O Extremely O No statement
• What are your native languages? _________________
• In total, how much money does your household have at its disposal (net income)
per month? Please choose one of the following answers: O Up to less than 500€
O 500€ to 1,000€ O 1,000€ to 1,500€ O 1,500€ to 2,000€ O 2,000€ to 3,000€ O 3,000
to 4,000€ O 4,000€ or more O No statement
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• Which party would you vote for if there were general elections to be held on
next Sunday? Please choose one of the following answers: O CDU/CSU O SPD
O Bündins 90 / Die Grünen O FDP O Die Linke O AfD O I do not vote O No
statement O Other: ________
• What is the highest level of education you have received? Please choose one
of the following answers: O No qualification O Secondary School Leaving Cer-
tificate [Hauptschule] O O level [Mittlere Reife] O Advanced Technical College
Certificate [Fachhochschulreife] O A level / Higher Education Entrance Qualific-
ation [Abitur] O Completed apprenticeship O University Diploma / Polytechnic
Degree O No statement O Other qualification: ________
- Screen 16 -
You will definitely receive 5 euros for your participation. For the additional payment,
there will be a procedure (comparable with a coin flip) which randomly determines
whether you will receive the additional payment from task 1 or from task 2. Both
outcomes are equally likely. We definitely choose and pay one of the two amounts.
You will receive the respective payment additionally to the fixed amount.
Your total payment = 5 euros + payment from either task 1 or task 2
As soon as all participants have made their decisions, we will inform you about the
resulting total payment. In order to allow you to receive your total payment without
having to provide your personal bank data, you will receive a shopping voucher by
mail approximately 4 weeks after your participation. The value of the voucher cor-
responds to your total payment. You can redeem the voucher to at numerous local
shops and online shops (e.g. Galeria Kaufhof, Karstadt, Media Markt, Saturn). For this
purpose, please enter your address:
• Name:____
• Surname:____
• Street Address:____
• Zip Code:____
• City:____
Note: Your address will be used only for sending the shopping voucher and will not be
transferred to third parties. Moreover, the data of the questionnaires will not be linked
to your address data. If you have any questions concerning this research procedure,
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please do not hesitate to contact the directors of the study by calling 0621/1235-214 or
by email (umfrage@zew.de).
Did you enjoy taking part in this study and do you want to participate in other sci-
entific studies of this type? We would be pleased to add your name to our members’
database and would be happy to invite you to further studies. For this purpose, we
only need your e-mail address. As a matter of course, your e-mail address is not used
for any other purposes and if you wish to withdraw your participation offer at any
future point, you will be directly unsubscribed from the database.
• E-mail Address: ____
- Screen 17 -
Thank you very much! Your answers were stored.
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4.6.4 Screenshots
[In German]†
Screenshot of the contribution stage
†Explanatory notes are given in square brackets.
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5 Non-binding restrictions, cooperation, and coral reef
protection: Experimental evidence from Indonesian
fishing communities
This chapter has been published as:
Gallier, C., J. Langbein and C. Vance (2018). Non-binding restrictions, cooperation,
and coral reef protection: Experimental evidence from Indonesian fishing
communities. Ecological Economics 150, 62-71.
This article can be downloaded via
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.006
Abstract: We conduct a framed field experiment in Indonesian fishing communities,
with an eye towards evaluating alternative decision-making processes for setting ex-
traction restrictions to preserve coral reef fisheries in the absence of stringent monit-
oring and enforcement. We explore whether the individual extraction decision varies
according to three non-binding recommended extraction levels originating from (1) a
democratic process, (2) a group leader or (3) an external source. For the sample as a
whole, we find a strong effect of the external treatment, with a weaker effect of the
democratic treatment and no effect of the leadership treatment. Closer inspection re-
veals that the results are driven by one of the three sites where the experiment was
conducted – that having the highest levels of ethnic and religious diversity. There we
find that democratic decision-making as well as information originating from outside
the community reduces the extraction level, a result that is robust to regressions con-
trolling for community and individual attributes. The absence of effects in two of the
three sites suggests that a non-binding recommendation may often be insufficient in
promoting the cooperative behavior that underpins contemporary approaches to man-
aging coral reefs.
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5.1 Introduction
The ongoing destruction of coral reef ecosystems ranks among the major drivers of
global environmental change, with already more than a quarter of the world’s reefs ir-
revocably damaged from the combined effects of climate change and local stressors
(Burke et al. 2011). Beyond serving as repositories of biodiversity and marine nu-
trients, coral reefs provide a multitude of benefits to local communities, including
storm surge protection and livelihood from fishing and tourism. Coral reefs are of-
ten located within open-access fisheries, making them vulnerable to overfishing and
destructive fishing practices. This situation is aggravated by the weak formal and in-
formal enforcement mechanisms characterizing fisheries management in many devel-
oping countries. The establishment of exclusive access privileges is increasingly seen
as an effective response to countering the resulting overexploitation (Afflerbach et al.
2014). One such management strategy is referred to as Territorial Use Rights for Fish-
eries (TURF), which has gained traction in recent years largely due to its promotion by
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Nevertheless, the decision-processes under-
pinning the establishment of a TURF, particularly as regards the setting of an extraction
rate that aligns the self-interest of individual fishers with the collective stewardship
of the fishery, remains sparsely studied. Velez et al. (2010), Lopez et al. (2012) and
Santis and Chávez (2015) are notable exceptions, focusing on the complementarity of
informal and formal enforcement mechanisms using framed field experiments with
fishers in Colombia and Chile, respectively.
The present study complements the work of these authors with an experiment of non-
enforced limits on extractive behavior in fishing communities located in Sulawesi,
Indonesia. The idea is to conduct an ex-ante analysis of alternative processes for
reaching a decision on the extraction rate in a region where TURFs are planned but
have not yet been implemented. We explicitly framed the experiment as extraction
from a common-pool fishery for Indonesian fishers.57 Our experimental design em-
ploys a common-pool resource (CPR) game that introduces treatments corresponding
to alternative strategies for encouraging cooperative behavior. Drawing on Cardenas
(2004), we specifically investigate whether recommendations originating either from a
democratic decision process, a group leader decision or an external source affect parti-
cipants’ extraction behavior.
A distinguishing feature of our approach is that the recommendations are non-binding,
with no formal or informal sanctioning mechanism introduced for non-compliance.
Diverging from the substantial literature on monitoring and enforcement of state and
57Following the nomenclature of Harrison and List (2004) our experiment can be classified as framed
field experiment.
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federal regulation, we abstain from introducing even a weak enforcement protocol
(e.g., Cardenas et al. 2000; Moreno-Sánchez and Maldonado 2010) and, in addition, any
informal internal sanctioning measures, e.g., self-imposed sanctions (e.g., Gatiso et al.
2015) or punishment (e.g., Ostrom et al. 1992; Vollan 2008). Our set-up thereby rep-
resents an extreme case that we believe characterizes the environment that our study
subjects actually encounter, one under which highly costly monitoring and sanctioning
precludes a credible deterrent to overfishing. Although many experiments document
that costly monitoring and sanctioning devices are effectively used to increase cooper-
ation in social dilemma situations (e.g., Casari and Plott 2003; Carpenter 2007), Villena
and Chávez (2005) show that rational fishermen will not engage in monitoring when
there are no economic incentives in place for the reporting of violators. Given the
absence of compensation for monitoring within the TURFs in operation elsewhere in
Indonesia, the question arises as to whether the process for determining the extraction
level prior to the establishment of the TURF is, itself, sufficient to support compliance
with a socially optimal extraction level.
Previous research suggests that participation in decision making affects behavior and
increases individuals’ willingness to cooperate in social dilemma situations (e.g., Os-
trom and Nagendra 2006; Sutter et al. 2010). However, it has also been shown that
the means by which community involvement is implemented can have a fundamental
bearing on outcomes (e.g., Agrawal and Chhatre 2006; Cinner and Aswani 2007; Per-
sha et al. 2011; Cox et al. 2014). Moreover, there is evidence that the effects of measures
that attempt to foster cooperation in social dilemma situations perform differently de-
pending on the underlying set of personal attributes and informal norms prevailing in
the community (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Carpenter et al. 2004; Herrmann et al. 2008; Gächter
et al. 2010; Vollan et al. 2017).
The present study expands on these themes with an experimental design that links dif-
ferent decision-making processes to different extractive outcomes, revealing how these
outcomes are mediated by the socio-cultural setting in which the participants in the ex-
periment reside. Among our main results, we find that non-binding recommendations
originating from both a democratic process and an external source have a statistically
significant effect in drawing participants toward the social optimum in the sample as a
whole. Closer inspection reveals, however, that this result is driven by one of the three
sites where the study was undertaken, that having the highest levels of ethnic and
religious diversity. This result is robust to regressions controlling for individual and
community level factors. Nevertheless, the absence of effects in two of the three sites
underlines the importance of evaluating effects on a case-by-case basis, and suggests
that non-binding recommendations may often have only a muted effect in encouraging
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cooperative behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, background information on coral
reef fisheries and TURFs in Indonesia as well as our subject pool are presented. The
experimental design and procedures are presented in Section 5.3. Results are presented
in Section 5.4. A summary discussion is provided in Section 5.5.
5.2 Background, community descriptions, and sampling
5.2.1 The Indonesian context
Harboring the largest expanse of reefs worldwide, Indonesia is heavily dependent on
marine resources, with 54% of the country’s animal protein coming from fish and sea-
food (Burke et al. 2011). A variety of stressors, including agricultural runoff and fishing
activities, have put this resource base under severe duress. The World Bank (2014) re-
ports that almost 65% of Indonesia’s reefs are threatened by overfishing, and roughly
half are threatened by destructive fishing practices.
The Indonesian government recognized the urgency of protecting the reefs decades
ago. National and regional laws against destructive fishing practices and overfishing
have been introduced over the years, but a lack of monitoring capacities has under-
mined law enforcement. Conservation NGOs have partially filled this void. A unify-
ing principle of many early interventions was the establishment of Marine Protected
Areas (MPAs). The record of MPAs, however, has been mixed, with poor management
performance (e.g., Mora et al. 2006), non-compliance with existing rules (e.g., Pierac-
cini et al. 2017), the prioritization of conservation over economic development, and
the non-involvement of local communities in the implementation process (e.g., Ferse
et al. 2010) being cited as sources of ineffectiveness. TURFs represent an integrated ap-
proach to management that couples conservation with economic development goals
by bestowing local fishers with exclusive access to their fishing grounds in the form of
territorial use rights.
As documented in a meta-study undertaken by Afflerbach et al. (2014), a common
trend characterizing the creation of TURFs is a diversity of stakeholders. While TURFs
have existed in various forms for centuries, Afflerbach and colleagues (2014) find that
in most contemporary cases TURFs have emerged from the collaboration of an NGO, a
governmental unit, and/or a community organization. Such is the situation on the is-
land of Sulawesi, where the creation of the TURFs is supported by international NGOs
working in tandem with the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries and
respective regional governments, which hold the authority to transfer geographically
assigned property rights to the communities. The communities, in turn, set operational
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rules, define monitoring and enforcement procedures, and regulate harvest (e.g., Wilen
et al. 2012).
Monitoring itself, which is in principle carried out by local fisherman, is often costly
in practice, particularly – as in Sulawesi – when the planned TURFs are large or loc-
ated far from the coastline. Under such circumstances, rule enforcement may be cor-
respondingly lax or even non-existent, including in cases where the rules are clear
(De Alessi 2014). Depending on local socio-economic, political and environmental fea-
tures, NGOs have consequently availed a mix of strategies to encourage voluntary
compliance with the rules established under the TURF. Perhaps the most important
question in gauging the scope for garnering support relates to the process by which
a given community reaches decisions on exploitation and resource extraction. While
a variety of decision-making procedures are possible during the planning phase of a
TURF, our experimental approach broadly distinguishes between decisions reached by
way of a democratic process, a group leader, or through an outside entity. This divi-
sion largely captures the alternative channels through which NGOs may attempt to
coordinate behavior in the Indonesian context, where rule setting is left to the villages
managing the TURF, without a clear agreement about the procedure.
5.2.2 Community descriptions
An immediate challenge in undertaking survey work in Indonesia is the country’s rich
tapestry of cultural and ethnic heterogeneity. Indonesia is home to more than 300 eth-
nic groups, and around 700 different languages are spoken across its 14,000 islands.
The study site of Sulawesi, which is the fourth biggest Indonesian island in territory
and the third biggest in population, embodies this heterogeneity, with at least 117 local
ethnicities residing on the island (Ananta et al. 2015). While the main religion is Islam,
Christians are also prevalent and comprise about 20% of the population.
Recognizing that this diversity conspires against drawing samples that allow the ex-
trapolation of findings (e.g., Henrich et al. 2001; Herrmann et al. 2008), we selected cul-
turally distinct communities to test the extent to which generalizations can be drawn.
Specifically, we selected three sites from a set of 12 sites in which one of the inter-
national NGOs working in the region is in the planning phase of a program to es-
tablish TURFs (see Figure 5.1). Two of the sites are on Wakatobi, a small string of
islands in South-East Sulawesi that are primarily populated by two different ethnicit-
ies, the Badjo and the Liya. Badjo communities are primarily organized around fishing
and have governance structures that are largely democratic, with village leaders de-
termined by elections. Liya communities occupy the same string of islands and are
primarily populated by seaweed farmers, who augment their livelihood by part-time
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Figure 5.1: Study sites
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Note: Study sites are located on the island of Sulawesi in Indonesia. The study was conducted in Liya
(1) and Badjo (2) on Wakatobi islands in South-East of Sulawesi and in Bunaken (3) in the North-East of
Sulawesi.
fishing. Liya governance is hierarchically organized, with the village leader usually
selected from one of several influential families. While both the Badjo and Liya are re-
latively cut-off from the remainder of the island, being connected primarily via ferries
and planes, the third site, Bunaken, is situated on the main part of the island in the
North-East of Sulawesi. Its centralized location, transportation linkages, and mix of
ethnicities and religions makes Bunaken more prototypical of Sulawesi at large. Con-
trasting with the ethnically homogeneous and nearly exclusively Muslim communities
of the Badjo and Liya, Bunaken is represented in our sample by 23 different ethnicities
and a religious composition that is 64% Muslim. Governance structures in Bunaken
also vary, but are typically comprised of a village council and village leader who is
democratically elected.
5.2.3 Sampling and descriptive statistics
The sample comprises a total of 695 households distributed approximately evenly
across the three communities. Bunaken has 10 villages while Liya and Badjo have
4 and 3 villages, respectively. Sampling proceeded according to a design which en-
sured that the number of households surveyed from every village was proportional
to the village’s population within the community. The households were selected by
approaching every nth household from an arbitrary starting point, with n determined
according to the number of households in the village. If a household declined to parti-
cipate, which occurred in three cases, the next nth household was approached.
In addition to one member of each household – usually the head – participating in
the CPR game, we administered a questionnaire upon initially approaching the house-
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Table 5.1: Sample characteristics
All sites Badjo Liya Bunaken
Social Capital
Participant trust level
(linearized index from 0 to 1)
0.61 0.55
(0.01)
0.62
(0.01)
0.66
(0.01)
Participant locus of control level
(linearized index from 0 to 1)
0.36 0.35
(0.01)
0.36
(0.01)
0.35
(0.01)
Association membership
(head of household is member in
party or association)
0.33 0.32
(0.03)
0.27
(0.03)
0.40
(0.03)
Household demographics
Religion of head of household
(Islamic believer)
0.87 1.0
(0)
0.99
(0.0)
0.64
(0.03)
Household fishing intensity
(0 “Never” to 5 “More than 1-2
times per week”)
3.16 3.25
(0.15)
3.58
(0.14)
2.70
(0.14)
Household expenditures
(in IDR)
301,481 423,149
(60.52)
198,297
(21.24)
286,302
(15.2)
Head of household gender
(male dummy)
0.81 0.76
(0.03)
0.87
(0.02)
0.80
(0.03)
Head of household age
(age of head of household)
44.72 38.60
(0.95)
47.43
(0.88)
47.39
(0.77)
Education of head of household
(at least primary education)
0.41 0.30
(0.03)
0.46
(0.03)
0.45
(0.03)
Village characteristics
Internet
(good internet connection)
0.19 0.33
(0.01)
0 0.25
(0.009)
Transport services
(public transport services
available)
0.66 0.66
(0.01)
1
(0)
0.66
(0.01)
Observations 695 225 230 240
Note: Summary of household demographics, social capital indices, and village characteristics. The
column all sites denotes the average value of the other three sites. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Village characteristics are available for 17 communities.
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hold. The questionnaire elicited information on a range of socioeconomic variables
that serve as a baseline measure of conditions prior to the introduction of the TURF.
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics for a subset of these variables, which are sub-
sequently used in a regression analysis that explores whether the estimated treatment
effects vary when controlling for personal, household and village characteristics. The
majority of variables come directly from questions pertaining to education, religion,
age and other attributes, but two are derived from a battery of questions directed at the
respondent’s level of trust and perceived self-empowerment, referred to as the locus of
control.58 These questions are based on research on the locus of control and trust and
then transformed into one indicator ranging from 0 to 1 using principal component
analysis.59
5.3 Common-pool resource model, experimental design, and
predictions
5.3.1 Common-pool resource model
In standard CPR games, individuals exert effort to extract a shared resource. Extraction
is individually beneficial, but implies negative externalities (e.g., Ostrom et al. 1994).
Externalities arise whenever the extraction effort by one individual affects the benefits
of others. In order to analyze whether collective decision making is an appropriate
approach to increase cooperation within Indonesian fishing communities, we use a
CPR game based on Cardenas (2004). Rather than using a standard subject pool and
neutral framing, we explicitly framed the experiment as extraction from a common-
pool fishery for Indonesian fishers. The advantage of using a non-standard subject
pool and framing the decision as extraction decision is that the decision is familiar to
participants, who in turn bring the experience and context from their daily lives in
reaching their decisions.
The design is based on a model of a group of five (n = 5) homogeneous agents indexed
by i who have access to a common-pool resource, e.g., a fish stock. All agents have a
maximum labor endowment of 8 units of effort to spend and decide how much effort
to spend on extracting, xi ∈ [1, 8]. The instantaneous benefits of extraction accruing to
58The importance of trust has long been recognized in a collective action problem (e.g., Ostrom 2000).
We use seven questions similar to those of the World Value Survey to disentangle the trust nexus
from all perspectives. The locus of control concept measures the person’s belief in being able to
control events that affect their lives. We apply the method developed by Levenson (1974) to elicit the
multidimensionality of the locus of control that asks a set of interrelated questions adjusted to our
context. The questions were readjusted to our context.
59The principal component analysis allows reducing several correlated variables into one indicator fa-
cilitating interpretation and analysis.
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agent i, Ei, are given by:
Ei = axi − 12bx
2
i ,
where a and b are positive constants. This implies diminishing returns from extrac-
tion and that instantaneous benefits received by an appropriator to be independent of
the extraction of other appropriators. Additionally, agents receive benefits from con-
serving the shared resource, Ci. Benefits from conserving the resource, in contrast to
extracting, depend on the total level of extraction and are given by:
Ci = α
5
∑
j=1
(c− xj),
where α and c are positive constants. Note that this introduces a negative external-
ity into the model because an agent’s benefit from conservation decreases with total
appropriation. Benefits from extraction, Ei, and conservation, Ci, define agent i’s indi-
vidual payoff:
pii = Ei + Ci = axi − 12bx
2
i + α
5
∑
j=1
(c− xj).
To assure comparability to the previous literature and keep the experiment as simple as
possible, we use the same parametrization as Cardenas (2004), i.e., e = 8, a = 60, b =
5, α = 20 and c = 800. This transfers the experiment into a CPR game that is linear
in payoffs with respective corner solutions.60 Differentiation with respect to xi yields
that the optimal extraction for agent i is x∗i =
(a−α)
b = 8. Given that xi ∈ [1, 8], the
social optimum, in contrast, is attained if agents extract in a way that maximizes the
joint payoff and is given by individual extraction levels of x
◦
i = 1.
5.3.2 Experimental design and predictions
Based on the CPR game by Cardenas (2004), our experimental design covers four
treatments reflecting regulatory approaches that apply to fishermen operating under
TURFs and allows us to study the effect of alternative strategies to implement com-
munity participation in defining and following extraction plans. At the beginning of
each session, which is administered from a team assembled from the University of In-
60Support for this transformation comes from Cason and Gangadharan (2015). Their results suggest
that non-linearity in payoffs complicate coordination in social dilemma games. Although our game
is linear in payoffs with corner solutions we abstain from framing it as public bad game (e.g., Andreoni
1995) to address that common-pool resource and public good or bad games are distinct types of social
dilemmas and not strategically equivalent (e.g., Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud 2006).
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Table 5.2: Experimental design
Treatment Description Sub. (obs.) per site
Badjo Liya Bunaken Total
autonomy Agents autonomously decide on
per-capita effort level
60
(12)
60
(12)
60
(12)
180
(36)
democracy Agents vote on the non-binding
recommended per-capita effort
level
55
(11)
60
(12)
60
(12)
175
(35)
leadership Group leader decides on
non-binding recommended
per-capita effort level
55
(11)
50
(10)
60
(12)
165
(33)
external External authority decises on
non-binding recommended
per-capita effort level
55
(11)
60
(12)
60
(12)
175
(35)
donesia, participants were randomly assigned to groups of five. There is no change
in the group throughout the experiment. In each session one of the four treatments
was played. Each session consists of 10 static decision rounds. The experiment was
consciously framed in such a way that participants were fully aware of participating in
an experiment about fishing in coral reefs. We abstain from introducing direct face-to-
face communication and focus on different regulatory approaches to implement com-
munity participation. This creates a situation more like that of a large group setting
than a small group setting (e.g., Walker et al. 2000), thereby mimicking the circum-
stances when planned TURFs are large and the participating communities cover a vast
area, as characterizes the study region.
Table 5.2 briefly summarized the experimental design. In the autonomy treatment,
which we later refer to as the baseline, each agent autonomously and simultaneously,
without any form of communication, decides how much effort to spend on extracting
the common resource, i.e., chooses xi ∈ [1, 8], in each decision round. After each de-
cision, agents are informed about the individual efforts and the corresponding payoffs.
Since each agent decides individually, the predicted Nash equilibrium is that all agents
spend their individually maximal level of effort, i.e., x∗i = 8, on extracting.
In the democracy treatment we introduce community participation by letting groups set
their own recommendation on how much effort members should spend on extracting.
In each decision round agents vote on the recommended effort level. This stylized
structure of participation follows the lead of Walker et al. (2000), who limit direct com-
munication, but allow for indirect communication via the signals through proposals
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and voting. Deviating from the previous literature, we capture the high costs of mon-
itoring and enforcement that prevail in the study region by making the recommenda-
tion in this and the other treatments non-binding. Although experimental results sug-
gest that voting on binding contribution schemes can substantially increase efficiencies
in the private provision of public goods (e.g., Kesternich et al. 2014) and the use of
common-pool resources (e.g., Bernard et al. 2013; Walker et al. 2000), evidence on non-
binding contribution schemes remains scarce. Kroll et al. (2007) investigate whether a
non-binding vote fosters contributions in a public goods game. Their findings suggest
that voting alone does not increase cooperation. Following Bernard et al. (2013), each
group member in our experiment proposes a per-capita effort level, knowing that the
median of all proposals will be selected to be the recommended effort level.
In the leadership treatment one group leader is randomly chosen among the members
at the beginning of each of the 10 rounds.61 The leaders thereby selected should not be
considered as commanding traditional authority, influence, or experience, as, for ex-
ample, in Javaid and Falk (2015). Our design instead follows the literature on leading
by example in social dilemma situations 62, with a key distinction being that the leader,
who remains anonymous, decides upon a non-binding recommended per-capita effort
level in each decision round on behalf of the group. Other work in this vein (e.g.,
Moxnes and van der Heijden 2003) has typically incorporated binding recommenda-
tions.
Under the external treatment, a staff member from the University of Indonesia gives
a recommendation on a per-capita effort level in each decision round, i.e., how much
effort group members should spend on extracting. The staff member thereby repres-
ents an external institution, like an NGO or scientist, which has been highlighted as
one of the key factors in establishing a TURF (Afflerbach et al. 2014). Following pre-
vious experiments on external regulation in a social dilemma context (e.g., Cardenas
2004; Velez et al. 2010; Lopez et al. 2012), agents received in each decision round the
recommendation to spend the socially optimal effort, i.e., x
◦
i = 1.
63
Since recommendations are always non-binding, our different mechanisms do not af-
fect the Nash equilibrium and, according to standard theory, agents should spend their
maximum amount of effort on extracting the resource, i.e., x∗i = 8.
61Güth et al. (2007) show that whether the leader is determined in a rotating order or once and for all
does not have a significant effect on cooperation levels.
62See, e.g., Güth et al. (2007) for an overview.
63Form the instructions and examples provided, it was clear to participants in all treatments that the
group earns the maximum amount if every group member chose a level of extraction of one unit.
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5.3.3 Experimental procedure
The experiments were conducted in 17 different villages within three sites in Sulawesi
(see Figure 5.1). After completing the household questionnaire, participants received
an invitation to the local community center where the game was conducted the follow-
ing day. They were randomly allocated to different groups once they had registered
and entered the community center. One session comprised ideally 4 groups of 5 play-
ers and lasted 10 rounds. In total, 36 sessions were conducted.
All groups were placed in the same room and the seating of the participants was ar-
ranged in a way that they could not see their fellow group members, ensuring an-
onymity. Once all participants had taken their seats, an instructor explained the exper-
iment verbally owing to the low literacy level of the participants.64 The instructions
stipulated the setting of the experiment as being in fishery management, how own ex-
traction rates are related to those of other group members, and the payment. At the
end of the instructions, examples were presented to improve the understanding of the
participants about the procedure. Then, a pilot round was played to help participants
familiarize themselves with the task. Questions could be asked after the explanation
of the instructions as well as after the pilot. The questions were answered within the
larger audience to ensure that at any time everyone had the same information. A large
poster with the payoff table was placed in a way that every participant could see it
during the presentation of the instructions. In addition, laminated payoff tables were
handed out to the participants before the pilot round started.65 The experiment only
started once everyone indicated that they had understood the rules and there were no
further questions to discuss.
One assistant was assigned to each of the four groups per session, ensuring a smooth
run of the experiment. In every round the participants had to select their extraction
rate and then hand it to the group’s assistant. The assistant transmitted the sheets to
the researchers, who entered the rates in a computer, calculated the respective payoff,
filled the payoff in the sheets and handed it back to the assistant who transmitted this
information to the participants. Information about the individual extraction rate and
payoff of all the group members were indicated on the sheet as well as the average
payoff of the group. Thus, the participants always knew their own payoff and the
payoff of all other group members.
The autonomy treatment was played as a standard CPR game without any interven-
tions. In the democracy treatment, every participant gave a recommendation on a per-
64In order to ensure that the instructions, which were in Bahasa Indonesia, did not suffer from any
translation bias, we had them retranslated by an independent Bahasa Indonesia native speaker. We
did not find any inconsistencies. Instructions in English are provided in the appendix.
65The payoff table is provided in Table 5.7 in the appendix.
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capita extraction effort level and the median of these recommendations was shown in
every group to each participant individually on a sheet of paper by the respective as-
sistant. Care was taken to ensure that everyone understood the concept of the median
before the game commenced. For the leadership treatment, one group leader per group
was drawn randomly in each round and his recommended extraction effort was then
shown to every participant individually on a sheet of paper by the respective assistant.
In the external treatment the participants were shown the social optimum individually
on a sheet of paper in every round by the respective assistant assigned to their group.
A total of 695 individuals participated in the experiments, with 180 participants in the
autonomy, 175 in the democracy treatment, 165 in the leadership treatment and 175 in the
external treatment (see Table 5.2). At the end of the experiment, we randomly drew
one out of the 10 rounds to be paid out. On average, the payoff was 28,505 Indonesian
Rupiah (IDR) per person. We also added a show-up payment of 10,000 IDR per person,
yielding an individual average earning of 38,505 IDR or 2.89 US-Dollar. This is around
86% of the daily working wage in Sulawesi.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Extraction efforts
We first analyze participants’ extraction rates across treatments aggregated in all three
sites (see Figure 5.2). Turning to our autonomy treatment, we find that participants
have an extraction effort of on average 4.3 hours. In the case of the democracy and
leadership treatments, we find that the mean extraction efforts of 4.1 hours (p-value:
0.128) and 4.3 hours (p-value: 0.961) are statistically indistinguishable from the level
in autonomy.66 The recommendations from an external source, by contrast, lead to an
average extraction effort of 3.6 hours, which is significantly below the extraction effort
in autonomy (p-value: 0.000).67
In line with Cardenas (2004), we find that extraction efforts in all treatments, and espe-
cially in autonomy, remain relatively stable throughout the experiment. While Carde-
nas (2004) shows that centralized punishment institutions and direct face-to-face com-
munication substantially decreases the extraction level, our non-parametric analysis
reveals that non-binding recommendations have a rather limited effect on participants’
66The p-values in this section correspond to Mann-Whitney U tests, except where otherwise specified.
67One might speculate that the noticeable accumulation of mean extraction efforts of around 4 hours
are a consequence of random decisions within the action space between 1 and 8 hours. Two features
of the data rebut this. Across sites and treatments, we detect different extraction patterns (see Figure
5.7 in the appendix). Furthermore, according to Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, we can clearly reject the
hypotheses that extraction patterns are uniformly distributed across sites and treatments.
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Figure 5.2: Extraction efforts by treatments
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Note: Average extraction effort during the 10 periods of the autonomy, democracy, leadership and ex-
ternal treatment.
extraction behavior. Only recommendations from an external source have a statistic-
ally significant effect in drawing participants toward the social optimum.68
To gain further insight into the mechanism for reaching the extraction decision, we ana-
lyze the variance of the results across treatments. Applying a Levene’s test as measure
for the variance, we find that there are no differences between the variances in demo-
cracy and leadership compared to autonomy (p-value: 0.57 and p-value: 0.96, respect-
ively). By contrast, we reject the equality of variances in autonomy and external, finding
a significant decrease in the variation of the extraction in the external treatment (p-
value: 0.000). This decrease likely reflects the additional information provided in the
treatment, which is in line with Geest et al.’s (2017) finding of decreases in variation
after providing information.
To explore the robustness of these non-parametric comparisons, we estimate a series
of random effects models. The first model in Table 5.3 includes dummies for the three
treatments, but as in the initial unconditional analysis, does not allow for differential
effects by site or individual controls. The results confirm our non-parametric estimates.
The coefficients on the external dummy is statistically significant at the one percent
level. The second model controls for the different sites through site dummies, revealing
only negligible differences relative to Model (1).
68An analysis of extractions in the first round only, reveals very similar results: autonomy vs. democracy
(p-value: 0.13), autonomy vs. leadership (p-value: 0.96), and autonomy vs. external (p-value: 0.00).
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Table 5.3: Random effects regressions of extraction efforts
Extraction effort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy -0.18
(0.142)
-0.18
(0.142)
-0.37**
(0.173)
-1.24***
(0.303)
Leadership 0.03
(0.147)
0.03
(0.148)
-0.02
(0.204)
-0.43
(0.364)
External -0.75***
(0.168)
-0.75***
(0.168)
-0.62**
(0.224)
-1.66***
(0.346)
Liya -0.01
(0.133)
0.01
(0.203)
-0.74**
(0.376)
Badjo 0.14
(0.133)
-0.40*
(0.208)
-1.60***
(0.383)
Democracy x Liya 0.81**
(0.381)
Democracy x Badjo 1.95***
(0.482)
Leadership x Liya 0.22
(0.517)
Leadership x Badjo 0.78
(0.474)
External x Liya 1.26**
(0.510)
External x Badjo 1.93***
(0.508)
Trust index 0.23
(0.461)
-0.02
(0.459)
Locus of control -1.25***
(0.417)
-1.23***
(0.415)
Association membership -0.07
(0.148)
-0.06
(0.140)
Primary education -0.23
(0.143)
-0.23*
(0.139)
Muslim 0.34
(0.254)
0.53*
(0.319)
Fishing intensity -0.08
(0.055)
-0.06
(0.056)
Note: Table 5.3 continues on the next page.
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Table 5.3 (continued)
Extraction effort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household expenditures
(in Mio. IDR)
-0.02**
(0.000)
-0.015
(0.000)
Gender 0.12
(0.251)
0.082
(0.228)
Age -0.00
(0.006)
-0.00
(0.006)
Internet -0.05
(0.179)
-0.41**
(0.191)
Transport services -0.83***
(0.182)
-0.78***
(0.208)
Round -0.01
(0.010)
-0.01
(0.010)
Constant 4.32***
(0.102)
4.30***
(0.126)
5.61***
(0.578)
6.09***
(0.561)
Observations 6,950 4,380 6,950 4,380
Note: Random effects regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05 and
∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Participants’ extraction effort in each round of the experiment. Demo-
cracy: 1 if subject participates in democracy treatment, 0 otherwise. Leadership: 1 if subject participate
in leadership treatment, 0 otherwise. External: 1 if subject participate in external treatment, 0 otherwise.
Liya: 1 if subject from is from Liya, 0 otherwise. Badjo: 1 if subject is from Badjo, 0 otherwise. Controls
(trust index, locus of control, association membership, primary education, Muslim, fishing intensity,
household expenditures, gender, age, internet, transport services) are summarized and outlined in Sec-
tion 5.2.
The third model introduces further controls for individual heterogeneity.69 The effect
of the external treatment is statistically significant at the one percent level and indic-
ates a reduction in the extraction of about 0.62 hours, which is just slightly lower than
the magnitude of the unconditional comparison. A statistically significant effect is now
likewise seen for the democracy treatment, with an associated reduction in the extraction
rate of 0.34 hours. Model (3) additionally reveals that behavior varies with socioeco-
nomic factors. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the locus of con-
trol is of particular interest, corroborating Kalamas et al. (2014) and Engqvist Jonsson
and Nilsson (2014), who find that a higher locus of control is associated with stronger
69Model (3) includes the variables presented in Table 5.1 as controls. This results in a loss of about 180
observations owing to instances when a shortened version of the questionnaire was administered
because the participant in the CPR game was not present at the household at the time of the interview.
When this was the case, we did not record information on the locus of control. As shown in Table 5.4,
the exclusion of this variable from the specification does not affect the remaining coefficient estimates
markedly.
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Figure 5.3: Extraction efforts by treatments and sites
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Note: Average extraction effort in Badjo (left), Liya (middle) and Bunaken (right) during the 10 periods
of the autonomy, democracy, leadership and external treatment.
pro-environmental behavior. Additionally, two other control variables – household ex-
penditure, and transport services – are statistically significant at the 5% level or below,
both of which have negative associations with extraction.
Recognizing the hierarchical structure of the data, we undertook robustness checks
by specifying multilevel models with random effects at the site and individual level.
While these models provided an improved fit to the data, as judging from a likelihood
ratio test, the differences in the estimated coefficients were negligible. Likewise, the
pattern of estimated treatment effects changed only marginally.70
To recap, Models (1)-(3) confirm the non-parametric results that recommendations ori-
ginating from an external source decrease participants extraction behavior. In addition,
if we take the different sites and individual characteristics into account in Model (3),
we find that recommendations from a democratic process also have a statistically sig-
nificant effect in reducing participants’ harvest.
Next, we separate our analysis according to the three sites to gauge the extent of re-
gional variation in extraction efforts and treatment effects. The main results of this
analysis are presented in Figure 5.3. We start with a non-parametric analysis by com-
paring extraction efforts in autonomy across sites. Based on a Kruskal-Wallis test, we
find that average extractions in our autonomy treatment differ significantly across the
three sites (p-value: 0.002). More precisely, extraction efforts in autonomy are higher in
Bunaken than in Liya (p-value: 0.001) and in Badjo (p-value: 0.003). Average extraction
efforts in democracy and leadership are remarkably similar across regions. According to
70Results are provided in Table 5.6 and Figure 5.8 in the appendix.
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Figure 5.4: Estimated treatment effects by sites
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Note: Estimated treatment effects based on regression model in column (4) of Table 5.3. Confidence
intervals at the 95%-level.
Kruskal-Wallis tests we do not find statistically significant differences in individual
extraction effort decisions across the three regions (p-value: 0.248 and p-value: 0.794,
respectively). In external, however, extraction efforts in Bunaken are significantly lower
than in Badjo (p-value: 0.001) and Liya (p-value: 0.035).
The statistically significant effect of the external treatment in the pooled analysis is thus
seen to be driven by one site, Bunaken, whose extraction effort of 3 hours is roughly
1.8 hours below the site’s relatively high level of 4.8 hours in autonomy (p-value: 0.000).
The democracy (p-value: 0.003) and leadership (p-value: 0.010) treatments are likewise
statistically significant in Bunaken compared to the autonomy treatment, albeit with re-
ductions in the extraction level that are substantially lower in magnitude than under
the external treatment. In Liya and Badjo, by contrast, none of the treatments signific-
antly bear on the extraction effort relative to each site’s baseline extraction effort of 4
and 4.1 hours.71
Returning to Table 5.3, the fourth model includes the full range of control variables in
addition to interactions between the site- and treatment dummies to allow the mag-
nitude of the treatment effect to vary by site. Several of the effects presented in the
table are seen to be statistically significant, but the resulting proliferation of coeffi-
cients makes it difficult to assess their magnitude. To ease interpretation, Figure 5.4
illustrates estimates of the deviation from the baseline by treatment and for each site,
along with the corresponding 95% confidence interval. As in the non-parametric ana-
lysis, this comparison shows statistically significant treatment effects only in Bunaken.
71Given that we test multiple treatments across multiple sites, we corrected our results for multiple
hypothesis testing by the corrections suggested in List et al. (2016). In no case are the statistically
significant results negated by those corrections.
144
Non-binding restrictions, cooperation, and coral reef protection
Figure 5.5: Recommended extraction efforts by treatments and sites
Badjo
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Re
co
mm
en
de
d e
xtr
ac
tio
n l
ev
el Nash
Social Optimum = external
Liya
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Nash
Social Optimum = external
Period
Democracy
Leadership
External
Bunaken
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Re
co
mm
en
de
d e
xtr
ati
on
 le
ve
lNash
Social Optimum = external
Note: Average recommended effort in Badjo (left), Liya (middle) and Bunaken (right) during the 10
periods of the democracy, and leadership treatment.
According to the point estimates, both the democracy and external treatments lower the
extraction effort by about 1.3 and 1.7 hours, respectively. This highlights that the over-
all effect discussed above are driven by Bunaken.72
The more flexible specification of Model (4) also alters the interpretation of some of
the control variables. Unlike in Model (2), household expenditures are no longer stat-
istically significant, while the dummy indicating a good internet connection is highly
significant and suggests a decrease in the extraction rate of about 0.41 hours, a three-
fold increase in magnitude relative to Model (1). The locus of control index remains
significant at a 1 percent level and increases in magnitude, with a one standard devi-
ation increase in the index associated with a 0.44 decrease in the hours of extraction.
Similar increases in magnitude are seen for the dummies indicating public transport,
religion, and primary school education.
5.4.2 Recommendations and compliance
To further explore what drives the regional heterogeneity, we analyze participants’ re-
commendations and whether those recommendations are followed across sites. Across
all sites and periods, participants recommend extracting on average significantly less
in democracy than in leadership (3.95 vs. 4.34, p-value: 0.008).
Controlling for the different sites where the experiment has been conducted reveals
72Again applying a Levene’s test to analyze different patterns in the variation of the extraction rates
within and across sites, confirms the significant decreases in the variation of extractions in external
compared to autonomy in all sites (Badjo: p-value: 0.054; Liya: p-value: 0.073; Bunaken: p-value:
0.000).
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that this effect is driven by participants in Liya (see Figure 5.5). In Liya, the mean
recommended extraction effort of 3.8 hours in democracy is roughly 0.6 hours below the
recommendations in leadership (p-value: 0.007). In Badjo and Bunaken we do not find
a statistically significant difference between the recommendations in democracy and
leadership. However, compared across sites, we find only moderate differences with
respect to the recommended extraction efforts. Most importantly, recommendations in
Bunaken are not systematically lower than those in Badjo or Liya, which could help
explain the heterogeneous treatment effects in extraction efforts.
Given the non-binding nature of the recommendation, a final question concerns the is-
sue of compliance, i.e., whether the recommended extraction levels emerging from the
treatments differ from those actually selected by the participants. Figure 5.6 presents
these differences by treatments and sites, with negative differences indicating the ex-
tent to which the recommended extraction level falls below the chosen one, that is,
the extent of non-compliance. For the case of democracy and leadership, the difference
in compliance across sites is negligible in magnitude and statistically insignificant (p-
value: 0.263 and p-value: 0.182, respectively, Kruskal-Wallis test).73 Focusing on com-
pliance with externally recommended non-binding extraction efforts, we find substan-
tial differences across regions (p-value: 0.003, Kruskal-Wallis test). While compliance
is lower in all sites, participants in Bunaken, in particular, show a significantly higher
compliance than participants from Badjo (-1.98 vs. -3.09, p-value: 0.001) and Liya (-1.98
vs. -2.67, p-value: 0.035). The differences in treatment effects across regions are thus
driven primarily by a relatively high extraction in our baseline treatment in Bunaken
and consequently a comparatively high compliance in Bunaken in the external treat-
ment.
In order to complement the analysis on group level, we also investigated individual
differences between participants’ recommendations and actual extraction decisions in
both the democracy and leadership treatment.74 By comparing recommendations and
extractions at the individual level, this analysis enables us to elicit whether parti-
cipants set recommendations strategically. In our democracy treatment, we find that
participants start to behave more strategically in the second-half of the experiment by
recommending a lower extraction level than they actually adhere to themselves. With
respect to our leadership treatment, we find that leaders follow their own recommend-
ations in most of the cases. However, also in leadership we recognize a slight increase
73We also include in our regression model the given recommendations in the groups (see Table 5.5 in the
appendix). This allows us to analyse the extraction rate given the recommendation and controlling
for several confounders. For both treatments, democracy and leadership, a low recommendation is
associated with a lower extraction rate, on average, and the extraction effort increases with the re-
commendation level.
74Results are provided in Figures 5.9 and 5.10 in the appendix.
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Figure 5.6: Differences between recommendations and extraction efforts by treatments
and sites
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Note: Average difference between recommendations and actual extraction efforts over periods across
all participants from Badjo (left), Liya (middle) and Bunaken (right).
in strategically recommending low extraction efforts while pursuing higher individual
extractions.
5.5 Summary and concluding remarks
This study examined collective resource management among fishing communities on
the Indonesian island of Sulawesi. The island, one of the most biologically diverse ex-
panses of coral reef fisheries globally, has been subject to extensive degradation from
overfishing (Burke et al. 2011). In response, international NGOs and regional govern-
ments have teamed up to coordinate the establishment of TURFs, community-based
management regimes for regulating access to the fishery. Following Handberg and
Angelsen (2015), who highlight the importance of framed field experiments for the
evaluation of proposed conservations measures, we undertake an ex-ante analysis of
the establishment of a TURF reserve that is being overseen by an environmental NGO.
An underlying premise of our analysis is the importance of understanding common re-
source management when costly monitoring precludes a strong enforcement regime,
a common feature of TURFs globally. Using a common-pool resource game conduc-
ted in three culturally distinct sites on the island, we explored alternative strategies
for garnering the requisite cooperation under this circumstance. The game involves
individual fishers selecting a desired level of harvesting activity. Corresponding to
alternative strategies for encouraging voluntary cooperation in the absence of enforce-
ment, experimental treatments were introduced that consisted of different non-binding
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resource extraction recommendations originating from a democratic process, a group
leader decision or an external source that recommends a socially optimal level.
In line with the previous work on cross-cultural differences in behavior in social di-
lemma situations in cross-country (e.g., Henrich et al. 2001; Carpenter et al. 2004;
Gächter et al. 2010) and inter-country (e.g., Kocher et al. 2012) experiments, we find
substantial differences in participants’ extraction behavior in our CPR game across the
three sites. Although our pooled analysis suggests that non-binding recommendations
originating from both a democratic decision process and an external source increase
cooperation, a site-specific analysis revealed this result to be driven by one of the three
sites, Bunaken, which has the highest levels of ethnic and religious diversity. The ab-
sence of this effect in two of the sites shows that caution is warranted in generalizing
this conclusion to other sites in which TURFs are being considered.
As interaction with an external source, such as an NGO or scientist, is a feature of
TURF-implementation in Indonesia and throughout the world (Afflerbach et al. 2014),
the question arises as to the circumstances under which such interaction facilitates or
stifles cooperation. Part of the answer likely depends on the community’s diversity
and its exposure to outside influences. In this regard, the low compliance but high
extraction reduction of the external treatment in Bunaken together with the high com-
pliance but somewhat lower extraction reduction of the leadership and democracy treat-
ments suggests some promise for coupling external advocacy of the social optimum
with either a top-down or community-based democratic decision process, particularly
when enforcement is precluded. Recent work on cross-cultural management from
Meyer (2017), which situates Indonesia as a country that values top-down decision-
making and harbors hierarchical attitudes toward authority, provides some support
for this course of action in Bunaken. Nevertheless, the heterogeneity of Indonesia’s
cultural landscape suggests that caution is warranted in applying it elsewhere, partic-
ularly given the significantly lower rates of compliance in the more remote and cul-
turally homogenous communities of Badjo and Liya. The discrepancy in outcomes
in these locations emphasizes the importance of the context in which fishermen live
(Torres-Guevara and Schlüter 2016), and specifically the potential interactions between
the socio-cultural setting and interventions targeted at increased cooperative behavior
(e.g., Ostrom 1990; Herrmann et al. 2008). Further research should thus be directed
at disentangling the root of different extraction levels, and in particular at identifying
the circumstances under which non-binding recommendations from an external source
serve to motivate conservation.
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5.6 Appendix
5.6.1 Figures
Figure 5.7: Histograms of extraction efforts by treatments and sites
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Note: Histograms of average extraction efforts by treatment (autonomy, democracy, leadership, external)
and site (Badjo, Liya, Bunaken) across all 10 periods of the experiment.
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Figure 5.8: Estimated treatment effects by sites - hierarchical models
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Note: Estimated treatment effects based on regression model in column (4) of Table 5.6. Confidence
intervals at the 95%-level.
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5.6.2 Tables
Table 5.4: Random effects regressions of extraction efforts without locus of control
Extraction effort
(1) (2)
Democracy -0.19
(0.16)
-0.94***
(0.28)
Leadership 0.03
(0.17)
-0.33
(0.34)
External -0.56***
(0.20)
-1.54***
(0.33)
Liya -0.63*
(0.36)
Badjo -1.21***
(0.36)
Democracy x Liya 0.75**
(0.36)
Democracy x Badjo 1.71***
(0.45)
Leadership x Liya 0.44
(0.47)
Leadership x Badjo 0.66
(0.44)
External x Liya 1.36***
(0.46)
External x Badjo 1.85***
(0.47)
Trust index 0.54
(0.41)
0.30
(0.43)
Association membership -0.04
(0.13)
-0.00
(0.13)
Primary education -0.17
(0.13)
-0.19
(0.12)
Muslim 0.22
(0.21)
0.341
(0.31)
Fishing intensity -0.03
(0.031)
-0.01
(0.03)
Note: Table 5.4 continues on the next page.
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Table 5.4 (continued)
Extraction effort
(1) (2)
Household expenditures
(in Mio. IDR)
-0.01
(-0.01)
-0.01
(-0.01)
Gender 0.19
(0.19)
0.16
(0.18)
Age 0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
Internet -0.22
(0.15)
-0.46***
(0.17)
Transport services -0.61***
(0.13)
-0.69***
(0.20)
Round -0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
Constant 4.16***
(0.43)
4.81***
(0.46)
Observations 5,780 5,780
Note: Random effects regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05
and ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Participants’ extraction effort in each round of the experiment.
Democracy: 1 if subject participates in democracy treatment, 0 otherwise. Leadership: 1 if subject par-
ticipate in leadership treatment, 0 otherwise. External: 1 if subject participate in external treatment, 0
otherwise. Liya: 1 if subject from is from Liya, 0 otherwise. Badjo: 1 if subject is from Badjo, 0 otherwise.
Controls (trust index, association membership, primary education, Muslim, fishing intensity, household
expenditures, gender, age, internet, transport services) are summarized and outlined in Section 5.2.
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Table 5.5: Random effects regressions of recommendations and extraction efforts
Extraction effort
democracy leadership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recommendation of 1 -1.28**
(0.58)
-0.97
(0.90)
Recommendation of 2 0.23
(0.32)
0.31
(0.37)
-1.35***
(0.19)
-1.36***
(0.24)
Recommendation of 3 0.92***
(0.32)
1.07***
(0.37)
-0.87***
(0.19)
-0.89***
(0.24)
Recommendation of 4 1.27***
(0.34)
1.39***
(0.39)
-0.33**
(0.16)
-0.16
(0.20)
Recommendation of 5 2.01***
(0.35)
2.04***
(0.40)
0.69***
(0.14)
0.68***
(0.13)
Recommendation of 6 2.16***
(0.39)
2.24***
(0.44)
1.12***
(0.19)
1.25***
(0.19)
Recommendation of 7 2.90***
(0.39)
3.01***
(0.44)
1.87***
(0.32)
2.09***
(0.25)
Recommendation of 8 3.85***
(0.48)
4.14***
(0.50)
3.05***
(0.26)
2.98***
(0.29)
Liya 0.19
(0.26)
0.11
(0.28)
-0.24
(0.30)
-0.17
(0.33)
Badjo 0.65**
(0.27)
0.67**
(0.29)
0.46
(0.70)
-1.05*
(0.58)
Locus of control -0.31
(0.57)
-1.00
(0.96)
Trust index 0.87
(0.64)
0.87
(0.68)
0.37
(0.70)
0.59
(0.81)
Association membership 0.12
(0.17)
0.26
(0.17)
-0.57**
(0.28)
-0.56
(0.35)
Primary education -0.11
(0.18)
-0.03
(0.19)
-0.03
(0.23)
-0.65**
(0.28)
Muslim -0.14
(0.21)
-0.04
(0.25)
0.27
(1.01)
0.38
(0.97)
Fishing intensity -0.10*
(0.05)
-0.10
(0.07)
0.01
(0.05)
0.00
(0.14)
Note: Table 5.5 continues on the next page.
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Table 5.5 (continued)
Extraction effort
democracy leadership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household expenditures
(in Mio. IDR)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00*
(0.00)
Gender 0.19
(0.24)
0.32
(0.28)
-0.02
(0.33)
-0.13
(0.47)
Age -0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.02)
Internet -0.49**
(0.23)
-0.51**
(0.26)
-0.55*
(0.32)
0.28
(0.38)
Transport services -0.65***
(0.24)
-0.75***
(0.27)
0.37
(0.73)
-0.99
(0.62)
Round 0.01
(0.02)
0.00
(0.02)
-0.03
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.02)
Constant 2.87***
(0.74)
2.62***
(0.97)
3.74***
(1.42)
5.96***
(1.41)
Observations 1,520 1,280 1,350 910
Note: Random effects regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05 and
∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Participants’ extraction effort in each round of the experiment. Re-
commendation 1 (2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7, 8): 1 if recommendation is equal to 1 (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8), 0 otherwise.
Democracy: 1 if subject participates in democracy treatment, 0 otherwise. Leadership: 1 if subject par-
ticipate in leadership treatment, 0 otherwise. External: 1 if subject participate in external treatment, 0
otherwise. Liya: 1 if subject from is from Liya, 0 otherwise. Badjo: 1 if subject is from Badjo, 0 otherwise.
Controls (trust index, locus of control, association membership, primary education, Muslim, fishing in-
tensity, household expenditures, gender, age, internet, transport services) are summarized and outlined
in Section 5.2.
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Table 5.6: Hierarchical regressions of extraction efforts
Extraction effort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy -0.18
(0.155)
-0.30*
(0.180)
-0.64**
(0.261)
-1.24***
(0.338)
Leadership 0.031
(0.158)
-0.05
(0.195)
-0.55**
(0.261)
-0.43
(0.400)
External -0.75***
(0.155)
-0.67***
(0.196)
-1.86***
(0.261)
-1.66***
(0.355)
Liya -0.83***
(0.261)
-0.74*
(0.427)
Badjo -0.74***
(0.261)
-1.60***
(0.364)
Democracy x Liya 0.57
(0.369)
0.81*
(0.448)
Democracy x Badjo 0.80**
(0.373)
1.95***
(0.471)
Leadership x Liya 0.86**
(0.378)
0.22
(0.526)
Leadership x Badjo 0.89**
(0.373)
0.78
(0.509)
External x Liya 1.52***
(0.369)
1.26***
(0.484)
External x Badjo 1.85***
(0.373)
1.93***
(0.475)
Trust index 0.46
(0.439)
-0.02
(0.443)
Locus of control -1.19***
(0.443)
-1.23***
(0.430)
Association membership -0.11
(0.142)
-0.06
(0.139)
Primary education -0.14
(0.138)
-0.23
(0.142)
Muslim 0.23
(0.211)
0.53*
(0.310)
Fishing intensity -0.09*
(0.052)
-0.06
(0.052)
Note: Table 5.6 continues on the next page.
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Table 5.6 (continued)
Extraction effort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household expenditures
(in Mio. IDR)
-0.00*
(0.000)
-0.00
(0.000)
Gender 0.11
(0.237)
0.08
(0.231)
Age 0.00
(0.006)
-0.00
(0.006)
Internet -0.13
(0.177)
-0.41*
(0.214)
Transport services -0.67***
(0.148)
-0.78***
(0.223)
Round -0.00
(0.006)
-0.01
(0.008)
-0.00
(0.007)
-0.01
(0.009)
Constant 4.34***
(0.115)
5.19***
(0.559)
4.87***
(0.188)
6.09***
(0.586)
Observations 6,950 4,380 6,950 4,380
Number of groups 3 3 3 3
LR χ2(4) 32.92
Prob > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LR χ2(23) 104
LR χ2(12) 66.54
LR χ2(15) 66.27
Note: Hierarchical regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05 and
∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Participants’ extraction effort in each round of the experiment. Demo-
cracy: 1 if subject participates in democracy treatment, 0 otherwise. Leadership: 1 if subject participate
in leadership treatment, 0 otherwise. External: 1 if subject participate in external treatment, 0 otherwise.
Liya: 1 if subject from is from Liya, 0 otherwise. Badjo: 1 if subject is from Badjo, 0 otherwise. Con-
trols (trust index, association membership, primary education, Muslim, fishing intensity, household
expenditures, gender, age, internet, transport services) are summarized and outlined in Section 5.2.
158
Non-binding restrictions, cooperation, and coral reef protection - Appendix
Table 5.7: Payoff table
Their effort extracting (in
hours)
My effort extracting (in hours)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 37880 39500 40880 42000 42880 43500 43880 44000
5 36880 38500 39880 41000 41880 42500 42880 43000
6 35880 37500 38880 40000 40880 41500 41880 42000
7 34880 36500 37880 39000 39880 40500 40880 41000
8 33880 35500 36880 38000 38880 39500 39880 40000
9 32880 34500 35880 37000 37880 38500 38880 39000
10 31880 33500 34880 36000 36880 37500 37880 38000
11 30880 32500 33880 35000 35880 36500 36880 37000
12 29880 31500 32880 34000 34880 35500 35880 36000
13 28880 30500 31880 33000 33880 34500 34880 35000
14 27880 29500 30880 32000 32880 33500 33880 34000
15 26880 28500 29880 31000 31880 32500 32880 33000
16 25880 27500 28880 30000 30880 31500 31880 32000
17 24880 26500 27880 29000 29880 30500 30880 31000
18 23880 25500 26880 28000 28880 29500 29880 30000
19 22880 24500 25880 27000 27880 28500 28880 29000
20 21880 23500 24880 26000 26880 27500 27880 28000
21 20880 22500 23880 25000 25880 26500 26880 27000
22 19880 21500 22880 24000 24880 25500 25880 26000
23 18880 20500 21880 23000 23880 24500 24880 25000
24 17880 19500 20880 22000 22880 23500 23880 24000
25 16880 18500 19880 21000 21880 22500 22880 23000
26 15880 17500 18880 20000 20880 21500 21880 22000
27 14880 16500 17880 19000 19880 20500 20880 21000
28 13880 15500 16880 18000 18880 19500 19880 20000
29 12880 14500 15880 17000 17880 18500 18880 19000
30 11880 13500 14880 16000 16880 17500 17880 18000
31 10880 12500 13880 15000 15880 16500 16880 17000
32 9880 11500 12880 14000 14880 15500 15880 16000
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5.6.3 Instructions
[Translated from Bahasa. Instructions were written in English, translated into Bahasa In-
donesia by an native speaker and retranslated by another independent Bahasa Indonesia native
speaker. Instructions were read out loud due to a high illiteracy rate.]†
Welcome [This information was given to all participants]
Hello, Good Afternoon/evening... My Name is ... from UI and RWI. As already men-
tioned in the survey we are here for a research project about fishing behavior. As a
complimentary part of our research, we are going to have a simulation. To guarantee a
smooth process, we need to establish some rules first: Please do not talk to each other
and do not use any electronic devices such as mobile phones, smart phones, or the like
throughout the whole game. If you want to go to restroom, please do it now because
we will have the simulation for about 2 hours. If any of you want to go to restroom,
you may go now. We won’t give permission to go to the restroom when the simula-
tion has begun. During the game, you make your decisions anonymously. Only the
researchers will know your identity and your data will be treated confidentially. In
order to make these projects as useful as possible to the local population we heavily
depend on exact, truthful, and comprehensive information. Are you ready?
General Information [This information was given to all participants]
In this simulation, you will be sharing a small fish site with four other people. You
profit in two different ways from the fish site. By fishing you will earn money, but at
the same time you receive benefits from conserving the fish stock. This means, if you
refrain from fishing you will help the fish population to grow more sustainable and
secure the future of the fish population. At the same time, a more amenable habitat
will attract tourists from outside, who pay for the conserved environment. A healthy
fish stock will then pay out for you in the future. You will be asked to decide on the
amount of time you spend for fishing. Please note that the more time you use for
fishing, the more fish you will get. However, at the time you will also reduce the stock
of fish, which also means decreasing the profit gained from fish conservation as well
as future gains from the fish population.
[This information was given to participants in external treatment only] Before you make a
decision, you will get an official recommendation about how much time you should
spend for fishing. Please notice that even though this is an official recommendation, it
is not binding. This means that you and the other four people who share this fish site
can spend more or less time fishing than officially recommended.
[This information was given to participants in democracy treatment only] In this simula-
tion, you will be deciding together in your group about the number of hours each
†Explanatory notes are given in square brackets.
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participant should spend fishing. Each of the group members will propose how many
hours each participant should spend fishing. Following this, the median of all the pro-
posals, which is the third highest value proposed by your group, will be treated as
the recommended time duration to fish for every member of the team. Please notice
that even though this is a recommendation, it is not binding. This means that you and
the other four people who share this fish site can spend more or less time fishing than
recommended.
[This information was given to participants in leadership only] Before you make a decision,
you will get a recommendation about the length of time to fish. This recommendation
will be made by the head of this group. This leader will be randomly chosen at the time
when the simulation starts. Please notice that even though this is a recommendation, it
is not binding. This means that you and the other four people who share this fish site
can spend more or less time fishing than recommended.
[This information was given to all participants] In this simulation, you can earn money,
to an amount depending on your decisions and your group members’ decisions. The
decisions you take will determine how much you can earn during the course of the
simulation, so please take your time and make your decisions after thinking carefully.
This simulation will go on for ten separate rounds, during which you will play the
same exercise and interact with the same four people. In each round you can earn
money, and at the end of the simulation we will randomly draw one round and this
round will then be paid out. Thus, each of your decisions may be the one that will be
paid out in the end, so always think carefully about your decisions.
Rules of the game [This information was given to all participants]
Remember that in this simulation you will be sharing a small fish site with four other
people. You will get benefits from the fish stock in two ways; earning money from
fishing or from preserving the fish stock for the future. Your task now is to decide how
many hours you want to spend fishing each day. You can spend between one and eight
hours fishing per day. Remember, the more hours you spend fishing, the more fish you
will catch, but the lower the fish stock.
[This information was given to participants in external only] Please notice that before you
make your decision, you will receive an official recommendation on how much hours
to spend fishing. This recommendation is official, but not binding. This means that
you and the other group member can spend more or less hours fishing than officially
recommended.
[This information was given to participants in democracy only] Please note that in this sim-
ulation you decide together with the other four group members how many hours each
group member should spend fishing. Each of the group members can spend between
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one and eight hours fishing each day. To decide collectively, each of the group mem-
bers has to propose how many hours each group member should spend fishing. After-
wards, the median of all proposals will be imposed as non-binding recommendation.
In other words, you and the other four group members should spend the median of all
proposed hours fishing. Please notice that this recommendation is not binding, mean-
ing that you and the other group members can spend more or less hours to fishing than
recommended.
[This information was given to participants in leadership only] Please note, that at the be-
ginning of each round one of the group members is selected randomly to become the
group leader. The person chosen will be informed about the outcome whereas those
not chosen will be informed about this outcome as well. The responsibility of the leader
is to provide a recommendation on how many hours to be spent by each group mem-
ber on fishing. This recommendation is not binding, meaning that you and the group
members can spend more or less hours fishing than recommended.
[This information was given to all participants] Please remember, the simulation consists
of ten separate rounds, in which you always play the same simulation and interact
with the same four people. After each round, you will be informed about the amount
of fish caught and the payoffs of all the players in your group. Please be aware that all
the group members face the same decision like you. Your total earnings in each round
depend on: (i) The number of hours you spend fishing, (ii) The number of hours the
other 4 group members spend fishing. The payoff table [see Table 5.7] shows that the
amount of your earning depending on the time that you and the other group members
spend fishing per day. Remember your payoff depends on how many hours you and
your group members spend fishing per day. Please note, your payoff increases with
the hours you spend fishing, but the more hours you and your group spend on fishing,
the lower is your benefit from conserving the fish stock.
Examples
[This information was given to participants in autonomy only] Example 1: Imagine that you
and the other group members spent one hour per day for activities related to fisheries.
This means that you and your group members would get 37880 Rupiah at the end of
the round. Example 2: Imagine that you and all the other group members spent eight
hours per day for activities related to fisheries. This means that you and the other
group members would get 16000 Rupiah at the end of the round. Example 3: Imagine
that the other group members spent together ten hours per day for activities related
to fisheries and you spend one hour per day for activities related to fisheries. This
means that you would get 31880 Rupiah at the end of the round. Example 4: Imagine
that the other group members spent together ten hours per day with activities related
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to fisheries and you spend eight hours per day for activities related to fisheries. This
means that you would get 38000 Rupiah at the end of the round.
[This information was given to participants in external only] Example 1: Imagine that you
get a recommendation to spend one hour per day to fish. You and all other group
members follow this recommendation and spend one hour per day fishing. Then you
and the other group members earn 37880 Rupiah at the end of the round. Example 2:
Imagine that you get a recommendation to spend one hour per day to fish, but you
and all the group members spend eight hours per day fishing. Then you and the other
group members earn 16000 Rupiah at the end of the round. Example 3: Imagine that
you get a recommendation to spend one hour per day to fish. Then you spent exactly
one hour per day to fish, but the other group members spent together ten hours per
day to fish. Then you earn 31880 Rupiah at the end of the round. Example 4: Imagine
that you get a recommendation to spend one hour per day to fish. However, it turns
out that the other group members spent together ten hours per day fishing, and you
spent eight hours per day fishing. Then you earn 38000 Rupiah at the end of the round.
[This information was given to participants in democracy only] Example 1: Imagine that
you proposed to spend 1 hour per day to fish, and the four other group members
proposed to spend 2, 4, 6, and 8 hours per day fishing. This means that you and all
the group members should spend 4 hours per day on fishing. Example 2: Imagine
that you proposed to spend 8 hour per day to fish, and the other four group members
proposed to spend 1, 2, 4, and 6 hours per day fishing. This means that you and all
the group members should spend 4 hours per day on fishing. Example 3: Imagine that
you and all the group members proposed to spend one hour per day on fishing. This
means that you and all the group members should spend 1 hour per day on fishing.
By assuming that you and all the other group members follow this proposal you and
all of the group members will earn 37880 Rupiah at the end of the round. Example
4: Imagine that you and all the group members proposed to spend eight hours per
day on fishing. This means that you and all the group members should spend 8 hour
per day on fishing. By assuming that you and all the other group members follow
this proposal you and all the group members will earn 16000 Rupiah at the end of the
round. Example 5: Imagine that you and all the group members proposed to spend 3
hours per day on fishing. However, all of the other group members together spend 10
hours per day on fishing and you spend one hour per day on fishing. Then you earn
31880 Rupiah at the end of the round. Example 6: Imagine that you and all the group
members proposed to spend 3 hours per day on fishing. However, that all of the other
group members together spend 10 hours per day on fishing and you spend 8 hours per
day on fishing. Then you earn 38000 Rupiah at the end of the round.
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[This information was given to participants in leadership only] Example 1: Imagine that you
were recommended to spend one hour per day to fish. You and all the other group
members follow this recommendation. Then you and your group members earn 37880
Rupiah at the end of the round. Example 2: Imagine that you were recommended
to spend one hour per day to fish, but you and all the other group members spend
eight hours per day on fishing. Then you and your group members earn 16000 coins
at the end of the round. Example 3: Imagine that you were recommended to spend
one hour per day to fish. You spend only one hour on fishing per day but the other
group members spend ten hours per day fishing. Then you earn 31880 Rupiah at the
end of the round. Example 4: Imagine that you were recommended to spend to spend
one hour per day to fish. However, the other group members spend 10 hours per day
fishing, and you spend 8 hours per day fishing. Then you earn 38000 Rupiah at the
end of the round.
[This information was given to all participants] We will now play one round to help you to
familiarize yourself with the simulation. This round will not count for the payoff. Are
there any more questions? If not, I will began the game. And please, be reminded that
no smartphones are allowed in this room, you should not talk to each other, and there
is no permission to go to the restroom after the simulation has begun without losing
all your payoffs.
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6 Democracy and compliance in public goods games
A previous version of this chapter has appeared as:
Gallier, C. (2017). Democracy and compliance in public goods games. ZEW
Discussion Paper No. 17-038.
This article can be downloaded via
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp17038.pdf
Abstract: I investigate if, how, and why the effect of a contribution rule in a public
goods game depends on how it is implemented: endogenously chosen or externally
imposed. The rule prescribes full contributions to the public good backed by a non-
deterrent sanction for those who do not comply. My experimental design allows me
to disentangle to what extent the effect of the contribution rule under democracy is
driven by self-selection of treatments, information transmitted via the outcome of the
referendum, and democracy per se. In case treatments are endogenously chosen via a
democratic decision-making process, the contribution rule significantly increases con-
tributions to the public good. However, democratic participation does not affect parti-
cipants’ contribution behavior directly, after controlling for self-selection of treatments
and the information transmitted by voting.
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6.1 Introduction
In this paper, I investigate whether the effect of a rule on how to act in a social dilemma
situation depends on how it is implemented: endogenously chosen or externally im-
posed. Most importantly, my experimental design allows me to determine the drivers
of the effect of democratic participation: self-selection of treatments, information trans-
mitted via voting, or democracy per se. Since many interactions in real life related to
cooperation are subject to non-deterrent policies, I focus on a rule which prescribes
full contributions to a public good and is backed by a weak sanction for those who do
not comply. For instance, in international environmental treaties between sovereign
nations, like the Kyoto protocol, no third-party mechanism exists to enforce the agree-
ment (e.g., Barrett 2010). Small scale common property goods, like fisheries, do have
formal authorities in most cases, but authorities often lack the capacities to monitor,
sanction and enforce (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Kroll et al. 2007). Therefore, this experiment
is in general related to the vast literature on how to design policies in order to foster
cooperation in social dilemma situations in the absence of strong enforcement mech-
anisms.75
However, not the policy itself but rather the process of how it is implemented is at the
focus of my paper. Thus, I contribute to the growing economic literature which invest-
igates whether the effect of a policy depends on how it is implemented. One of Elinor
Ostrom’s design principles characterising robust institutions for managing common-
pool resources is that resource users affected by regulations should be authorized to
participate in making and modifying the rules (Ostrom 1990). Initially this refers to
the importance of local knowledge in devising effective rules. Further - and most of all
- positive aspects of participation have been identified in several field studies. Particip-
ation is suggested to increase the willingness to follow rules or to avoid that externally
imposed regulations crowd out voluntary cooperative behavior (e.g., Ostrom and Na-
gendra 2006). In this line, Bardhan (2000) shows that users of a common-pool resource
tend to manage the resource more successfully when they are genuinely engaged in
decisions on rules affecting their use. Further empirical findings by Pommerehne and
Weck-Hannemann (1996) and Frey (1998), for example, suggest that income tax compli-
ance in Switzerland increases with democratic participation. A central problem with
the interpretation of theses studies is that unobservable confounding factors such as
self-selection into policies could affect the results.
A series of laboratory experiments aim at taking confounding factors into account
in more controlled environments and suggest that the effect of democratic particip-
ation is rather nuanced. The majority of the experiments suggest a positive democracy
75For overviews, see, e.g., Ledyard (1995), Chaudhuri (2011), and Zelmer (2003).
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premium, i.e., that institutions are more effective if they are endogenously chosen via
a democratic decision-making process than externally imposed (e.g., Grimm and Men-
gel 2009; Sutter et al. 2010; Gürerk et al. 2014). However, other experiments provide
a more differentiated and mixed picture. Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2003), for in-
stance, find that democratic participation in determining minimum contributions to
a public good does not necessarily raise overall cooperation levels. Especially parti-
cipants with relatively high obligations reduce contributions, if these are democratic-
ally determined. In a related experiment, Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2004) show
that cooperation collapses if groups democratically reject imposing minimum contri-
bution levels. Tyran and Feld (2006) find that the effect of democratic participation can
cut both ways. Based on a public goods game, they find that a simple contribution
rule which aims at fostering cooperation is more effective in case it is endogenously
chosen than the same rule externally imposed. If, by contrast, the rule is endogenously
rejected, the effect of participation tends to be negative. Drawing on the experiment
by Tyran and Feld (2006) and using samples of students and workers in China, Vollan
et al. (2017) conclude that the effectiveness of democratic participation depends on its
conformity with societal values, norms, and rules. They find that participants cooper-
ate on average the most if the contribution rule is exogenously imposed, what can be
explained with a long history and great importance of authoritarian norms in China.
One reason that prevents us from identifying a coherent effect based on these studies is
that potential drivers of the effect democratic participation are not equally considered,
identified, and quantified. Dal Bó et al. (2010) suggest a randomization technique to
identify and quantify different drivers of the effect of democratic participation. Based
on a prisoner’s dilemma they introduce the opportunity to democratically impose a
deterrent sanction on mutual defection which transforms their social dilemma game
into a coordination problem. After taking potential confounding factors into account,
they conclude that the deterrent policy is more likely to be respected if it is democrat-
ically chosen than externally imposed.
In this paper, I complement the existing literature by investigating whether demo-
cratic participation increases participants’ compliance with a non-deterrent interven-
tion. I focus on a non-deterrent intervention, what is of fundamental importance since
it provides the opportunity to study how participants follow rules although they face
incentives not to do so. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether the findings by Dal Bó
et al. (2010) can be extrapolated into a setting with a non-deterrent intervention. Based
on the experimental design by Tyran and Feld (2006), the rule in my experiment pre-
scribes full contributions to the public good and a sanction for participants who do
not comply with the obligation. The sanction is non-deterrent and zero contributions
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remain the unique Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. In addition, my paper ex-
tends previous experiments by identifying and separating three potential drivers of the
effect of democratic participation. Theory on procedural utility suggests that people
do not only value outcomes but also the processes. It indicates that being aware of the
fact that the group imposed the policy may directly affect agents’ behavior (Frey et al.
2004; Frey and Stutzer 2005). A second hypothesis is that democratic decision making
could also affect behavior because it reveals information to agents on their partners’
likelihood to favor a specific policy or not, affecting both the agents’ beliefs about the
partners’ future behavior and thus their own behavior (Tyran and Feld 2006). Finally,
while groups are randomly formed, they are not necessarily identical. One cannot ex-
clude the possibility that there are unobservable factors that explain both responses to
policies and the policy selected (Dal Bó et al. 2010). Adopting an identification strategy
suggested by Dal Bó et al. (2010), I control for self-selection and separate the total effect
of a democratically chosen contribution rule into a selection, information, and demo-
cracy effect.
Using a laboratory experiment, I observe that a contribution rule in a public goods
game backed by a mild and non-deterrent sanction improves contributions, if treat-
ments are democratically chosen. In line with Tyran and Feld (2006), I find that contri-
butions to the public good are significantly higher if the rule is democratically chosen
than if it is democratically rejected. By contrast, if the corresponding treatments are
exogenously given the contribution rule does not affect participants’ contribution be-
havior. A naive comparison of these effects suggest that the contribution rule is more
effective in fostering contributions to the public good in case treatments are democrat-
ically chosen than in case treatments are externally given. However, my decomposition
reveals that the apparently different effects are not driven by democratic participation
per se. After taking into account effects of self-selection into treatments and the in-
formation transmitted via voting, democratic participation does not directly affect par-
ticipants’ contribution behavior. My findings thus suggest that the effect of democratic
participation does not directly increase participants’ willingness to comply with rules
which are for the common good, but at odds with their individual free-riding incent-
ives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents the experi-
mental design of the study. Results are presented in Section 6.3. A concluding discus-
sion is provided in Section 6.4.
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Figure 6.1: Timeline for the experiment
Voting Stage
referendum and 
randomization
Part I Part II
ten rounds of standard public good game
ten rounds of public good game with or 
without rule as well as with or without 
information about the outcome of the voting 
stage, depending on votes and randomization
Note: In Part I, subjects play ten round of a standard public good game. Depending on votes and
randomization, subjects are assigned to treatments in Part II of the experiment.
6.2 Experimental design and procedure
The experimental design is based on a linear public goods game with subjects ran-
domly and anonymously matched into groups of three for the entire experiment. The
experiment consists of two parts (Part I and II) and a timeline for the experiment is
provided in Figure 6.1.
In Part I, subjects participate in ten rounds of a standard public goods game. Each
subject i receives an initial endowment of e = 20 LabDollar (LD) in each round. Of this
endowment an amount qi is contributed to a public good, while the rest, e− qi, goes
to a private account. Subject i’s payoff (pii) is given by the private account plus the
benefit from the group’s contributions to the public good multiplied by the marginal
per capita return of β = 0.5, i.e., pii = e− qi + 0.5∑3j=1 qj. Since β < 1 < nβ, complete
free-riding (qi = 0) is the dominant strategy for all subjects, according to the standard
game theoretic prediction of purely selfish subjects. Full contributions to the public
good (qi = 20) are, in contrast, socially optimal.
Right after the ten rounds of this standard public goods game (Part I) has been com-
pleted, the voting stage starts (see Figure 6.1). Subjects vote in a referednum on whether
or not to enact a contribution rule in Part II of the experiment. The main focus of my
experiment is to investigate whether and, if so, how the effect of the rule depends on
the procedure of implementation. Therefore, I decided to keep the rule as simple and
non-strategic as possible and abstain from introducing rather complex centralized (e.g.,
Cardenas et al. 2000) or decentralized sanctioning mechanisms (e.g., Carpenter 2007).
Following Tyran and Feld (2006), the rule aims at fostering cooperation by prescrib-
ing full contributions to the public good backed by a fixed and automatically imposed
sanction of s = 4 for subjects who do not comply, i.e., qi < 20. In case the rule is
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imposed, subject i’s payoff is given by:
pii =
20− qi + 0.5∑3j=1 qj − 4 i f qi < 2020− qi + 0.5∑3j=1 qj i f qi = 20.
With s = 4 the penalty for violating the proposed contribution is rather low and
zero contributions to the public good remain the unique Nash equilibrium in dom-
inant strategies. Since β = 0.5, partial contribution is never optimal. Complete free-
riding yields a payoff of pii(qi = 0|q−i) = 20 + 0.5∑j 6=i qj − 4. Compliance, in con-
trast, yields pii(qi = 20|q−i) = 10 + 0.5∑j 6=i qj. Compliance is rational if and only if
pii(qi = 0|q−i) < pii(qi = 20|q−i). This would require a sanction of s > 10. Thus,
for s = 4 full free-riding is the unique Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies, i.e.,
pii(qi = 0|q−i) > pii(qi = 20|q−i) ∀i.
Participants in Tyran and Feld (2006) vote in a referendum on whether or not to enact
the rule at the beginning of the experiment. In order to enhance the understanding
of the game and give participants the opportunity to gain experiences, participants in
my experiment play ten rounds of a standard public goods game before they vote (see
Figure 6.1). Furthermore, Tyran and Feld (2006) do not explicitly control for confound-
ing factors like self-selection and information transmitted by voting. Using a within-
subject design, Tyran and Feld (2006) rely on the strategy method, in which subjects
make contingent decisions for all possible outcomes of the referendum. According to
standard game theoretic predictions, the strategy method should yield the same de-
cisions as the direct-response method. However, the literature suggests that subjects
make different decisions in contingent responses relative to situations where they face
given and known decisions (e.g., Falk et al. 2005; Brandts and Charness 2011; Jordan
et al. 2016). In this experiment, I rely on a direct-response design and adopt a ran-
domization technique suggested by Dal Bó et al. (2010) to control for self-selection of
treatments and to disentangle the effect of a democratically chosen contribution rule.
Dal Bó et al. (2010) use a prisoner’s dilemma with mutual defection as unique Nash
equilibrium and introduce the opportunity to impose a sanction on unilateral defec-
tion. The sanction is comparatively strong and both mutual defection and cooperation
are Nash equilibria. I investigate the effect of a rather weak and non-deterrent rule.
This is of fundamental importance because strong and deterrent rules set strong in-
centives, thus cooperation and compliance seem easier anyway. Furthermore, many
situations in real life, and especially in an environmental policy context, are subject
to rather non-deterrent interventions. Either no supra authorities exist in order to
monitor, enforce, and sanction any policy, or, in case authorities exist, they lack the
resources to enforce policies.
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Figure 6.2: Illustration of the randomization technique
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consider 
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not 
consider 
votes
Program
decides to
info about outcome of 
voting stage
not info about outcome 
of voting stage
Program
decides to
implement 
rule
not 
implement rule EndoNoRule
EndoRule
Majority 
decides to
Vote
Program
decides to
implement 
rule
not 
implement rule ExoMinNoRule
ExoMajRule
implement 
rule
not 
implement rule ExoNINoRule
ExoNiRule
(ExoMinRule)
(ExoMajNoRule)
Note: Randomization technique adopted by Dal Bó et al. (2010). After all participants have voted the
program decides randomly whether to consider the votes. In case the votes are not considered, it ran-
domly decides whether to reveal the information about the outcome of the voting stage and thereafter
whether to implement the rule. Consequently, participants could be assigned randomly to eight dif-
ferent treatments. However, only six out of all the treatments are of primary interest, i.e., EndoRule,
EndoNoRule, ExoMajRule, ExoMinNoRule, ExoNiRule, and ExoNiNoRule. The two remaining treatments,
i.e., ExoMinRule and ExoMajNoRule, are not considered in the following analysis and, therefore, placed
in parentheses.
I complement the existing literature by combining the experiments by Tyran and Feld
(2006) and Dal Bó et al. (2010) in order to test whether the effect of a weak and non-
deterrent contribution rule in a public goods game depends on how it has been imple-
mented. The corresponding randomization strategy is summarized in Figure 6.2. First,
all three participants per group vote simultaneously and anonymously in a referendum
on whether to enact the rule or not. Second, the computer randomly chooses whether
to consider the votes in each group. If the computer considers the votes, the majority
wins. If the computer does not consider the votes, it randomly chooses whether or not
to reveal the information regarding the outcome of the referendum and, in a second
step, whether or not to impose the rule exogenously.
After the voting stage, subjects are assigned to treatments (see Figure 6.1). Depending
on votes and the randomization technique, they are informed whether the computer
randomly chose to consider votes and whether the rule is implemented.76 In case par-
76Subjects were informed that the computer will randomly decide. However, following Dal Bó et al.
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ticipants do receive the information about the outcome of the voting stage, they not
learn the exact distribution of votes. They learn whether at least two subjects or at the
most one subject per group voted for the rule.
The eight possible treatments are denoted as EndoRule, EndoNoRule, ExoMajRule, Ex-
oMinRule, ExoMajNoRule, ExoMinNoRule, ExoNiRule, and ExoNiNoRule (see Figure 6.2).
Endo denotes that the votes of the group were considered and Exo denotes that the
computer overrode the votes. Rule denotes that the rule is implemented versus NoR-
ule. In case the information regarding the outcome of the referendum is available, Maj
denotes that the majority of the group supported the rule, Min denotes that only a
minority supported the rule. Ni denotes that this information is not available.77
After Part II has been completed, agents fill in a final questionnaire on socio demo-
graphic characteristics as well as attitudes and values adapted from established value
surveys (World Value Survey 2014). I included questions to measure participants’ trust
level, locus of control, political preferences and political commitments as well as their
acceptance of authorities. The experiment was conducted at the mLab of the Uni-
versity of Mannheim, Germany. I used the experimental software z-Tree developed
by Fischbacher (2007) for programming, and participants were recruited via ORSEE
(Greiner 2015). I conducted 17 sessions between October 2016 and June 2017 with a
total of 270 participants.78 A session lasted on average slightly more than 60 minutes
and participants earned on average 11.60 euros, with a maximum of 18.00 euros and a
minimum of 5.00 euros.
(2010) they were not informed about the exact probabilities. The instructions said that “the computer
will randomly choose whether to consider the votes or not in your group”, “it will randomly choose
whether to reveal the outcome of the voting stage or not” and “it will randomly choose whether to
implement the contribution rule or not”. Instructions and screenshots are provided in the appendix.
77Only six out all eight possible treatments are of central importance for the following analysis, i.e., En-
doRule, EndoNoRule, ExoMajRule, ExoMinNoRule, ExoNiRule, ExoNiNoRule. The program, however,
decides randomly whether to consider votes, and in case the votes are not considered, whether to re-
veal the information of the voting stage and thereafter to implement the rule. It is thus possible that
the votes are not considered, the rule exogenously implemented (not implemented) and participants
informed that a majority of their group members are against (in favor of) the rule, i.e., ExoMinRule,
ExoMajNoRule. The function of the information treatments is to provide the necessary intermediate
steps between the exogenously imposed and democratically chosen treatments. This is done by com-
paring participants with the same information of the outcome of the referendum across treatments,
i.e., EndoRule vs. ExoMajRule and EndoNoRule vs. ExoMinNoRule. Following this logic, there is no
equivalent for ExoMinRule and ExoMajNoRule under democracy. Therefore, both treatments are not
considered in my analysis.
78Panel A of Table 6.2 summarizes the number of participants by treatment and vote. The two treat-
ments ExoMinRule and ExoMajNoRule are irrelevant for my analysis, therefore the results are based
on the 213 participants in the treatments of primary interest, i.e., EndoRule, EndoNoRule, ExoMajRule,
ExoMinNoRule, ExoNiRule, and ExoNiNoRule.
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6.3 Results
Figure 6.3: Contributions by treatment
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Note: Average contributions to the public good in LabDollar (LD) by round and vote stage results. In
Part I, all participants play a voluntary contribution mechanism. After Part I participants vote in a ref-
erendum on whether or not to enact the contribution rule. Depending on individual votes and the ran-
domization strategy described in Section 6.2 participants are assigned to treatments in Part II. EndoRule
(EndoNoRule): contribution rule is democratically chosen (rejected). ExoMajRule (ExoMinNoRule):
contribution rule is externally imposed (not imposed) and participants receive the information that the
majority (minority) of their group supported the rule. ExoRule (ExoNoRule): contribution rule is ex-
ternally imposed (not imposed).
Average contributions to the public good over rounds and across treatments in both
parts of the experiment are summarized in Figure 6.3. In the first part of the exper-
iment, both the level of contributions to the public good as well as the pattern are
comparable to other voluntary contribution mechanisms (e.g., Ledyard 1995; Zelmer
2003; Chaudhuri 2011). In Part I, participants contribute on average 6.99 LD to the pub-
lic good and contributions decrease over rounds with an average of 10.40 LD in round
1 and 3.63 LD in round 10. Although all participants played a standard voluntary
contribution mechanism without any interventions in the first ten rounds, there are
differences across treatments in terms of participants’ contributions, especially at the
end of Part I. According to a Kruskal-Wallis test, contributions cannot be considered
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as equal across treatments in the last five (p-value: 0.066) and three (p-value: 0.040)
rounds of the first part of the experiment. More precisely, in round 10 participants in
ExoNiNoRule contribute on average 1.25 LD to the public good and therefore signific-
antly less than participants in the other treatments.79 Therefore, even before the voting
stage and the assignment to treatments, participants cannot be considered statistically
identical in terms of contribution levels.
In line with previous evidence on the restart effect in prisoner’s dilemma games (e.g.,
Andreoni and Miller 1993) and public goods games (e.g., Andreoni 1988), contribu-
tions increase at the beginning of the second part of the experiment (see Figure 6.3).
The increase is much larger in case the rule is implemented, which leads to substantial
differences across treatments in Part II (p-value: 0.000, Kruskal-Wallis test) and espe-
cially in round 11 (p-value: 0.000, Kruskal-Wallis test).80
In order to estimate and disentangle the effect of democratic participation, I follow
Dal Bó et al. (2010) and initially focus on behavior in the first round of Part II, i.e.,
round 11. Since participants cannot be considered statistically identical in terms of
cooperation levels in the first part of the experiment, I use individual differences in
contribution levels between round 11 (i.e., the first round of Part II) and round 10 (i.e.,
the last round of Part I) as primary outcome variable.
6.3.1 Voting behavior
The vast majority of the 270 participants wanted the rule to be introduced. More pre-
cisely, significantly more participants vote in favor of the rule than against it: 196
(72.59%) yes-voters versus 74 (27.41%) no-voters (p-value: 0.000, Binomial test).
Result 1: Participants vote for rule in the majority of all cases.
The approximately 73% of participants voting for the rule are clearly above the 50%
obtained by Tyran and Feld (2006) and 53% by Dal Bó et al. (2010). However, the in-
tervention of Dal Bó et al. (2010) differs substantially from the rule used by Tyran and
Feld (2006) and in this experiment. The intervention by Dal Bó et al. (2010) affects
the equilibrium of their prisoner’s dilemma. It is comparatively strong intervention
and both mutual defection and cooperation are Nash equilibria. This could explain
the comparatively low level of support.81 I use the same contribution rule as Tyran
and Feld (2006), however, the experiments differ in their protocols. In the experiment
79Differences are robust to corrections for multiple hypothesis testing proposed by List et al. (2016).
80In Part II of the experiment, the differences are also robust to corrections for multiple hypothesis
testing (List et al. 2016).
81See Section 6.2 for a detailed discussion of the differences in interventions.
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Table 6.1: Determinants of voting behavior
Dependent variable: Yes
Coefficients Average
marginal effects
Coop. Part I: Own 0.08**
(0.042)
0.02**
(0.012)
Coop. Part I: Others -0.03
(0.020)
-0.01
(0.006)
Trust -0.06
(0.123)
-0.02
(0.036)
Locus of control 0.15**
(0.058)
0.04***
(0.016)
Obey authority 0.14
(0.179)
0.04
(0.052)
Democrat -0.01
(0.069)
-0.00
(0.020)
Pol. commitment -0.45***
(0.158)
-0.13***
(0.044)
Female -0.41**
(0.205)
-0.12*
(0.058)
Age 0.00
(0.020)
0.00
(0.060)
Constant -0.23
(0.900)
Observations 216 216
Log likelihood -112.031
Note: Probit regression. Coefficients (average marginal effects) with robust standard errors in paren-
theses in column 1 (2). ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable (Yes): 1 if participant
votes for rule and 0 otherwise. Coop. Part I: Own (Others): average own contributions (contributions of
others) in Part I. Trust: index for stated trust level between 0 (low) and 1 (high). Locus of control: stated
locus of control on a scale between 1 (low) and 10 (high). Obey authority: index for stated respect for au-
thorities between 0 (high) and 1 (low). Democrat: stated importance of living in a democratic system on
a scale between 1 (low) and 10 (high). Pol. commitment: index for stated political commitment between
0 (low) and 1 (high).
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by Tyran and Feld (2006) participants do not interact before they vote on whether or
not to impose the contribution rule. In my experiment, in contrast, participants play
ten rounds of a standard public goods game before they vote (see Figure 6.1). The ex-
perience they have made in Part I and the enhanced understanding of the experiment
could drive the differences in voting behavior.
I define the variable Yes, which is a binary variable for whether participants vote in
favor of the rule or not, in order to analyze participants voting behavior in more detail
via estimating a regression model. Results are shown in Table 6.1. In line with Dal Bó
et al. (2010) my results suggest that participants own contributions to the public good
in Part I of the experiment (Coop. Part I: Own) are positively and significantly correl-
ated with voting for the rule. More cooperative participants are more likely to vote for
enacting the rule. In this line, voting for the rule is negatively correlated with the aver-
age contributions of the other group members in Part I (Coop. Part I: Others). However,
the effect does not reach the conventional significant levels. In addition, my findings
suggest that participants who are convinced to be able to control events that affect their
lives (Locus of control) are more likely to vote for the rule. Furthermore, males are more
likely to favor the rule compared to females (Female). Finally, I find that that parti-
cipants’ political commitment (Pol. commitment) affects participants’ voting behavior
significantly. Participants reporting a strong political commitment vote significantly
less frequently for enacting the rule than participants with a weak commitment.
6.3.2 Endogenous vs. exogenous treatments effects: Aggregated analysis
The main results of Part II of the experiment are summarized in Table 6.2. Panel A
shows the number of observations by vote and treatments. Treatment effects shown
in Panel B are estimated by the differences in individual contribution levels between
round 11 (i.e., the first round of Part II) and 10 (i.e., the last round of Part II).82
To start the aggregated analysis I derive the total treatment effect (TotalTrE) of the
democratically chosen rule by comparing the treatment effect in case the rule is demo-
cratically chosen (EndoRule) with the effect if it is democratically rejected (EndoNoRule).
By randomly assigning participants to treatments and conditioning on individual votes,
I can decompose this TotalTrE into four components: the exogenous treatment effect
(ExoTrE), the effect of revealing the information about the outcome of the referendum
(In f oE), the effect of self-selection into treatments (SelE), and the effect of democratic
participation (DemoE).83
82The two treatments ExoMinRule and ExoMajNoRule are not required to estimate and disentangle
the effect of democracy and therefore not considered in Table 6.2. A summary of all individual
contributions in Part I and Part II of the experiment is given in Table 6.6 in the appendix.
83A graphical illustration of the decomposition strategy is provided in Figure 6.5 in the appendix.
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Table 6.2: Summary statistics - individual level data
Considering votes Not considering votes
Information available Information not
available
Vote EndoRule EndoNoRule ExoMajRule ExoMinNoRule ExoNiRule ExoNiNoRule
Panel A. Votes
No 14 14 4 6 13 6
Yes 70 7 29 3 29 18
Total 84 21 33 9 42 24
Panel B. Treatment effects (Differences in individual contributions between round 11 and 10)
No 10.14 1.5 -0.5 1.67 5.54 6.17
Yes 12.67 5.43 12.55 3.67 12.62 8.88
Total 12.25 2.81 10.97 2.33 10.43 8.21
Note: Panel A summarizes the number of observations by vote and result of the voting state across
treatments. Treatment effects are summarized in Panel B. Treatment effects are measured by differences
in individual contribution levels between round 11 (i.e., the first round of Part II) and round 10 (i.e., the
last round of Part I).
In order to structure the analysis, I extend the analysis of Dal Bó et al. (2010) by expli-
citly addressing the effect of information transmitted via the results of the referendum.
In this sense, I denote as g(υ|M, I, R) the proportion of subjects who vote υ ∈ {Y, N}
(in favor or against the rule) given the procedure of implementation M ∈ {Endo, Exo}
(democratically chosen or randomly by the computer), the information available about
the outcome of the voting stage I ∈ {Maj, Min, Ni} (majority or minority support the
rule or no information available), structure of the experiment R ∈ {Rule, NoRule} (rule
imposed or not), and let q(υ|M, I, R) be the difference between contributions in round
11 and round 10 of participants who voted υ given the structure of the experiment R,
the amount of information available I, and the procedure of implementation M.
The statistical inference in this section is based on a series of linear regression models.
Since the decomposition relies on ex-post estimates of linear combinations of regres-
sion coefficients, all regressions are estimated with indicator variables for the different
treatments that are separated for yes- and no-voters and without a constant.84 To ease
interpretation, results of the decomposition analysis are illustrated in Figure 6.4 and
summarized in Table 6.3.
Total Treatment Effect - The first two columns in Panel B of Table 6.2 show that the in-
crease in individual contributions at the beginning of Part II is substantially stronger if
84Results are provided in Table 6.7 in the appendix.
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Figure 6.4: Decomposition analysis
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Note: Estimated total treatment effect (TotalTrE), endogenous treatment effect (EndoTrE), information
treatment effect (In f oTrE), and exogenous treatment effect (ExoTrE). Confidence intervals at the 90%-
level. The information effect (In f oE) is given by the difference between In f oTrE and ExoTrE. The
selection effect (SelE) is given by the TotalTrE and the difference between EndoTrE. The democracy
effect (DemoE) is given by the difference between EndoTrE and In f oTrE.
the rule is democratically chosen than democratically rejected: 12.25 vs. 2.81. Follow-
ing Dal Bó et al. (2010), I can calculate the TotalTrE as weighted average of individual
contributions by participants’ voting behavior if I use the proportion of participants
who vote for and against the rule as weights.
TotalTrE = ∑υ∈{Y,N}[g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)q(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)
−g(υ|Endo, Min, NoRule)q(υ|Endo, Min, NoRule)].
This shows that participants contribute on average 9.44 LD more to the public good
in case the rule is democratically chosen than democratically rejected (p-value: 0.000,
Table 6.3 - row 1).85 This first observation can be summarized by establishing the fol-
lowing result:
Result 2: Contributions are higher if the rule is democratically chosen than if it is
democratically rejected.
85TotalTrE = ( 1484 ∗ 10.14 + 7084 ∗ 12.67) − ( 1421 ∗ 1.50 + 721 ∗ 5.43) = 9.44. If not mentioned otherwise,
the statistical analyzis in this section is based on linear regression models presented in Table 6.7
in the appendix. Test statistics and p-values correspond to Wald tests based on respective linear
combinations of regression coefficients presented in Table 6.7.
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In case both treatments are exogenously imposed and participants do not receive the
information about the outcome of the referendum, the rule does not significantly in-
crease contribution levels (ExoNiRule: 10.43 vs. ExoNiNoRule: 8.21, p-value: 0.357).
Moreover, by simply comparing these two effects I can replicate the finding by Tyran
and Feld (2006) that the effect of the rule is stronger under democracy than if treat-
ments are exogenously given (9.44 vs. 2.22, p-value: 0.024).86
However, the TotalTrE captures at least two changes. A change in treatments (EndoRule
vs. EndoNoRule) and, by design, a change in the proportion of yes- and no-voters
across treatments. Furthermore, under democracy participants do know the outcome
of the referendum. This is not the case if treatments are exogenously given and could
also affect their behavior. Before we take potential effects of self-selection into treat-
ments and the information transmitted via voting into account the naive comparison
between endogenously and exogenously implemented treatments could be biased. By
conditioning on the proportion of yes- and no-voters or the contributions per treat-
ment, I can separate the TotalTrE into an endogenous treatment effect (EndoTrE) and
a selection effect (SelE).
Endogenous Treatment Effect - The EndoTrE leaves the proportion of yes- and no-voters
constant and captures only the endogenous change in the structure of the experiment.
EndoTrE = ∑υ∈{Y,N} g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)[q(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)
−q(υ|Endo, Min, NoRule)].
In other words, it measures the effect of changing treatments democratically assuming
that the proportion of yes- and no-voters is the same in both treatments. With 7.47 LD
the effect loses some of its strength, but contributions are still significantly higher in
case the rule is democratically chosen than if it is rejected (p-value: 0.006, Table 6.3 -
row 1).87 That the EndoTrE is de facto slightly below the TotalTrE indicates a weak and
positive effect of self-selection into treatments under democracy.
Selection Effect - The SelE is given by the difference between the TotalTrE and the
EndoTrE. It captures the effect of the change in the proportion of yes- and no-voters in
EndoRule and EndoNoRule leaving the contributions constant across treatments.
86Under democracy, a comparison of average contributions in EndoRule (12.25) and EndoNoRule (2.81)
reveals a treatment effect of 9.44 LD. Following this logic and simply comparing average contribution
in ExoNiRule (10.43) and ExoNiNoRule (8.21) leads to a treatment effect of 2.22 LD in case treatments
are exogenously imposed.
87EndoTrE = 1484 ∗ (10.14− 1.50) + 7084 ∗ (12.67− 5.43) = 7.47.
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SelE = ∑
υ∈{Y,N}
[g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)− g(υ|Endo, Min, NoRule)]q(υ|Endo, Min, NoRule).
The effect of self-selection is given by 1.97 LD.88 In line with Dal Bó et al. (2010) this
indicates that yes-voters show the tendency to contribute more to the public good than
no-voters across treatments. However, the selection effect is statistically indistinguish-
able from zero (p-value: 0.282, Table 6.3 - row 1).
Exogenous Treatment Effect - The ExoTrE captures the change in contributions to the
public good due to an exogenous change in treatments in case participants do not re-
ceive any information about the outcome of the voting stage. As in the endogenous
treatment effect, it leaves the proportion of yes- and no-voters constant across treat-
ments in order to take the effect of self-selection into account.
ExoTrE = ∑υ∈{Y,N} g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)[q(υ|Exo, Ni, Rule)
−q(υ|Exo, Ni, NoRule)].
The ExoTrE is given by 3.01 LD and statistically indistinguishable from zero (p-value:
0.253, Table 6.3 - row 1).89 In case treatments are exogenously given, the rule does not
affect participants’ contribution behavior. In line with Tyran and Feld (2006), this leads
to the following result:
Result 3: In case treatments are exogenously imposed, the rule does not increase con-
tributions.
Information Treatment Effect - Analogous to the ExoTrE the information treatment ef-
fect (In f oTrE) captures the change in contributions due to an exogenous change in
treatments and leaves the proportion of yes- and no-voters constant. In addition, the
information about the outcome of the voting stage is revealed.
In f oTrE = ∑
υ∈{Y,N}
g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)[q(υ|Exo, Maj, Rule)− q(υ|Exo, Min, NoRule)].
I can calculate this effect as 7.04 LD.90 In case treatments are exogenously given and the
information about the outcome of the referendum is revealed the rule does significantly
affect participants’ contribution behavior (p-value: 0.002, Table 6.3 - row 1).
88SelE = ( 1484 − 1421 ) ∗ 1.5+ ( 7084 − 721 ) ∗ 5.43 = 1.97.
89ExoTrE = 1484 ∗ (5.54− 6.17) + 7084 ∗ (12.62− 8.88) = 3.01.
90 In f oTrE = 1484 ∗ (−0.50− 1.67) + 7084 ∗ (12.55− 3.67) = 7.04.
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Information Effect - In order to isolate the effect of the information transmitted by the
voting stage, I use the difference between the information treatment effect (In f oTrE)
and the exogenous treatment effect (ExoTrE). Therefore, the information effect (In f oE)
leaves the proportion of yes- and no-voters, the treatments and how they have been
imposed constant and only captures the effect of revealing the outcome of the voting
stage.
In f oE = ∑υ∈{Y,N} g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)
[(q(υ|Exo, Maj, Rule)− q(υ|Exo, Min, NoRule))
−(q(υ|Exo, Ni, Rule)− q(υ|Exo, Ni, NoRule))].
It is given by 4.03 LD, but the difference is statistically not different from zero (p-value:
0.239, Table 6.3 - row 1).91
Democracy Effect - Finally, the democracy effect (DemoE) captures the effect of choosing
treatments democratically. It is measured by the difference between the endogenous
treatment effect (EndoTrE) and the information treatment effect (In f oTrE). It leaves the
proportion of yes- and no-voters, the information available and respective treatments
constant. Only the procedure how treatments have been implemented changes.
DemoE = ∑υ∈{Y,N} g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)
[(q(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)− q(υ|Endo, Min, NoRule))
−(q(υ|Exo, Maj, Rule)− q(υ|Exo, Min, NoRule))].
The DemoE is given by 0.43 LD and indicates that democratic participation does not
affect contributions directly (p-value: 0.900, Table 6.3 - row 1).92 This leads to the
following result:
Result 4: After controlling for self-selection into treatments and information transmit-
ted via voting, democratic participation does not affect contributions.
Decomposition - Having calculated all the different effects, I can decompose the total
treatment effect of 9.44 LD into four components. It can be rewritten as TotalTrE =
ExoTrE + In f oE + SelE + DemoE.
The TotalTrE is given by the effect of the rule if treatments are exogenously imposed
(ExoTrE = 3.01), the effect of revealing the outcome of the referendum (In f oE = 4.03),
91 In f oE = 1484 ∗ (−0.50− 1.67) + 7084 ∗ (12.55− 3.67)− ( 1484 ∗ (5.54− 6.17) + 7084 ∗ (12.62− 8.88) = 4.03.
92DemoE = 1484 ∗ (10.14− 1.50) + 7084 ∗ (12.67− 5.43)− ( 1484 ∗ (−0.50− 1.67) + 7084 ∗ (12.55− 3.67)) = 0.43.
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Table 6.3: Summary of aggregated effects
TotalTrE EndoTrE SelE ExoTrE In f oTrE In f oE DemoE
Basis ↓
(1) Differences in
contributions between
round 11 and 10
9.44***
(1.379)
7.47***
(2.626)
1.97
(1.813)
3.01
(2.605)
7.04***
(2.185)
4.04
(3.400)
0.43
(3.416)
(2) Contributions in round
11
7.95***
(1.583)
7.02***
(2.579)
0.93
(2.03)
6.47***
(2.32)
7.47**
(3.652)
0.93
(4.327)
-0.45
(4.471)
(3) Average contributions in
Part II
6.85***
(1.926)
6.52***
(1.919)
0.33**
(0.161)
7.56***
(2.701)
6.41*
(3.706)
-1.15
(4.587)
0.109
(4.174)
Note: Estimated effects with standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Estimates are based on differences between individual contributions in round 11 and 10 (row 1), indi-
vidual contributions in round 11 (row 2), and average contributions in Part II of the experiment (row 3).
Estimates and standard errors are based on coefficients and weighted linear combinations of coefficients
of regressions presented in column (1), (2), and (3) of Table 6.7 in the appendix, respectively.
the effect of self-selection into treatments under democracy (SelE = 1.97), and, fi-
nally, the effect of democratic participation itself (DemoE = 0.43). The decomposition
shows that the effect of democratic participation is not statistically significant and is
also rather low in magnitude. My results suggest that the democratic participation
explains only 5% of the total treatment effect.
The absence of a direct effect of democratic participation is robust to restricting the ana-
lysis to contributions in the first round of Part II of the experiment (see Table 6.3 - row
2) and expanding the analysis to average contributions in all ten rounds of the second
part (see Table 6.3 - row 3).93 By considering only the average contributions in the first
round of Part II, contributions to the public good are on average significantly higher
in case the rule is democratically chosen than if it is democratically rejected (16.00 vs.
8.05, p-value: 0.000) and the TotalTrE is given by 7.95 LD. The TotalTrE consists of
the effect of the exogenously imposed treatments (ExoTrE = 6.47, p-value: 0.007), the
information effect (In f oE = 0.997, p-value: 0.818), the effect of self-selection into treat-
ments (SelE = 0.929, p-value: 0.649), and the direct effect of democratic participation
(DemoE = −0.446, p-value: 0.921). By expanding the analysis to all ten rounds of Part
II of the experiment, the TotalTrE amounts to 6.85 LD (p-value: 0.001). This effect can
be decomposed into a ExoTrE of 7.56 LD (p-value: 0.005), a In f oE of -1.15 LD (p-value:
0.799), a SelE of 0.33 LD (p-value: 0.040), and a DemoE of 0.109 LD (p-value: 0.979). In
case the analysis is restricted to contributions in round 11 or expanded to the average
93Contributions in the in round 11 and all ten rounds of Part II are shown in Table 6.6 in the appendix.
A summary of all estimated aggregated effects is given in Table 6.3.
182
Democracy and compliance in public good games
of contributions in all ten rounds of Part II, I find that the rule increases contributions
significantly even in case treatments are exogenously given. Furthermore, when giv-
ing participants time to learn and coordinate by considering contributions in all ten
rounds of Part II, the effect of self-selection into treatments becomes more important
and statistically significant.
6.3.3 Endogenous vs. exogenous treatments effects: Individual level analysis
When I control for self-selection into treatments and the information transmitted via
the outcome of the election, the aggregated analysis in Section 6.3.2 shows that demo-
cratic participation does not affect participants’ contribution behavior. However, the
effect may vary across individual types of participants, especially yes- and no-voters,
and could also depend on further individual characteristics.
To take individual heterogeneity into account, I estimate a series of linear regression
models separately for yes- and no-voters and control for additional individual at-
tributes. I use linear regressions models with individual differences in contributions
between round 11 (i.e., the first round of Part II) and 10 (i.e., the last round of Part
I) as dependent variable. The difficulty is that participants in groups that choose or
reject the rule democratically may be different from those participants in exogenously
imposed treatments. I can derive unbiased estimates by conditioning on participants’
votes. Furthermore, I can disentangle the effect of democratic participation by condi-
tioning on the information available and the structure of the experiment.
To ease ex-post comparisons of coefficients across the procedure of implementation
(Endo vs. Exo), the information available (Maj vs. Min vs. Ni), and the structure
of the experiment (NoRule vs. Rule), all regressions are estimated without a constant
and indicator variables for the different treatments. Table 6.4 contains the regression
results. More precisely, I can estimate the information effect by comparing contribu-
tions under externally imposed treatments with treatments under exogenously im-
posed treatments where the outcome of the election is revealed, i.e., ExoNiRule vs.
ExoMajRule if the rule is implemented and ExoNiNoRule vs. ExoMinNoRule if it is
not imposed. Following this logic, I estimate the democracy effect by comparing contri-
butions in case the rule is democratically chosen or rejected with contributions in case
treatments are externally imposed and the information about the referendum are avail-
able, i.e., ExoMajRule vs. EndoRule if the rule is implemented and ExoMinNoRule vs.
EndoNoRule if it is not. The main results of this analysis are summarized in Table 6.5.
Among participants who voted in favor of the rule, i.e., yes-voters, there is no evidence
that the information transmitted via voting affect participants’ contribution levels, if
the rule is imposed. According to Table 6.4 - column 1, yes-voters contribute 12.62
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Table 6.4: Individual contributions
Dependent variable: Differences in contributions
between round 11 and 10
Yes-voter No-Voter
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EndoRule 12.67***
(1.259)
27.92***
(6.422)
10.14***
(2.454)
-2.27
(9.692)
EndoNoRule 5.43*
(2.917)
22.51***
(7.658)
1.50
(0.964)
-13.32
(10.096)
ExoMajRule 12.55***
(2.155)
26.08***
(6.939)
-0.50
(0.459)
-11.03
(10.592)
ExoMinNoRule 3.67**
(1.551)
17.16**
(7.357)
1.67**
(0.721)
-12.15
(9.34)
ExoNiRule 12.62***
(2.426)
28.13***
(6.558)
5.54*
(3.105)
-6.35
(9.89)
ExoNiNoRule 8.88***
(1.716)
21.89***
(6.558)
6.17**
(3.019)
-6.85
(9.463)
Coop. Part I: Own -0.508
(0.374)
-1.42
(0.83)
Coop. Part I: Others -0.08
(0.200)
0.59
(0.432)
Trust -0.684
(1.068)
-0.28
(1.837)
Locus of control 0.65
(0.522)
-0.89
(1.09)
Obey authority 3.50**
(1.652)
-2.61
(2.83)
Democrat -1.56***
(0.523)
1.63
(1.284)
Pol. commitment 0.79
(1.44)
3
(2.779)
Female 0.64
(1.436)
3.56
(3.276)
Age -0.07
(0.186)
0.13
(0.187)
Observations 156 123 57 42
Adj. R2 0.644 0.726 0.403 0.565
Note: OLS regressions. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the group level. ∗p < 0.1,
∗∗p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗p < 0.01. In order to ease the ex-post comparisons of coefficients, all regressions are
estimated without a constant. Regressions are done for yes-voters (column 1, 2) and no-voters (column
3,4) separately. Differences in individual contributions between round 11 and 10 are the dependent
variable. The independent variables are indicator variables for the different treatments. Further control
variables, see Section 6.3.1.
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Table 6.5: Summary of individual effects
Information effect Democracy effect
Rule No Rule Rule No Rule
ExoMajRule
vs.
ExoNiRule
ExoMinNoRule
vs.
ExoNiNoRule
EndoRule
vs.
ExoMajRule
EndoNoRule
vs.
ExoMinNoRule
Ye
s-
vo
te
rs
(1) Without
control
variable
0.07
(3.245)
5.22**
(2.313)
0.12
(2.496)
1.76
(3.304)
(2) With
control
variables
2.05
(2.943)
4.73
(4.481)
1.84
(2.391)
5.35
(5.53)
N
o-
vo
te
rs
(3) Without
control
variable
6.04*
(3.139)
4.5
(3.104)
10.64***
(2.496)
-0.17
(1.204)
(4) With
control
variables
4.67
(8.088)
5.30
(3.699)
8.75*
(4.871)
-1.17
(2.40)
Note: Estimated effects with standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Estimations are based on differences between individual contributions in round 11 and 10. Estimates
and standard errors in row 1 (2, 3, 4) are based the comparison of coefficients of regressions presented
in column 1 (2, 3, 4) of Table 6.4, respectively, and shown separately for yes- and no-voters with and
without consideration of control variables.
LD if the rule is exogenously given and 12.55 LD if it is exogenously imposed and, in
addition, the information about the outcome of the election is revealed (p-value: 0.983,
Table 6.5 - row 1). In case the rule is not imposed (8.88 vs. 3.67), in contrast, I find
evidence for an information effect (p-value: 0.027, Table 6.5 - row 1). However, this
effect is not robust to controlling for further individual characteristics (21.89 vs. 17.16,
p-value: 0.296, Table 6.5 - row 2). Furthermore, I do not find an effect of democratic
participation among yes-voters. Neither in case the rule is implemented (12.67 vs.
12.55, p-value: 0.962, Table 6.5 - row 1) nor in case it is not implemented (8.88 vs. 5.43,
p-value: 0.560, Table 6.5 - row 1).94 This supports Result 4 that democratic participation
does not affect contributions after controlling for self-selection and taking into account
the information effect.
For no-voters, revealing the outcome of the election does affect participants’ contribu-
tions when the rule is externally imposed (5.54 vs. -0.5, p-value: 0.061, Table 6.5 - row
94This is robust to controlling for further individual attributes (see Table 6.4 - column 2 and Table 6.5 -
row 2.
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3). However, this information effect is not robust and not statistically significant when
I control for further individual characteristics (-6.35 vs. -11.03, p-value: 0.567, Table 6.5
- row 4). When the rule is not imposed, the information about the outcome of the refer-
endum does also not have a statistically significant effect (6.17 vs. 1.67, p-value: 0.155,
Table 6.4 - row 3). In case the rule is not imposed, there is no effect of participation
(1.67 vs. 1.50, p-value: 0.891, Table 6.5 - row 3). The effect of participation is, in con-
trast, positive and statistically significant if the rule is implemented. More precisely,
the difference in contribution levels between round 11 (i.e., the first round of Part II)
and 10 (i.e., the last round of Part I) is -0.5 LD if the rule is externally imposed and
participants receive the information about the outcome of the referendum. In case the
rule is democratically chosen, this difference amounts to 10.14 LD (Table 6.4 - column
3). This shows a positive democracy premium among no-voters if the rule is imposed
(p-value: 0.000, Table 6.5 - row 3). This effect is robust to regressions controlling for
additional individual characteristics (-11.03 vs. -2.27, p-value: 0.082, Table 6.5 - row 4).
However, this effect is not strong enough to drive aggregate results.
6.4 Summary and concluding remarks
This experiment contributes to the literature on endogenous institutions in social dilam-
ma situations by investigating if, how, and why democratic participation increases
participants’ willingness to comply with a non-deterrent rule which aims at foster-
ing cooperation. My experimental design enables me to identify and separate poten-
tial drivers of the effect of democratic participation. I can determine to what extent
the effect is driven by self-selection into the rule, information transmitted by voting,
and democracy per se.Tyran and Feld (2006) report that a non-deterrent contribution
rule is more effective if it is endogenously chosen by voting than externally imposed.
However, they do not explicitly take into account effects of self-selection and inform-
ation transmitted via voting. Focusing on a deterrent intervention which transforms
their prisoner’s dilemma into a coordination problem, Dal Bó et al. (2010) suggest a
randomization strategy to derive an unbiased estimate of the effect of democratic par-
ticipation.
I complement the existing literature by combining the key elements of Tyran and Feld
(2006) and Dal Bó et al. (2010) experiments to test whether the effect of a non-deterrent
contribution rule depends on whether is has been endogenously chosen via a demo-
cratic decision-making process or externally imposed and, if so, to what extent this is
driven by self-selection into treatments, the information transmitted via voting, and
democratic participation per se. Investigating a non-deterrent contribution rule en-
ables me to investigate the willingness of participants to follow a rule which is for the
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common good, but at odds with their individual free-riding incentives. This is a cent-
ral characteristic of many interactions in real life social dilemmas which are subject to
non-deterrent policies which do not affect underlying incentive schemes. In an envir-
onmental policy context, for instance, either no supranational authorities exist in order
to enforce international environmental policies (e.g., Barrett 2010), or, in case authorit-
ies exist at the local level, they lack capacities and resources to actually enforce policies
(e.g., Ostrom 1990; Kroll et al. 2007). Furthermore, deterrent rules set strong incent-
ives and, thus, there is no conflict between cooperation and compliance what increases
participants’ willingness to follow the rule.
In line with the existing literature, I find that contributions to the public good are sig-
nificantly higher if the rule is democratically chosen than if it is democratically rejec-
ted. In case treatments are exogenously given, in contrast, the contribution rule does
not affect participants’ contribution behavior. A naive comparison would suggest that
the contribution rule is more effective in fostering contributions to the public good in
case treatments are endogenously chosen than in case treatments are externally given.
However, this comparison neglects potential confounding factors and does not neces-
sarily prove that democratic participation increases participants’ willingness to com-
ply with a non-deterrent contribution rule. More precisely, my decomposition reveals
that the apparently different effects are not directly driven by democratic participation
per se. Democratic participation does not affect participants’ contribution behavior if
I take into account self-selection into treatments and the information transmitted by
revealing the outcome of the referendum.
Of course, it is very difficult to make direct generalizations from my experiment, not
at least because of the fact that I study students’ behavior in an environment where
they know they are being observed which might lead to higher willingness to follow
the rule. Furthermore, due to my randomization strategy and the high amount of par-
ticipants supporting the rule, participants are distributed unequally across treatments.
It becomes thus more difficult to provide evidence for a statistically significant effect
of democratic participation in my experiment. However, my findings not only indic-
ate that democratic participation does not directly and significantly affect participants’
compliance with a non-deterrent contribution rule, it is also shown that democratic
participation explains only about 5% of the overall treatment effect. Therefore, the
effect of participation appears to be neither of statistical nor economic significance.
This is not necessarily a contradiction to the postulate that democratic participation
actually affects behavior. My findings rather show that the effect of choosing a non-
deterrent intervention which aims at fostering cooperation in a social dilemma situ-
ation is a conglomerate of different sub-effects of participation. Differences with the
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existing literature suggest that the effect of participation depends on the type of the
intervention. While Dal Bó et al. (2010) find a positive democracy premium in case of
a deterrent contribution rule, my experiment does not provide evidence that people
are more willing to follow a weak and non-deterrent rule if it is democratically chosen
than externally given. This suggests that democratic participation can motivate people
to comply with rules which are in their own interest, but not necessarily with rules
which are at odds with their individual free-riding incentives. Finally, abstracting from
important aspects of democratic decision-making like, for instance, direct communic-
ation, deliberation, and different decisions rules, I follow the experimental literature
and reduce democratic participation to voting. It is not the purpose of this paper to
capture democratic decision-making in all this facets, but this could be a an interesting
and important route for further research.
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6.5 Appendix
6.5.1 Figures
Figure 6.5: Illustration of the decomposition analysis
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Note: The total treatment effect (TotalTrE) captures the difference in contributions in EndoRule and
EndoNoRule. The information treatment effect (In f oTrE) is derived by comparing contributions in
ExoMajLaw and ExoMinNoLaw and the exogenous treatment effect (ExoTrE) by comparing contribu-
tions in ExoNiLaw and ExoNiNoLaw. The information effect (In f oE) captures the difference between
In f oTrE and ExoTrE. The TotalTrE can be decomposed into a selection effect (SelE) and the endogen-
ous treatment effect (EndoTrE). The democracy effect (DemoE) captures the difference between EndoTrE
and In f oTrE.
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6.5.2 Tables
Table 6.6: Summary statistics - individual level data (all)
Considering
votes
Not considering votes
Information available Information not
available
Vote EndoRule EndoNoRule ExoMajRule ExoMinRule ExoMajNoRule ExoMinNoRule ExoNiRule ExoNiNoRule
Panel A. Votes
No 14 14 4 9 8 6 13 6
Yes 70 7 29 3 37 3 29 18
Total 84 21 33 12 45 9 42 24
Panel B. Average contributions in Part I
No 5.52 6.80 7.65 7.41 5.29 7.75 5.9 5.38
Yes 7.52 7.87 8.85 10.27 6.25 5.63 7.11 5.33
Total 7.19 7.16 8.71 8.13 6.08 7.04 6.74 5.34
Panel C. Contributions at the end of Part I (round 10)
No 3.43 5.93 2.50 0.56 1.25 5.00 4.23 1.67
Yes 3.81 3.86 4.34 5.33 3.35 3.33 4.76 1.11
Total 3.75 5.24 4.12 1.75 2.98 4.44 4.60 1.25
Panel D. Treatment effects (Differences in individual contributions between round 11 and 10)
No 10.14 1.5 -0.5 12.22 6.25 1.67 5.54 6.17
Yes 12.67 5.43 12.55 4.67 6.70 3.67 12.62 8.88
Total 12.25 2.81 10.97 10.33 6.62 2.33 10.43 8.21
Panel E. Contributions at the beginning of Part II (round 11)
No 13.57 7.43 2.00 12.78 7.5 6.67 9.77 7.83
Yes 16.49 9.29 16.90 10.00 10.05 7.00 17.38 10.00
Total 16.00 8.05 15.09 12.08 9.60 6.78 15.02 9.46
Panel F. Average contributions in Part II
No 10.90 5.24 4.45 8.92 5.84 6.25 8.26 4.17
Yes 12.60 5.90 13.00 12.23 6.53 4.87 13.00 4.87
Total 12.31 5.46 11.97 9.75 6.41 6.06 12.15 5.28
Note: Panel A summarizes the number of observations by vote and result of the voting state across
treatments. Average contributions in Part I of the experiment are summarized in Panel B. Individual
contributions at the end of Part I (i.e., the last round of Part I) and the first round of Part II (i.e., the first
round of Part II) are summarized in Panel C and E, respectively. Differences in individual contribution
levels between the first round of Part II and the last round of Part I are summarized in Panel D. Average
contributions in Part II of the experiment are summarized in Panel E.
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Table 6.7: Estimates for aggregated effects
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3)
Differences in
contributions
between round 11
and 10
Contributions in
round 11
Average
contributions in
Part II
EndoRule-Y 12.67***
(1.272)
16.49***
(0.839)
12.60***
(1.12)
EndoNoRule-Y 5.43*
(2.947)
9.29***
(3.033)
5.9***
(1.573)
ExoMajRule-Y 12.55***
(2.177)
16.90***
(1.180)
13***
(1.516)
ExoMinNoRule-Y 3.67**
(1.567)
7.00*
(3.991)
4.87
(3.736)
ExoNiRule-Y 12.62***
(2.451)
17.38***
(1.256)
13.90***
(1.784)
ExoNiNoRule-Y 8.89***
(1.73)
10.00***
(2.072)
5.64***
(2.102)
EndoRule-N 10.14***
(2.3936)
13.57***
(2.474)
10.9***
(1.8)
EndoNoRule-N 1.50
(0.940)
7.43***
(1.914)
5.24***
(1.59)
ExoMajRule-N -0.50
(0.448)
2.00
(1.791)
4.45**
(1.95)
ExoMinNoRule-N 1.67**
(0.7037)
6.67***
(1.862)
6.65**
(2.73)
ExoNiRule-N 5.54*
(3.029)
9.77***
(2.837)
8.26***
(2.517)
ExoNiNoRule-N 6.17**
(2.945)
7.83***
(2.548)
4.17*
(2.349)
Observations 213 213 213
Adj. R2 0.612 0.795 0.776
Note: OLS regressions. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Differences in individual contributions
between round 11 and 10 are the dependent variable in column (1). In column (2), individual contri-
butions in round 11. In column (3), average contributions in all ten rounds of Part II are the dependent
variable. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the group level. In order to ease the ex-post es-
timates of weighted linear combinations of coefficients, all regressions are estimated without a constant
and indicator variables for the different treatments that are separated for yes- and no-voters. Indicator
variables for yes-voters (no-voters) receive the corresponding suffix -Y (-N).
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6.5.3 Instructions
[Translated from German]†
Welcome!
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Please do not talk to other participants
and turn off all electronic devices such as phones for the whole course of this session.
Please read the instructions carefully and raise your hand if you have any questions.
This experiment regards individual decision behaviour. At the end of the experiment,
you will receive an individual payment anonymously and in cash. Your payment will
be based on the decisions you and your fellow participants will have taken as well as
a random component. During the experiment, your payment will be calculated in so-
called LaborDollar (LD). After the experiment, the total sum of LD will be converted
into euros. The exchange rate is:
2 LD = 1 euro.
During the experiment, you will take your decisions anonymously. Only the exper-
imenter will know about your identity. Of course, all provided information will be
treated in strict confidence.
Rules of the experiment
The experiment consists of two parts (Part I and Part II). For the whole course of the
experiment, all participants are divided into groups of three. The group constellations
do not change and every participant inside their respective group will face the same
decision scenarios.
Part I
In Part I, we will ask you and your fellow participants to take decisions in ten separate
rounds. At the beginning of each round, you and your fellow group members will be
endowed with 20 LD, respectively. You (as well as your fellow group members) will
then have to decide on the amount of LD that you wish to contribute to a joint project.
Your contribution, q, can be between be 0 and 20 LD.
The individual payment (in LD) for all three participants is calculated as follows:
Payment = (20 – Contribution of the participant) + 0.5·(Total sum of contributions)
As an example, if the other two group members contribute together 40 LD while your
contribution is 10 LD, your individual payment will be calculated as follows:
Payment = (20 – 10) + 0.5·(40 + 10) = 35
If on the other hand, both group members contribute 40 LD in total and you refrain
from paying by entering 0 LD, your individual payment will be calculated as follows:
†Explanatory notes are given in square brackets.
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Payment = (20 – 0) + 0.5·(40 + 0) = 40
Part I consists of ten separate rounds. In each round, you will face the same decision
task and interact with the same two group members. After each decision, you will be
informed on the average values as well as the contributions and payments regarding
the other two group members. At the beginning, there will be two test rounds. They
are not relevant for disbursement.
Part II
As in Part I, we will ask you and your fellow participants to take decisions in ten
separate rounds. You will be part of the same group, which remains unchanged in
its constellation. Again, at the beginning of each round, you and your fellow group
members will be endowed with 20 LD, respectively. The decision tasks are the same
as in Part I. You (as well as your fellow group members) will have to decide on the
amount of LD that you wish to contribute to a joint project. Your contribution, q,
can be between be 0 and 20 LD. Contrary to Part I, it is now possible to introduce a
contribution rule. It stipulates that all group members shall contribute the total sum
of LDs endowed at the beginning (q = 20) to the joint project. Participants who do not
abide by this rule shall pay a fee of 4 LD.
If a participant adheres to the rule (q = 20), their individual payment will be calculated
as follows:
Payment = (20 – 20) + 0.5·(20 + Total sum of contributions made by all the other group
members.)
If a participant refrains from adhering to the rule (q < 20), their individual payment
will be calculated as follows:
Payment = (20 – Contribution of the participant) + 0.5·(20 + Total sum of contributions
made by all the other group members) – 4
As an example, if the other two group members contribute a total sum to the tune of
40 LD while your contribution is 10 LD, your individual payment will be calculated as
follows:
Payment = (20 – 10) + 0.5·(40 + 10) – 4 = 31
If on the other hand, both group members contribute 40 LD in total and you refrain
from paying by entering 0 LD, your individual payment will be calculated as follows:
Payment = (20 – 0) + 0.5·(40 + 0) – 4 = 36
Whether the rule is introduced or not depends on the following: Firstly, the group
decides on introduction of the rule by majority vote. Secondly, it is decided at random,
whether the group’s decision will be taken into account. After the voting, you will be
informed on whether the group’s decision will be taken into consideration.
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• If the group’s decision is taken into account, you will be informed on the voting
results. The decision will be taken based on the group’s majority. For example,
if two out of the three group members vote in favour of the rule, it will be intro-
duced. If only one group member is in favour, the rule will not be introduced.
• If the group’s decision is not taken into account, the decision on introducing the
contribution rule will be taken at random. Furthermore, it is decided at random,
whether you will be informed about the voting results.
In total, the experiment is made up of 20 separate rounds (10 rounds for Part I and 10
rounds for Part II). At the end of the experiment, you will receive the payment of one
of the 20 rounds in euros. The round which will serve as the basis of your payment will
be selected at random. For this reason, we recommend you to decide for each round
as if it was the basis of your payment.
Control Questions (please fill in)
1. Suppose that in Part I, your contribution to the joint project amounted to 15 LD.
The other two group members payed 15 LD in total. What is your individual
payment?
My payment is _______
2. Suppose that in Part I, your contribution to the joint project amounted to 5 LD.
The other two group members payed 15 LD in total. What is your individual
payment? My payment is _______
3. Suppose that in Part I, the two other group members contributed their total ini-
tial sum to the joint project. Which contribution would produce the maximum
individual payment (please tick)? O 0 LD O 5 LD O 10 LD O 15 LD O 20 LD
4. Suppose that in Part I, the two other group members contributed their total ini-
tial sum to the joint project. Which contribution would produce the maximum
payment for your group (please tick)? O 0 LD O 5 LD O 10 LD O 15 LD O 20 LD
5. Suppose that in Part II, the contribution rule was implemented and your con-
tribution to the joint project amounted to 20 LD. The other two group members
payed 20 LD in total. What is your individual payment? My payment is: _____
6. Suppose that in Part II, the contribution rule was implemented and your con-
tribution to the joint project amounted to 10 LD. The other two group members
payed 20 LD in total. What is your individual payment? My payment is: _____
7. Suppose that in Part II, the contribution rule was implemented and the two other
group members contributed their total initial sum to the joint project, respect-
ively. Which contribution would produce the maximum individual payment
(please tick)? O 0 LD O 5 LD O 10 LD O 15 LD O 20 LD
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8. Suppose that in Part II, the contribution rule was implemented and the two other
group members contributed their total initial sum to the joint project, respect-
ively. Which contribution would produce the maximum payment for your group
(please tick)? O 0 LD O 5 LD O 10 LD O 15 LD O 20 LD
Please raise your hand after you finished answering all questions. We will then check
your answers. The experiment will start once all participants have successfully com-
pleted this test.
Good luck!
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6.5.4 Screenshots
[In German]†
Screenshot of the voting stage
Screenshot of the contribution stage [In Part II of the experiment with contribution rule
implemented]
†Explanatory notes are given in square brackets.
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